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Abstract 
The increased incidence of natural disasters over recent decades has been accompanied by a 
corresponding dramatic proliferation of human casualties, economic damage and recovery costs.  
Post-disaster processes are therefore increasingly becoming the paramount focus of disaster-
management stakeholders.  Current research has noted the importance of improving community 
resilience with respect to household capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital, as the 
three main assessment dimensions to enable communities to recover effectively and efficiently 
from future disaster events.  Community resilience involves proactive preparedness and 
mitigation initiatives.  In the context of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the lack of either 
precedent research or functioning post-disaster recovery policies made the 2009 and 2011 flash 
floods in the City of Jeddah extremely serious natural disasters.   
 The principal objective of the research conducted for this thesis was to evaluate the 
importance and implications of the role of the three main assessment dimensions as well as the 
effect of religious aspects that characterized Saudi society during and post-disaster with respect 
to improving flood resilience, speeding recovery, and minimizing the detrimental impact on 
vulnerable communities.  In addition, the optimal utilization of social capital, efficient internal 
cohesion, and effective resource-sharing within and across any community groups to ensure their 
advance preparedness and contribution are also fundamental and critical factors that must be 
addressed if post-disaster recovery is to be sustainable and resilient. 
 The research entailed a literature review, including an examination of the lessons learned 
from the 2009 and 2011 flash floods in the City of Jeddah.  Drawing from the literature, an initial 
resilient post-disaster assessment framework (RPDR-AF) was developed.  The field case study 
involved three sources of information: secondary data, interviews, and field observations. 
Interviewees included household members, government officials, community leaders, and 
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participating NGOs and CBOs.  The empirical analysis combined qualitative and quantitative 
techniques focusing on themes derived from the RPDR-AF. 
 The results of the research indicate a strong correlation between the incorporation of all 
three assessment concepts and the successful planning of a long-term recovery strategy.  The 
research also shows that religious practices and leaders can be strong motivators for the 
implementation of effective overall post-disaster responses and can also deliver significant 
spiritual, emotional, and psychological support for alleviating the trauma associated with the 
recovery process.  Based on the empirical analysis of the research results, a refined framework 
was developed. In addition, general and strategic recommendations were outlined to improve 
disaster resilience for the City of Jeddah.  The framework would be useful for local government, 
decision-makers, volunteer organizations, local citizens (e.g., for perceiving the relevant tasks 
during a flash flood and act quickly accordingly), and relevant major stakeholders related to 
disaster management and recovery.  The model was built based on a hypothetical notion that it 
would suit the study area considering the religious affiliation of the local citizens.  However, 
improvement might be extended considering geographical locations and different socio-
economic circumstances. 
 Future avenues of investigation include improving the implementation of recovery 
planning and management as well as enhancing the knowledge and efficiency associated with the 
restoration, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of the assets and areas affected.  In conclusion, the 
developed framework will provide Saudi authorities with a strategic tool for assessing and 
improving flood resilience and recovery and for reducing the multiple effects of a natural 
disaster, while effectively facilitating an enhanced capacity for resilience in other at-risk Saudi 
communities. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background  
 Natural disasters are relatively frequent occurrences.  For example, at the international 
level, during the ten-year period from 1992 to 2001, losses associated with natural disasters 
averaged about US$65 billion per year, which represents a seven-fold increase since the 1960s 
(Freeman, Keen, & Mani, 2003).  For the same period, the overall damage and impact costs 
totaled more than $1.3 trillion.  Munich Re estimated that by the year 2050, the costs associated 
with disaster events could exceed US$300 billion per year (UNISDR, 2002).  In terms of 
populations affected, approximately 144 million people worldwide were displaced by disasters 
between 2008 and 2012 (Sendai Framework, 2015).  Statistics have shown that in many 
countries, particularly those less developed, appropriate of governmental capacity and hazard 
prevention measures were either not in place or were unable to deal with the disasters that 
occurred (Joakim, 2013).  In the event of a disaster, relief and recovery operations constitute the 
initial tactics aimed at bringing a stricken community back to its former condition.  However, 
many scholars have acknowledged that returning communities and households to pre-disaster 
levels leaves them in a position of susceptibility to future disasters (Mileti, 1999; McEntire, 
1999; McEntire, Fuller, Johnston, & Weber, 2002; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004; 
Birkmann & Fernando, 2008; Joakim, 2013).   
 In many societies affected by disasters, religious ties and beliefs have been important 
features of the cultural and social fabric (Clarke & Jennings, 2008).  Despite the importance of 
religious beliefs, some researchers have considered religion-based interpretations of responses to 
disasters as indicating superstition and backwardness (Chester, Duncan, & Dibben, 2008; Lunn, 
2009; Chester & Duncan, 2008).  However, research has revealed that people may use religion-
based beliefs to rationalize disasters or other traumatic events (Chester et al., 2010; Stephens, 
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Fryberg, Markus, & Hamedani, 2012; Aten, Bennet, Hill, Davis, & Hook, 2012).   In Saudi 
Arabia, floods have becoming an annual disaster with high impact in this region.  Jeddah, a 
coastal Saudi city on the Red Sea to the west, has experienced severe flood events in November 
2009 and December 2011, when flooded waters and sediments (flash flood) inundated the urban 
areas and resulted in deaths of many people and damaged the infrastructure and homesteads at 
urban centers. 
 The disaster-management process or cycle of action is characterized by four pillars: (1) 
preparedness, (2) mitigation, (3) response, and (4) recovery (Henstra & McBean, 2005).  The 
research reported in this thesis was focused on resilient recovery skills as arguably the most 
important pillar for the survival of human communities.  Recent studies of hazards and disasters 
have revealed that, when dealing with the impact of disasters and post-disaster recovery, 
stakeholders experienced recovery processes characterized by a variety of resilience levels 
(Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 1994, p. 265).  Highfield, Peacock, and Van Zandt (2014) 
claimed that in the wake of a disaster, poor and marginalized groups are often subject to higher 
rates of casualties and damage (Highfield et al., 2014), while they are more likely to struggle 
desperately during their recovery (Fothergill & Peek, 2004; Cutter et al., 2008; Tafti, 2015).  
 Vale and Campanella (2005) perceived resilience as the ability of impacted stakeholders 
to create a range of survival opportunities, based on their location, economy, and human 
relations (Vale & Campanella, 2005).  Achieving resilient post-disaster recovery therefore 
involves establishing provisions for mitigating and minimizing the impact of future disaster 
events and exploiting available resources and capacities to their maximum potential.  Early 
concepts of disaster recovery focused on the dark side of disasters that leads to the disruption and 
subsequently to the disorganization of social, economic, and ecological systems.  However, more 
recently, disaster experiences are also being understood to be valuable learning opportunities.  
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Communities recover more strongly through better communication and cooperation among 
community groups, experts, authorities, and different organizations as a result of the increased 
contribution of social capital (Drabek & Key, 1984).  In general, social capital is regarded as the 
capacity of social networks and connections to contribute to enabling and improving the 
interaction of individuals and groups in order to create resilient post-disaster recovery.  The 
researchers believe that taking into account the role and contribution of social capital is a 
significant asset for the development of more resilient, faster, and better recovery after a 
community is hit by a disaster (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Dynes, 2005; Bankoff, 2007).  
 Resilience is a crucial concept that must be taken into consideration whenever 
appropriate and responsive post-disaster recovery plans are developed and implemented, 
especially for communities vulnerable to potential disasters.  For these plans to be effective and 
efficient, they should be drawn well in advance of any anticipated disaster event, and provisions 
should be made for urgent relief needs, such as temporary shelter and medical, food, and 
drinking water supplies, as well as for long-term implementable and affordable rebuilding and 
restoration strategies. 
 As stated by Berke and Campanella (2006), the elements of a basic post-disaster recovery 
plan for any community should include the following provisions: 
1. The envisioning of post-disaster situations along with their potential impact and damage 
2. A directive framework for achieving the vision based on strong facts, goals, and policies 
3. The merging of long-term resilience and short-term recovery considerations in order to 
promote post-disaster rebuilding and restoration capacities that are socially justified, 
economically viable, environmentally sustainable, and less vulnerable 
4. Alignment with the comprehensive picture of regional, provincial, and national disaster 
response and rebuilding policies and plans 
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In a broad sense, Zhou (2009) defined the concept of resilience as “the capacity to resist and 
recover from loss”, and stated that it is “an essential concept in natural hazard research and is 
central to the development of disaster reduction at the local, national, and international levels” 
(Zhou, 2009, p.21-41).  The notion of resilience originally came from the field of ecology 
(Holling, 1973), but has also been employed in other disciplines (Adger, 1997), such as those 
that integrate social sciences and systems with other human-and-environment interactions 
(Carpenter, Walker, Marty, & Abel, 2001; Folke, 2006).  More recently, the concept of resilience 
has begun to be applied in the field of climate change (Timmerman, 1981; Dovers & Handmer, 
1992), as well as in disaster-resistance and -recovery systems (Tierney, 1997; Bruneau et al., 
2003; Rose, 2004).  However, there is still no common consensus about the meaning of 
resilience in relation to post-disaster recovery, especially with respect to low- and middle-income 
communities across countries.  
               To ensure a quick disaster response, rapid rescue intervention, and resilient post-
disaster recovery, researchers in the disaster-management domain have expressed a need for the 
development of comprehensive and standardized assessment tools that will include, as much as 
possible, all contributing variables, players, and stakeholders that are important for a more 
accurate representation of the impact of a disaster and post-disaster recovery (Bates & Peacock, 
1992).  Such a tool will be a crucial source of long-term strategies for building more effective 
sustainable communities and efficient, resilient recovery and restoration efforts.  In the context 
of KSA, due to there was neither a precedent research nor implemented post-disaster recovery 
policies; the 2009 and 2011 flash floods in the City of Jeddah were the most serious natural 
disaster events.  The principle objective of this research is to develop a framework to help guide 
the assessment of resilient post-disaster recovery, minimizing disaster impacts and contributing 
to the efficient recovery of vulnerable communities.  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
 Researchers, humanitarian aid agencies, and government departments have recently 
recognized the importance of improving community resilience with respect to recovering 
sustainably and resiliently from future disaster events.  Enhanced community resilience 
incorporates the implementation of preparedness and mitigation initiatives as part of the post-
disaster recovery process (Joakim, 2013).  While there is an abundance of published literature 
related to the notions of resilience, recovery, and social capital, there is still a need to explore 
more thoroughly the relationships among these notions, particularly within the domain of post-
disaster recovery (e.g., Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Aldrich, 2012).  In the context of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia (KSA), there is virtually no precedent research or post-disaster recovery 
framework that emphasizes household capacity, government roles, and organizational capacity.  
The key hypothesis of this research is that stronger relationships and coordination between the 
household and organizational capacities with special attention to religious dimensions of a 
community are necessary for achieving higher levels of utilization of social capital.  Likewise, 
higher levels of resiliency can be achieved through effective facilitation between internal 
cohesion of stakeholders and resource sharing, whose preparedness and contribution are essential 
to sustainability and resilience after disaster recovery. 
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
 Based on the literature review conducted for this research, and building on the experience 
provided by the case study of the 2009 and 2011 flash floods that occurred in the City of Jeddah, 
KSA, this study identifies current research gaps and emphasizes the important role of social 
capital with special attention to religious dimensions in increasing the resilience of post-disaster 
recovery conditions at the levels of locally- and geographically- related communities.  Based on 
observed, measured, and derived lessons from actual experience acquired from the 2009 and 
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2011 flash floods, a framework was first developed and then tested and revised during the use of 
empirical analysis for assessing the importance and role of contributing factors for building a 
resilient post-disaster recovery framework for flash-flood-prone coastal communities, with a 
special focus on the incorporation of the context of household capacity, organizational capacity, 
and social capital in the City of Jeddah.  The research also provides strategic recommendations to 
authorities for enhancing flood resilience and recovery in other Saudi communities at risk.   
The objectives of this research were as follows: 
1) Focusing on building resilience for post-disaster recovery, develop and test an evaluation 
framework that expressly incorporates the religious dimensions which have a significant 
impact on Saudi society  
2) Using the 2009 and 2011 flash flooding in Jeddah city as case study evaluate the key 
factors that contribute to resilient post-disaster recovery, with a special emphasis on the  
investigation of how religion, religious leaders and institutions affected resilience and 
recovery during and after the two flash flood events 
3) Provide recommendations regarding the enhancement of Jeddah’s capacity to be more 
resilient to future flash flooding 
 This research project poses several research questions, as follows: 
a) How does household capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital with special 
attention to religious dimensions, contribute to resilient post-disaster recovery?  
b) To what extent were there community strengths/deficiencies/gaps during the post-disaster 
recovery phase in the 2009 and 2011 flash floods? 
c) What should the government and community do to improve community resilience and 
post-disaster recovery for the City of Jeddah?  
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1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
 This thesis is organized into seven chapters.  Chapter 1 provides a general overview of 
hazards, disasters, disaster resilience and impact, and post-disaster recovery, as well as a 
summary of the context of hazard research.  Key definitions are introduced, and the importance 
of recovery research in the context of the increasing costs and expected frequency of disaster 
events is highlighted.  Chapter 1 also states the research problem, explains the research goals and 
objectives, lists the research questions, and briefly describes the organization of the thesis. 
 Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of the literature related to pre-disaster and 
post-disaster theories, practices, and acquired experience, as well as the procedures, variables, 
and factors that influence disaster events and disaster recovery.  The importance and roles of the 
relationships among all stakeholders are reviewed, along with an examination of how they can 
contribute to the achievement of sustainable and resilient post-disaster recovery. 
 Chapter 3 introduces the contextual background of KSA and the City of Jeddah including 
location and size, topography, and climate overview.  Chapter 3 also includes background 
information about the historical and legal disaster preparedness and responses and an overview 
of the impact of the 2009 and 2011 Jeddah flash flood events.  This chapter lays the foundation 
for a better understanding of the ways in which the contextual recovery operations, historical 
circumstances, roles and contributions of a variety of stakeholders, and how the relationships in 
place have contributed to the conditions of resilience and marginalization throughout the City of 
Jeddah. 
 Chapter 4 explains the research methodology, including the data collection sources and 
methods and the combined quantitative/qualitative assessment technique used.  The explanation 
of the research methodology also elaborates on methods of data collection and analysis, as well 
as the manipulation and cross-checking of the data sources.  Based on the lessons learned and the 
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resilience exhibited in the post-disaster recovery experiences, theories, and practice, a conceptual 
framework for resilient post-disaster recovery is presented, with a special focus on how the 
concepts of household capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital are organized under 
the proposed assessment framework.  The criteria for selecting the four impacted sites are also 
outlined, thus providing an overview of the living conditions at the affected sites, including 
population, economics, and the significance of cultural and religious factors.  A brief synopsis of 
living conditions and other important factors for the four selected sites is provided, which serves 
as the basis of guidelines for the development of an effective long-term recovery and risk-
reduction strategy.  An overview of the long-term recovery efforts after the 2009 and 2011 
Jeddah flash floods is also outlined and discussed.  
 Chapter Five presents the results and finding of the empirical analysis and learned lessons 
from the case study.  This chapter is organized according to the developed framework and tests 
its key tenets and components. The results are summarized following the concepts of household 
capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital.  
 Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the results, which establishes practical insights into 
these results and links between the findings and resilient post-disaster recovery.  .  These links, 
insights, and the empirical evidence derived from the case study were utilized for improving the 
resilient post-disaster recovery conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 4.   
 Chapter 7 connects all of the research and provides an overview of how the work 
achieved the research objectives.  A number of suggested resilience-enhancing post-disaster 
recovery concepts and strategic recommendations for a variety of stakeholders involved are also 
presented.  To contribute to ongoing research related to resilient post-disaster recovery and 
associated risk reduction, additional topics for further research are highlighted.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Background 
 Henstra and McBean (2005) defined disaster management as the process by which 
societies, groups, and individuals sustainably prevent, reduce, and/or recover from the impact of 
disasters and hazardous events.  According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRCS), the four pillars of disaster management are identified as “the 
organization and management of resources and responsibilities for dealing with all humanitarian 
aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, response and recovery in order to lessen the 
impact of disasters” (IFRCS, 2017).  Disaster management can thus comprise the notions, 
operations, and aspects related to four main areas: (1) preparedness, (2) mitigation, (3) response, 
and (4) recovery (Henstra & McBean, 2005).  Figure 2.1 illustrates the IFRCS definition of 
disaster management. 
 
Figure 2.1: Disaster Management (IFRCS, 2017) 
Simply put, mitigation and preparedness occur prior to a disaster event, while response and 
recovery occur after the event.  Mitigation focuses on activities designed to reduce and/or 
eliminate the risks associated with particular hazards, whereas preparedness includes actions for 
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improving the ability of a community to respond effectively to a disaster event.  Response and 
recovery activities occur during the post-disaster period and represent attempts to meet basic 
needs and then a transition to longer-term rebuilding and recovery processes (EC, 2011).  These 
four pillars of disaster management are intended to be combined in order to reduce potential 
human, infrastructure, and economic losses related to a disaster event (Phillips, 2009).  Of the 
four, resilient post-disaster recovery experience has been the least studied (Barton, 1969; 
Saperstein, & Barbee, 1985; Schwab, 1998; Lloyd-Jones, 2006; Coppola, 2007; Joakim, 2013). 
 As a means of acquiring an understanding of the importance of resilient post-disaster 
recovery in the aftermath of a natural disaster event, a review of the concept, operations, 
processes, and impact of disaster recovery and the related literature was conducted, and the key 
concepts of household and organizational capacities and social capital were examined.  The 
review provides a solid foundation for building the proposed resilient post-disaster recovery 
framework for addressing future flash floods in the City of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA).  
2.2 Disaster Management Cycle 
 As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the disaster-management cycle describes the process through 
which individuals, communities, and organizations prepare for the prevention of, and response 
to, a disaster as well as recover from its extreme impact.  An event is considered a disaster when 
it involves the threat of severe risk of destruction to a community, which will (1) adversely affect 
the community, (2) devastate its local capacities, and (3) trigger the need for external assistance 
and support (Guha-Sapir et al., 2010). 
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Figure 2.2: Disaster Management Cycle (Wood, Boruff, & Smith, 2013) 
Disaster management can start at any stage in the cycle due to the cyclical nature of a disaster 
occurrence.  As shown in Figure 2.2, disaster-management across the cycle involves: (1) the 
prevention/mitigation phase, which ideally involves measures that will prevent or reduce the 
impact of future events, including, for example, the implementation of disaster-resistant building 
codes and appropriate land-use planning; (2) the preparation phase, which includes actions that 
will proactively integrate available resources and local capacities and see related strategies 
enacted; (3) the response phase, which begins immediately after a disaster event and is focused 
on search and rescue, and the provision of medical care and temporary shelter; and (4) the 
recovery phase, which begins as individuals, communities, and organizations start the rebuilding 
process (Smith & Petley, 2009).  While prevention is often regarded as the initial starting point in 
the disaster-management cycle, for the purposes of this thesis work the discussion begins with 
the recovery phase, since recovery operations and efforts in the aftermath of a disaster event 
create critical conditions and windows of opportunity to increase resilience to future events 
Research Focus 
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(Wood et al., 2013). 
2.3 Disaster Recovery Goals 
 Following a disaster, the primary concern for most people is to restore their personal, 
commercial, and administrative activities to pre-disaster levels (Lindell, 2013).  However, 
restoring everything to its previous condition can also be understood as ensuring a return to the 
prior risk state, which is considered unsustainable when associated with activities such as 
building on floodplains or in earthquake-prone areas (Lindell, 2013).  Thus, increasing disaster 
resilience in a community means determining which areas are at greater risk and then defining 
which infrastructure resources and buildings are unfit to withstand the effects of future risk 
events.  According to the American Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
proactively prepared communities that implement disaster-control practices and protection 
approaches will sustainably recover their buildings, assets, land use, and local economies 
(FEMA, 1986; Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006).  In agreement with Lindell (2013), mitigating the 
impact of a disaster, for example, by managing vulnerable populations and areas in order to 
control expected debris flows, is considered a community-protection approach.  Minimizing the 
construction of new buildings in high-risk areas and ensuring that permitted construction adheres 
to building codes designed to mitigate the impacts of likely hazards, falls into the category of 
optimal land-use practices.  Similarly, protecting building contents, including personal 
belongings such as appliances, furniture, and equipment is considered to be an important 
component of resilience.  For instance, using suitable building construction methods, 
technologies, and materials that will resist wind loads and earthquake shakes will protect the 
structural elements of buildings at risk (Lindell, 2013).   
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2.4 Disaster Recovery Process 
 The term “recovery” refers to all aspects of post-disaster activities and outcomes, 
whereas terms such as “reconstruction,” “rehabilitation,” and “restoration” refer to specific 
recovery operations (Joakim, 2013).  Reconstruction almost exclusively denotes the rebuilding of 
physical assets that were damaged or destroyed in the event of a disaster.  Restoration indicates a 
return to pre-disaster conditions related to the physical, economic, and social aspects associated 
with community infrastructure, such as transportation and communications (Haas, Kates, & 
Bowden, 1977).  
 According to Hass, Kates, and Bowden, (1977), there are three operational stages in a 
post-disaster recovery period.  The first is the restoration stage, which can take days or weeks 
and refers to "temporary measures" implemented for repairing affected social systems and 
infrastructure assets in the period immediately following a disaster in order to restore a 
community to its basic functionality.  The second is the reconstruction stage, which can take 
months or years and is aimed at rebuilding fundamental assets to their prior disaster condition 
and returning their status in the community to acceptable service levels.  The third stage is the 
commemorative stage, also known as disaster risk reduction, which is an open-ended process 
intended to inspire, drive, and encourage the foreseeable future development and economic 
growth of the impacted communities (Hass et al., 1977).  Today, the term “commemorative” is 
associated with improvements in pre-existing conditions as opposed to simply a return to pre-
disaster conditions (Quarantelli, 1999).   
2.5 Concept of Post-Disaster Resilience 
 Resilience as a concept and its definition have increasingly appeared in the recent 
literature related to disasters.  The term “resilience” comes from the Latin word resilire, 
meaning “to jump back” or “to recoil”.  Within the current social and biological sciences 
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research domain, resilience indicates a "capacity for successful adaptation in the face of 
disturbance, stress, or adversity” (Norris, Stevens, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008, pp.127-150).  
Accordingly, many scholars refer to resilience as the resources and capacities that allow 
communities and societies to withstand a disaster event or to be restored following an event 
(Foster, 1995; Ronan & Johnston, 2005; Paton, 2006; Joakim, 2013).  Since the concept of 
resilience has been defined and applied differently in a wide array of fields and domains, 
establishing a standardized definition is difficult. 
 In fact, credit for viewing resilience as a concept goes back to Holling’s (1973) 
contribution, and his interpretation has subsequently become more recognized and accepted.  
Today, the term is applied in many fields, including research, practices, mitigation, and relief of 
hazards and disasters.  Timmerman (1981) was likely the first to use the concept of resilience 
with regard to disasters and hazards (Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003).  Resilience was 
defined by Timmerman (1981) as “the degree to which a system or part of a system can deal with 
and recover after a hazardous event” (Klein et. al., 2003, pp.35-45).  Following Timmerman’s 
(1981) definition, many other versions emerged in other fields that deal with hazards and 
disasters (Mayunga, 2007).  Ferrier (2008) defined resilience as the “relative ability of a 
community to absorb the effects of a hazard event and quickly return to normal, or near-normal, 
operations” (Ferrier 2008, p.108).  According to this definition, at least six aspects of post-
disaster resilience can be identified: “(1) personal and familial socio-psychological wellbeing, (2) 
organizational and institutional restoration, (3) economic and commercial resumption of services 
and productivity, (4) reliably restored infrastructure systems, 5) operational regularity of public 
safety and governance, and (6) resilience of ecological systems” (McCreight, 2010, pp.4-5). 
 Paton (2006, p.8) defined resilience as “a measure of how well people and societies can 
adapt to a changed reality and capitalize on the new possibilities offered.”  Alternatively, 
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resilience is also seen as being the opposite of vulnerability, meaning that when social 
susceptibility to disaster is high, resilience levels tend to be low and vice versa.  As stated by 
Klein et al. (2003), the challenge with this definition of resilience is that it involves a circular 
argument. In other words, a community might be vulnerable because of a lack of resilience, and 
lacks resilience because of its vulnerability to risk (Mayunga, 2007).  
 Accordingly, Maguire and Hagan (2007) conceptualized resilience as involving three 
different dimensions: “resistance, recovery, and creativity” (Adger, 2000, pp.347-364).  They 
defined resistance as related to the capacity to withstand an initial impact, while recovery is the 
capacity and time involved for a community to return to its former functionality, and their 
conceptualizations of resilience are commonly found in the literature related to hazards.  Maguire 
and Cartwright (2008) argued that the resistance and recovery dimensions are deterministic since 
they failed to take into account the dynamic nature of people and communities.  As the third 
dimension of Maguire and Hagan’s (2007) model, the creativity dimension relates to improving 
the resilience of a community and restoring its functionality after a disaster event.  To 
incorporate the element of communities actually improving their situations during post-disaster 
recovery, the definition of the creativity dimension includes the capability of “adapting to new 
circumstances and learning from the disaster experience” (Maguire & Hagan, 2007, p.17; Adger, 
2000).  
 As a graphical illustration of the concept of resilience and how it can mitigate the impact 
of a disaster, Figure 2.3 depicts hypothetical recovery paths for two communities.  The first path, 
indicated by the bolded line, represents a more resilient community, while the dotted-line path 
designates a less resilient community (Zhang, 2006).  These two paths denote sequential changes 
in the hypothetical communities over time during the following four phases: (1) pre-disaster, (2) 
disaster, (3) restoration, and (4) long-term recovery.  Figure 2.3 suggests that a more resilient 
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community will often be subject to fewer effects and will recover more quickly, while a 
community with less resilience will endure a more significant impact and will take longer to 
recover (Mayunga, 2007). 
 
Figure 2.3: Hypothetical Trajectories for Resilient and Less Resilient Communities (modified 
from Zhang, 2006) 
2.6 Social Capital   
 Social capital is related to the ties that bind people together (Cohen & Arato, 1992; 
Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000; Castiglione, van Deth, & Wolleb, 2008).  Social capital can be also 
understood as the ability of individuals, groups, and governments to participate in social 
networks to connect with and influence others (Tolsma & Zevallos, 2009).  Although most 
people recognize the influence of personal contacts and social networks in their lives, decision-
makers and scholars of disasters have lagged in incorporating social capital into their theoretical 
frameworks (Aldrich, 2012).  Hurlbert, Haines, and Beggs (2000) claimed that during the post-
disaster stage, people who have stronger ties, relationships, and connections with other 
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stakeholders are able to obtain more help than those who do not.  In addition to rapid-
intervention and rescue crews, the first to respond to rescue calls when a disaster hits are usually 
neighbours, blood relatives, friends, and local groups (Murphy, 2007).  Aldrich (2012, pp.254-
269) argued that such quantitative and qualitative measures provide evidence that demonstrates 
that “social resources, at least as much as material ones, prove to be the foundation for resilience 
and recovery.”  Social capital can also be impacted by a disaster due to the consequent disruption 
of social networks and social ties (Varda, Forgette, Banks, & Contractor, 2009; Kaniasty & 
Norris, 1993), which will negatively affect the delivery of resources to individuals who need them 
in communities with low levels of social resilience (Stack, 1975; Domínguez & Watkins, 2003; 
Tobin-Gurley, Peek, & Loomis, 2010; Sadeka, Reza, Pereira, & Sarkar, 2015). 
2.6.1 Conceptual Roots of Social Capital 
 A review of the historical development of the concept of social capital reveals that it dates 
back to the Aristotelian age, when human conduct was regarded as a paramount force in the 
pursuit of a common interest.  Over time, the evolution of the notion of social capital has been 
influenced by many factors, individuals, associations, organizations, neighbourhoods, 
communities, regions, and societies that have refined its meaning and shaped the present 
understanding of the term.  For example, many current studies have included social relations 
within and outside families, as well as within companies and other organizations.  
 In reference works, research conducted by Bourdieu (1985) and Coleman (1990) is 
generally credited with the creation of today’s theoretical concept of social capital. Bourdieu 
(1985) established the concept as part of his larger scheme aimed at understanding the 
perpetuation of inequality in society (Wahab, 2012).  The amount of social capital to which 
individuals have access is dependent on both the extent of their network connections, as well as 
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the total amount of capital that each member of the network possesses (human, cultural, financial, 
etc.) (Glanville & Bienenstock, 2009).  
 From its debut as a modern term, social capital has been characterized as a concept 
strongly associated with notions of action and application.  Bourdieu (1985) and Wahab (2012) 
described social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession  of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1985, p.248; Wahab, 2012).  Social networks are not 
formed naturally or effortlessly but rather are built through investment approaches, with the goal 
of institutionalizing group relations and making them a reliable source of beneficial assistance 
(Wahab, 2012; Hanna, Dale, & Ling, 2009; Portes, 1998).  
2.6.2 Definition of Social Capital 
 Bourdieu’s (1985) initial definition of social capital was later modified by Putnam (1995, 
pp.65-78), who stated that social capital comprises “features of social organization such as norms, 
networks and trust that facilitate cooperation and coordination for mutual benefit.”  Putnam (2000, 
pp.35-49) also explained that “physical capital refers to physical assets and human capital refers 
to the properties of individuals; social capital refers to connections among individuals – social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.”  Coleman (1988, 
pp.95-120) further stated that social capital “consist[s] of aspects of social structure, obligations 
and expectations, information channels, and a set of norms and effective sanctions that constrain 
and/or encourage certain kinds of behavior.”  When looking at the connections among national 
economic success, social capital, and trust, Fukuyama (2001) defined social capital as “the ability 
of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations, …, the existence of 
a certain set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permit 
cooperation among them” (Fukuyama,  2001, pp.7-20).  Woolcock (1998) defined social capital 
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as “the information, trust and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social networks.”  With 
regard to organizations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(2001) described social capital as “networks together with shared norms, values and 
understandings that facilitate cooperation within or among groups.”  From another perspective, 
Lin (1999, 2001) believed that social capital consists of social connections and commitments 
between members of a group characterized by two major features: robust social networks and the 
availability of resources that can be shared via the network ties.    
 Another aspect of social capital is that the benefits that apply at group or community 
levels can also apply to individuals (Walkup, 2003), who can gain an advantage from the social 
capital that exists even if they themselves have not contributed to it (Edwards & Foley, 1997).  
During the 1995 Chicago heat wave, for example, mortality was found to be much higher among 
socially isolated elderly residents living in more disconnected communities (Semenza et al., 
1996).  A further consideration is that both individuals and communities can suffer the adverse 
effects of living in a community that lacks social capital regardless of individual stocks of 
resources (Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner, & Prothrow, 1997).  
2.6.3 Relationship between Social and Human Capital 
 Social capital is considered a complement to human capital.  It is generally understood 
that individuals who are networking successfully in their personal life are also considered to have 
better social connections with their immediate community network than those who do not.  A 
number of scholars have described networking as an essential element of social capital but with 
considerably different definitions (Burt, 2000; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; Bhuiyan, 2005; 
Putnam, 2007).  For example, with respect to politics, the literature related to social networks 
contains a great deal of analysis of the circumstances that could motivate citizens to become 
engaged in democratic processes (Hays & Kogl, 2007; Wahab, 2012).  In this context, social 
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networks encompass some sort of shared obligations, which do not always involve ordinary or 
casual contacts. Community-engaged networks promote the idea that “I will do this for you now, 
in the expectation that you will return the favour” (Putnam, 2000, p.20).   
 The differences between networks with and without social capital interaction are 
important because of their implications for both theory and policy.  To elaborate, residents of poor 
neighbourhoods might have mutual support networks and tend, for example, to help one another 
with babysitting, car maintenance, or haircutting (Hays et al., 2007).  In contrast, social capital in 
the form of trust and social networks is considered to provide economic or political returns. As 
Wong (2008) stated, “Dense social networks and high levels of trust among community members 
are considered to have spill-over effects which facilitate social co-operation” (Wong, 2008, 
p.1413).  Putnam (1993) argued that, along with social networks, trust is a vital component of 
social capital. He also maintained that “social networks allow trust to become transitive and 
outreaching: I trust you because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you” (p. 169).  
Underlying social networking theory is the idea that connections with others make it easier to seek 
the participation of other people in collective activities.  Such participation can take different 
forms: official or unofficial, cooperative or confrontational.  In some cases, it might involve 
becoming engaged in efforts undertaken by community neighbours such as activities for dealing 
with a disaster scenario. 
 From another perspective, studies have demonstrated that social networks can promote 
local capacity-building (Murphy, 2002, p.593), which could include tangible (e.g., a region’s 
infrastructure, natural resources, and trade regime) and intangible (e.g., local knowledge, skills, 
social networks, and institutional endowments) elements.  Social networks can thus play a 
significant role, for example, in increasing the employability of immigrants by connecting them 
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effectively with successful earlier immigrants from their home countries (Portes, 1998; 
Lelieveldt, 2004; Wahab, 2012).  
 Lin (2001) demonstrated the significance of social capital in his graphic model, depicted 
in Figure 2.4, which shows that the strength of individuals’ positions inside a network determines 
their ability to leverage their relative social capital contribution.  As illustrated in Figure 2.4, 
individuals in higher positions are able use their relatively higher levels of reputation and 
connections to obtain more resources than someone in a lower position (Lin, 2001). 
 
Figure 2.4: Schematic Illustrating Social Capital (Lin, 2001) 
One of the definitions of social capital is “The stock of active connections among people: the 
trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and behaviors that bind the members of human 
networks and communities and make cooperative action possible” (Cohen & Prusak, 2001, p.4).  
Therefore, this definition resonate with the focus of this research, i.e., with regard to the role of 
social capital in relation to disaster events; as bonding, bridging and linkage relationships have 
within the community and other communities proved to be a positive contribution to the overall 
recovery of the community.  Conceptually, the notion of social capital implies increased recognition 
of the various forms it can take.  Scholars have defined three types of social capital: (1) bonding 
social capital (e.g., connections between similar members of a network), (2) bridging social 
capital (e.g., across heterogeneous organizations and networks), and (3) linking social capital 
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(e.g., connections with individuals and organizations with stronger power or status) (Putnam, 
1995, 2000; Schuller, Baron, & Field, 2000; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004).  Each person’s levels of 
preparation and resilience are determined according to the amount of access to information and 
material resources; personal support networks; and the level of preparedness and ability of the 
community to obtain resources from local authorities, government officials, and other aid 
agencies at the national and international levels (FEMA, 2004; Dynes, 2006).  As depicted in 
Figure 2.5, the relationships and differences among bonding, bridging, and linking social capital are 
particularly relevant with respect to consideration of how individuals and communities deal with 
disasters and adversity.  
 
Figure 2.5: Types of Social Capital (Wood et al., 2013) 
For example, Putnam (2000) suggested that bonding social capital is an excellent resource for 
mobilizing solidarity and fostering reciprocity in similar groups.  Hence, for example, neighbours 
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will help one another when their homes have been damaged by a fire or hit by a storm.  The networks 
afforded through bridging social capital are better for diffusing information among heterogeneous 
groups, because that type of social capital acts to help disseminate warnings by spreading the word 
via people’s affiliations with different networks within a community (Wood et al., 2013).  Linking 
social capital is more vertical or distal in nature and usually facilitates access to external individuals 
or organizations with resources, influence, or authority.  In the event of disasters, having effective or 
ineffective connections can impact the levels of recovery of both the individual and the community. 
In addition, social relationships and bonding networks have even been shown to have a positive 
impact on survival rates as well (Wood et al., 2013).  In the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami, for example, villages with stronger links to outside organizations were observed to receive 
aid and assistance more quickly and to experience superior post-disaster recovery (Aldrich, 2011). 
2.6.4 Social Capital and Disaster Management 
 For communities confronted by disasters to successfully perform rescue, restoration, and 
recovery tasks, they must act collectively, highlight the importance of social linkages, renationalize 
trust, and capitalize on internal and external relationships during the overall disaster-management 
process (Patterson, Weil, & Patel, 2010).  Eisenman, Cordasco, Asch, Golden, and Glik  (2007) 
identified social networks as important channels for decision-making and the spreading of 
information after Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast of the USA in 2005, and recognized them as a 
crucial factor affecting an individual’s decision to evacuate.  Limited access to information can be 
detrimental.  People who had sparse networks were often left behind.  For these reasons, disaster-
management authorities (especially those from outside a community) must be extra alert to 
considering the social fabric and internal capacity of a community when planning future response 
and recovery scenarios (Eisenman et al., 2007). 
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2.6.4.1 Social Capital and Disaster Response and Recovery 
 The first evacuation intervention activities carried out in a disaster-affected community 
are considered the beginning of the response phase.  These activities include tasks such as search 
and rescue, emergency sheltering, and the provision of medical services (Wood et al., 2013).  Thus, 
the attainable level of social capital within an affected community contributes in a highly positive 
way to the effectiveness of the rescue and relief phase of the disaster-management cycle (Nakagawa, 
2004).  Individuals and collective actors have been helpful in the rescue of trapped victims and in 
providing emergency care for the injured, especially in situations when local emergency personnel 
are overwhelmed or unable to respond due very high demand and substantial damage (Poteyeva, 
Denver, Barsky, & Aguirre, 2007).  For example, during the 1980 earthquake in Italy, it was noted 
that individuals who lived alone were less likely to be rescued and experienced a death rate 2.4 times 
higher than did people living in households with more than one person (Dyne, 2006).  Likewise, an 
analysis of mortality rates during the 1995 Chicago heat wave revealed that socially connected 
individuals were less likely to die (Semenza et al., 1996).  More recently, bonding social capital was 
an evident in the influx of individuals who arrived to offer support and aid to their neighbours in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Hawkins & Maurer, 2010).  Nevertheless, it has also been argued 
that although some of the communities affected by Hurricane Katrina had strong bonding social 
capital, they lacked bridging and linking relationships at the societal and institutional levels (Trainor, 
& Quarantelli, 2006; Rodriguez, 2006; Hawkins & Maurer, 2010). 
 As articulated by Smith and Hoffman (1999), during the 1991 Oakland, California, 
firestorms, individuals  escaping on foot were picked up by passing motorists, while other individuals 
went door-to-door to ensure that everyone, including neighbours, children, the elderly, and pets, was 
rescued and safe.  Similar solidarity was demonstrated by other members of the community who 
joined householders who were attempting to enter their burning homes to save irreplaceable items so 
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that they would not have to face the flames alone.  In another example, during the 2010-2011 
Queensland floods in Australia, volunteer groups called “Broom Brigades” would gather every 
morning at centralized meeting points to be bused to the devastated communities where they helped 
with the cleanup process (Wood et al., 2013).  Smith and Boruff (2011) stated that in the case of the 
1999 Moora floods, in a very few hours, strong horizontal relationships were evident in the 
community search and rescue assistance units who arrived when responses from state authorities fell 
short.  
 An additional factor is the sentiment confirmed by stories from outside authorities while 
rescuing local residents, who observed that a lack of confidence in emergency responders from 
outside the community meant that some elderly people were willing to be evacuated only by trusted 
community members.  The greater the strength of community trust in local leadership, the more 
effectively that leadership can successfully facilitate the local coordination of necessary emergency 
response operations (Smith & Boruff, 2011).  Bridging social capital can thus play a significant role 
in informal disaster-response and -recovery tasks.  Likewise, with respect to addressing new and 
unanticipated problems that require instant attention, collective pre-existing social networks are often 
utilized (Poteyeva et al., 2007).  Hence, reliance on local experiences, capacities, and resources 
enables people to extend help to others in time of need, and also explains how communities with 
strong social capital and collective trust (even if unprepared) can achieve impressive results.  Thus, 
communities with more coherent and interactive social capital can take the initiative and self-develop 
long-term localized effective pre- and post-disaster strategies and techniques, which can be put in 
place to withstand future disasters.  These strategies and techniques can be crucial emergency 
survival tools that invest the local and bridged resources and capacities of the community while 
waiting the disaster responses from the other stakeholders.  It can also be argued that communities 
  26 
 
that have taken stock of their local resources and developed plans to respond to extreme events will 
likely demonstrate the most resilience during future disasters (Wood et al., 2013). 
 With respect to the recovery phase, the aim is to return the community at least to the pre-
disaster situation or a stronger state and conditions (Cardona, 2004).  While the scarcity of 
literature has focused on recovery in general, many researchers have noted the strong role of 
social capital in many aspects of the recovery process (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; David & Li, 
2010).  According to Sobel (2002), strong bonding, bridging, and linkage relationships have 
proved to be a positive contribution to the overall recovery of the community.  After the 1995 
Kobe Earthquake, Schellong (2007) noted that the links that form the social fabric of a society 
can have a significant impact on the speed of community recovery.  Olsen (2011) argued that in 
the wake of Hurricane Katrina 2005, the households who best managed their recovery were those 
who had a strong network of family and friends.  In addition, social networks play a distinctive 
role in developing a common vision for community recovery and advocacy to meet local needs 
(Evans et al., 2008).  During the recovery phase, information on resource allocation, recovery 
management is disseminated through social networks (Wood et al., 2013). 
2.6.5 Social Capital and Religion  
 In many communities affected by disasters, religious ties and beliefs have been important 
attributes that strengthen the cultural and social fabric (Clarke & Jennings, 2008; Adeney-
Risakotta, 2009; Kong, 2010; Ramsay, Manderson, &Smith, 2010; Joakim & White, 2015).  
However, only limited attention has been paid to the role of religious ties and beliefs in post-
disaster response and recovery phases at either the individual or community level, and their 
supportive role in preventing and preparing for future disasters has gone unexamined (Gaillard & 
Texier, 2010; Joakim & White, 2015).  Despite the importance of religious beliefs, some 
researchers have considered religion-based interpretations of responses to disasters as indicating 
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superstition and backwardness (Chester et al., 2008; Chester & Duncan, 2010; Lunn, 2009).  
 However, research has revealed that people may use religion-based beliefs to rationalize 
disasters or other traumatic events (Chester et al., 2010; Stephens et al., 2012; Aten et al., 2012).  
This behaviour is true even if the affected population has higher educational qualifications and 
sophisticated perceptions of the science behind a given disaster, such as plate movements or 
tectonic activity.  Their knowledge can often co-exist in parallel with their spiritual, 
mythological, or religious convictions (Schlehe, 2010; Merli, 2010; Joakim & White, 2015).  The 
result of downplaying these beliefs is that humanitarian aid organizations and donors often fail to 
make good use of religious groups after a disaster because of their lack of appreciation of the 
benefits to be derived from capitalizing on the faiths of the impacted people (Clarke et al., 2008).  
Declining to invest in and utilize religion-based groups thus means failing to make use of 
significant social capital resources within disaster-stricken communities (Joakim & White, 
2015).   
2.6.5.1 The role of Religion during Post-Disaster Recovery 
 Earlier researchers who concentrated on connections between disaster events and the 
contribution of religion often looked at interpretations of and answers to questions about a 
disaster as provided by local religious leaders (Schlehe, 2010).  As stated by Paradise (2005), 
“One of the most significant resilience factors is religious faith” (pp.167-180).  For example, 
religious culture and its social significance during the recovery process, including explanations, 
coping mechanisms, and rituals, have often been highlighted as important elements in both 
community and individual post-disaster recovery (Falk, 2010; Ramsay et al., 2010; Joakim & 
White, 2015).  Religious leaders can play important roles in encouraging and promoting 
community responses to a disaster and to working toward effective recovery afterwards.  In 
situations involving a lack of trust between communities and governments, religious leaders can 
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act as authority officials whenever the communities need trusted leaders for guidance and 
support (Bagir, 2012).  
 Keeping in mind the comments made above, it can also be the case that, while religious 
leaders can offer encouragement for community recovery, they may sometimes promote the 
disasters as a form of divine punishment (Reale, 2010; Joakim & White, 2015).  Such promotion 
could diminish disaster mitigation and hinder preparations because it denies human 
responsibility for creating low levels of resilience (choosing unsafe locations such as floodplains 
for buildings, employing poor construction materials and techniques, etc.).  Chester and Duncan 
(2010) found that the roles of religious leaders with respect to dealing with low resilience levels 
and to the enhancement of disaster resilience can be quite complex.  For example, instances exist 
of local leaders and governments in the USA calling disaster events “acts of God”.  Such labels 
enable those in authority to dodge responsibility for members of society who are poor and 
marginalized.  
2.7 Organizational Capacity 
 As stated by Bryan (2011), organizational capacity is a concept that has received 
increased attention from public and non-government organizations and has been the subject of 
studies published in the literature over the last several years.  Organizational capacity, broadly 
defined as the ability of an organization to fulfill its goals, has been a particular focus of 
scholars, as well as a topic of interest to outside funders such as the charity community.  Outsider 
funders have been increasingly focusing on investing community effort in the building of 
effective capacities, especially for organizations that provide services to the general public 
(Bryan, 2011).  
 Key characteristics of organizational capacity include financial resources, staffing, 
technical expertise, communication and information-sharing, leadership, and commitment to 
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disaster prevention, such as flood protection (Hartvelt & Okun, 1991; Grindle & Hilderbrand, 
1995; Hartig et al., 1995; Handmer, 1996).  This conceptualization of organizational capacity is 
based not solely on funding or the amount of technical expertise, but also on the ability of 
individuals within an organization or community to work together to achieve a set of common 
goals.  Capacity, in this sense, can be conceptualized as the ability of community organization to 
anticipate disaster events, make informed mitigation decisions, and implement effective policies 
(Honadle, 1981). 
 Organizational capacity thus constitutes a foundation on which rest strong strategies for 
the mitigation of the impact of a disaster as well as risk-reduction programs.  For example, 
fundamental capacities of an organization include planning and ensuring the availability of 
funds.  In previous studies, researchers concluded that increasing the number of planning staff 
and the amount of financial resources for executing a program leads to higher-quality mitigation 
policies (Burby & May, 1998).  The more established the planning capacity of an agency for a 
given jurisdiction, the more technical expertise and personnel can be devoted to the 
implementation of disaster-mitigation techniques (Olshansky & Kartez, 1998; Brody, 2003b; 
Laurian et al., 2004).  Greater financial resources can, for example, lead to more extensive 
engineering approaches to mitigation or to community-wide programs for preparing residents for 
flooding events.  
 Public organizations do not operate in isolation, but within a larger context of a variety of 
stakeholders such as communities, active stakeholder networks, complex relationships, and 
collective human values (Brody, 2008).  The groups include other government entities, as well as 
private and non-government interests.  Stakeholder groups and individuals can offer valuable 
knowledge and innovative ideas about their community that can increase the quality of any plans 
adopted and better ensure their implementation.  It is often argued that stakeholder collaboration 
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can act as powerful leverage for generating trust, credibility, and sustainable commitment to the 
implementation of policies (Innes, 1996; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).  Collaborative activities 
within and among organizations and communities include the sharing of data and information, 
access to communication channels, the establishment of informal networks, and joint project 
management (Ivey, Loe, & Kreutzwiser, 2002). 
 2.7.1 Government Organizations 
 A government organization has the following characteristics: 
1. Similar entities exist at other levels of the public sector (e.g., federal, provincial, 
territorial, and local governments; government organizations; government partnerships; 
and school boards).  
2. The entity normally has no transferrable ownership interests.  
3. The entity is organized and operated exclusively for social, educational, professional, 
religious, health, charitable, or any other not-for-profit purpose. 
4. Its members, contributors, and other resource providers do not, in their capacity, receive 
any financial return directly from exercising their powers and conducting their duties 
(FRASC, 2016). 
The role of government organizations in disaster relief is complex.  Most of the related debates 
are focussed on centralized versus decentralized approaches, including networked governance.  
The involvement of central governments is not atypical in disaster compensation even in the 
presence of private insurance.  Central governments often subsidize the incurred costs associated 
with a disaster through premium subsidies and relief funds (Aakre et al., 2010).  However, this 
pattern contrasts with calls for decentralized management in other areas of disaster management such 
as disaster response and reconstruction, for which community-based management and the invocation of 
the subsidiary principle are popular solutions (Boin & Hart, 2003; Dynes, 2006). 
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 For the United States of America (USA), Rubin (1991) set out six nationwide variables 
that affect the functioning of local governments with respect to their contribution to community 
recovery: (1) federal influence and conditions, (2) state influence and conditions, (3) community-
based needs and demands for action, (4) personal leadership, (5) ability to act, and (6) knowledge 
of what action to take.  According to a study by Rubin et al. (1985) of fourteen recovery cases in 
the USA, the shared dependent attribute that was common to all cases and that defined the speed, 
efficiency, and equity of community recovery was the ability of the local government to provide 
effective recovery strategies.  In other words, if a local government was able to identify and 
respond to specific disaster concerns quickly, the community tended to recover faster and more 
sustainably.  Recent scholarly consensus suggests that government recovery plans developed 
prior to a disaster lead to quicker and more effective post-disaster recovery for a community 
(Wilson, 1991; Olson, & Olson, 1993; Schwab, 1998; Wu & Lindell, 2004).  Ideally, recovery 
plans and work accomplished in the aftermath of a disaster should not return a community to 
previous risk levels, but should aim to increase resilience to future events.  Governments should 
also clearly communicate the goals and strategies of all recovery plans to their citizens (Smith & 
Wenger, 2006; Lindell, 2013). 
 In the event of a disaster, local authorities must act promptly and in a coordinated manner 
to execute a large number of tasks in a very condensed time period.  In practice, response and 
recovery phases and operations overlap to such a degree that it becomes difficult to establish a 
borderline, especially in emergencies, when some community areas might be in response mode 
while others are moving into recovery mode at the same time.  Therefore, once an emergency 
response has begun, there is little room for disaster-recovery planning to take place. Advance 
planning of resource allocation can thus provide an effective and efficient means of increasing 
the chance of fast and comprehensive community recovery (Lindell, 2013).  It is therefore crucial 
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for local governments to plan ahead of time for effective disaster responses and recovery 
strategies (Schwab, 1998; Lindell, 2013).  During the recovery phase, lack of accurate 
knowledge or readily available resources could result in the failure of businesses and households 
to recover to acceptable levels.  Local governments should therefore step in and provide the 
necessary recovery help in addition to their specific routine tasks, such as restoring infrastructure 
assets.  They should also return to performing the duties for which they are accountable in order 
to ensure more responsive and inclusive regulations and rules that ensure the enactment of 
preventive risk management measures related to land use and building construction (Lindell, 
2013).   
2.7.2 Non-Government and Community-Based Organizations 
 Community participation generally refers to the organized involvement of people in any 
project directed at running a social activity, solving their own problems, or maintaining or 
developing their socio-economic conditions.  In line with the aims of the organization, leading 
community members participate in setting goals and in preparing, implementing, and evaluating 
plans and programs (Hossain, 2012).  The United Nations (1970) defined participation as 
collective action by various strata of people or interest groups.  Basically, the term indicates a 
dynamic group process in which all members of a group contribute to, share in, or are influenced 
by cooperative ideas and activities targeted toward a problem-solving or decision-making goal 
(Banki, 1981; Samad, 2002).  As stated by Sastry (2001, pp. 19-22), “The crux of community 
participation is the exercise of the ‘voices and choices’ of the community and the development of 
human, organizational and management capacity to solve problems as they arise in order to 
sustain the improvements made over time.”  Hossain (2012, pp.159, 171) noted that “community 
participation motivates people to work together, where people feel a sense of community and 
recognize the benefits of their involvement.”  According to Barton (1969), due to the variety of 
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organizations involved in recovery efforts, there may be competition and breakdowns in 
coordination.                          
 NGOs are civil society associations that operate independently of the government. NGOs 
usually deliver resources or services to support a social or political purpose.  The World Bank 
classifies NGOs as either operational NGOs, which are concerned primarily with development 
projects, or advocacy NGOs, whose main interest is the promotion of a specific cause (Margaret, 
2015). 
 Community-based organizations (CBOs) are well positioned to carry out activities and 
assist government agencies in implementing plans that affect the lives of their communities with 
regard to socio-economic development, natural resources management, environmental 
conservation, or disaster management.  CBOs are established by community representatives to 
serve specific purposes and objectives, one of which is to ensure that decision-makers are taking 
into consideration the concerns of their local communities.  Work conducted by CBOs can be 
classified into themes that include human services, natural environment conservation or 
restoration, and the safety and revitalization of an urban environment.  Examples include the 
following (Tangui, 2014): 
- Neighbourhood revitalization 
- Affordable housing 
- Food security 
- Accessible transportation 
- Senior citizen associations 
- Environmental protection/conservation 
- Community sustainability 
- Humanitarian/disaster response 
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- Medical relief funds 
- Youth homes and centers  
As strong examples of social capital resilience, a variety of community-based organizations have 
participated in recovery efforts in order to assist in recovery programs and the distribution of aid.  
 The disaster-relief roles of community-based organizations (CBOs) and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Red Crescent, the Red Cross, religious 
institutions, and service organizations, are becoming increasingly recognized and more widely 
publicized (Willetts, 2002).  These organizations are coming to be regarded as reliable strategic 
partners of the local governments.  Such community-based associations provide help for disaster 
sufferers, including financial assistance, housing, food and water supplies, clothing, and medical 
aid.  In general, NGOs are counted as strategic partners of government social service agencies, 
playing a decisive and enhanced role by performing the recovery tasks they are expected to carry 
out during the disaster recovery phase (Dynes, 1970; Lindell, 2013).  CBOs, NGOs, and 
government agencies can together create an unmet needs committee, which is considered an 
emergent organization to help people who are not being adequately taken care of through regular 
disaster recovery programs.  In some cases, such emergent organizations can also be formed by 
local grassroots activist groups who feel that their recovery concerns are not being heard by 
government agencies or are not being adequately addressed (Murphy, 2007).  
2.7.3 Religious Organizations 
 The role of religious institutions, such as masjids and churches, in dealing with post-
disaster recovery is also an important factor (Joakim & White, 2015).  During and after a 
disaster, community-based religious organizations can supply a number of warning and rescue 
services; for example, alerting the population by using church bells or mosque loudspeakers, 
providing temporary shelter facilities, offering psychological support, and accommodating and 
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supporting the poor and vulnerable.  They can also be a significant pathway for the collection of 
aid for affected communities (Benthall, 2008; Chester et al., 2008; Falk, 2010; Wisner, 2010; 
Joakim & White, 2015).  Because faith-based organizations are often present in a community 
prior to a disaster, they are generally in a good position to be a valuable avenue of assistance 
with respect to risk reduction and disaster-recovery efforts (Fiddian & Ager, 2013).  Faith-based 
organizations have often been known for their humanitarian and social welfare services in 
addition to their roles in religious activities, which means that not only are they able to connect 
with their congregations, but they are also often linked with broader support networks that can 
help them mobilize larger institutional and social networks (Clarke, 2006; Deneulin & Rakod, 
2010; Joakim & White, 2015).   
2.8 Household Capacity 
 According to Lindell (2013), the four main social entities involved in the recovery of a 
community after disaster events are government agencies, civil society organizations, local and 
national businesses, and household capacities.  Businesses and household capacities are 
responsible mainly their own recovery, while government and civil society organizations share 
collective responsibility for post-disaster operations and the recovery of the overall community 
(Lindell, 2013).   
2.8.1 Household  
 A household is defined as a residential dwelling unit that has one or more persons living 
in it, collectively sharing meals, food supplies, and living accommodations.  A single family, 
partners, or a group of people who have social or ethnic ties could be counted as a household 
(Haviland, 2003).  Based on its considerable importance in the fields of economics and 
inheritance, the household is the basic unit of analysis in many social, microeconomic, and 
government models (O’Sullivan, MacGill, & Yu, 2003).  At the household level, a disaster could 
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result in major illness, death, or substantial economic or social misfortune (John Hopkins and the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2006). 
2.8.2 Household Resources 
 Community resilience is dependent on individuals and families within the community 
(Van Breda, 2001; Alshehri Rezgui, & Li, 2013).  When there is a great level of familial 
responsibility, the community is better placed to respond quickly and effectively to disasters 
(Kulig et al., 2012).  The capacity of households for resilient post-disaster recovery is highly 
dependent on two types of resources: financial and non-financial. The first type is also known as 
intangible resources, which are those that the household holds only for their convertible financial 
value.  Examples of financial resources include money held in savings and chequing accounts, 
certificates of deposits, savings bonds, stocks, retirement accounts, cash value life insurance 
policies, trusts, annuities, commodities futures, royalties, awards from lawsuits, and cash on hand 
(Bucks, Kennickell,  Mach,  & Moore,  2009).  The second type is the non-financial assets, 
which include possessions that are evaluated on a basis other than financial worth and are 
typically tangible. For example, residential and business property – both land and buildings – are 
forms of non-financial household assets, which also include possessions that have value, such as 
vehicles, electronic devices and equipment, art items, jewelry, furniture, appliances, and 
souvenirs (Bucks et al., 2009).  
2.8.3 Household Recovery 
 The main consideration associated with household recovery is the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the household capacity, which refers to the ability of the members of the 
household to return to their usual way of life after the recovery process.  According to recent 
research studies, household capacity is affected by the number of people living in a particular 
house, their education and income levels, their access to community organizations, and their 
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connections to local religious and social associations.  The household recovery process entails 
three main components that require specific resources: 1) housing recovery, (2) economic 
recovery, and (3) psychological recovery (Bolin & Trainer, 1978).  In fact, households require 
investments of time, including time to secure food, clothing, shelter, and household appliances 
and equipment (Yelvington, 1997), as well as time to file proper insurance claims, apply for 
grants or loans, and search for jobs, all of which also require huge effort as well as being time 
consuming (Morrow, 1997).  In addition, the stakeholders affected by the disaster must be self-
confident, self-motivated, and patient in dealing with the bureaucratic processes involved in 
approaching a variety of entities to seek assistance during the post-disaster period (Morrow, 
1997).  Vulnerable communities can learn from local and international practices with respect to 
pre-disaster preparedness.  In addition, communities will become better resilient when 
combining these best practices with their past disaster recovery experiences.  This combination 
can enable communities to develop some practical emergency tactics and procedures, as well as 
securing sustainable provisions for critical resources during the disaster times. 
2.8.4 Sources of Household Recovery Assistance 
 According to Bolin and Trainer (1978), three types of assistance are correlated with three 
respective types of household recovery capacities: (1) institutional (i.e., governmental), (2) 
blood-relative relationships (i.e., extended family resources), and (3) independent (i.e., personal 
resources).  Although few households actually rely on only one source, the ability of independent 
recovery is directly related to a household’s financial, physical, and human resources.  For 
example, local and central governments are obligated to provide the necessary recovery 
assistance based on its collective social responsibilities.  Likewise, the religious beliefs and 
norms of the Saudi society strengthen the bonding between the community members and make 
everyone accountable for providing assistance, as long as he or she has the capacity to do so.  In 
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addition, personal resources through business contacts or other social and political networking 
will allow some members of the communities to exploit their linkages outside their communities.  
 A great example of lateral initiatives between government institutions, businessmen, for-
profit organizations, and individuals with religious dimension is donating tangible and non-
tangible goods to the affected communities.  Through utilizing the existing links, governments 
effectively can manage the distribution of these good in collaboration with NGOs and CBOs.  
The contribution of these organizations in providing recovery assistance is normally built on the 
bonding and bridging capacities between these organizations and members of the affected 
communities.   
 Another illustration of the role of religious beliefs of individuals, either within the 
community outsiders, is paying their Zakat, which is equivalent to taxes, directly to the impacted 
people.  The payments can be in the form of food, household appliances, or cash.  The extent to 
which the members of a household can generate income from revenues arising from capital 
interest, dividends, rental of physical assets, or employment determines the human recovery 
resources that are available for exploitation and their preparedness to live more frugally.   
The successful recovery of a household is also substantially affected by how many undamaged 
resources and possessions remain (vehicles, crops and animals, buildings, equipment, land, 
clothes, furniture, etc.), as well as the ability of the household to acquire substitutes relatively 
inexpensively.  Likewise, significant factors in accelerating household recovery are the 
availability of financial assistance and the ease and immediacy of gaining access to it, such as 
cashing in insurance policies, liquidating stocks and bonds, and withdrawing funds from bank 
accounts.  Similarly, the flexibility of creditors with respect to deferring mortgage and loan 
payments can, to a considerable extent, hinder or facilitate the recovery of a household.  A final 
consideration is the fact that, to be eligible for recovery assistance, an affected household must 
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meet specific qualification criteria, such as the length of their residency in the area concerned 
and evidence of their losses (Bolin & Trainer, 1978; Lindell, 2013). 
2.8.5 Types of Household Recovery 
 Household recovery can be categorized according to four duration-related types that are 
typically needed following a disaster event (Quarantelli, 1982).  Since the impacted population 
and families differ in number, characteristics, causes of movement, and duration of stay, their 
movement patterns through various housing types also vary (Cole, 2003).  The first recovery 
type is called emergency shelter, which involves spaces in temporary accommodation for rapid 
and short-term protection and could be just mobile units or an open yard (Bolin & Stanford, 
1991, 1998).  The second type is temporary sheltering, which denotes longer-term facilities for 
sleeping, water supplies, and food preparation.  This type of household recovery may be 
obtainable through relatives or friends, or could be provided in commercial lodgings such as 
motels or, to some extent, in church auditoriums and school gymnasiums.  According to Islamic 
teachings, neighbours are regarded as relatives or even part of the extended family.  Therefore, 
community members whom properties were undamaged will offer their homes as emergency or 
temporary shelters; either for relatives or non-relatives; as a practical example of illustrating 
bonding between the community members.  The third type is called temporary housing, which 
allows disaster sufferers to re-establish their daily life activities in less than ideal settings, 
buildings, or locations.  The fourth type is designated permanent housing and enables impacted 
people to resume their normal lives in safe, regular dwellings and locations.  Based on the 
cultural traditions and norms, Saudi people are usually tend to reach out their relatives, friends 
and officials in close or even remote communities to seek recovery assistance.  Linking and 
bridging capacities are well exploited in these instances as it is usually correlated with social and 
economic ties and demographic backgrounds. 
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 Correlated demographic household characteristics reveal significant differences among 
households during the recovery stage (Peacock, Dash, & Zhang, 2006).  The availability of 
nearby relatives and close friends and the degree of damage determine who can stay with people 
they already know, while age, homeownership and income are decisive factors in establishing 
who can host relatives or friends after a disaster (Morrow, 1997).  Likewise, groups of impacted 
relatives will generally try to find a shared shelter, particularly if all of them are primary 
sufferers (Yelvington, 1997; Lindell, 2013).  Members of higher-income households but no 
nearby friends or relatives will often stay in motels, hotels, etc., whereas open spaces in public 
facilities may be the only sheltering option for lower-income households (Lindell, 2013).   
2.8.6 Problems Associated with Household Recovery 
 Scholars have stated that during the restoration and rebuilding stage, households can 
confront a number of problems, which include breaches of the terms and conditions of contracts, 
poor-quality building work, and high repair costs (Bolin, 1991, pp.25-34).  Lower-income 
households generally have a greater chance of being impacted simply because (1) their location 
is often more vulnerable to disasters, (2) the home may have been poorly maintained, (3) the 
building might have been constructed with lower-quality materials, and (4) standardized building 
codes might have been violated, all of which would mean that they would have lower levels of 
physical resilience (Bolin & Bolton, 1986; Lindell, 2013).  Another factor could be the longer 
time that these households might take to restore their housing status because of insufficient 
resources for self-sustenance and recovery (Girard & Peacock, 1997).  
2.9 Summary and Conclusion  
 To acquire a comprehensive understanding of the different phases of disaster management 
and the research related to this topic, a literature review was conducted, with a special focus on 
the recovery phase.  The review therefore involved an exploration of the disaster-management 
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cycle and recovery goals and entities.  Social capital and its conceptual roots were defined, and 
the investigation included an examination of the relationships between social capital and the 
disaster-management process, the disaster response phase, religion, and human capital.  Studies 
related to the role of religion and religious institutions during and after a disaster were also 
surveyed.  Household capacities and social capital have been considered pivotal assets, main 
drivers, and valuable resources in recent research related to resilient post-disaster recovery and the 
building of resilient capacities in communities vulnerable to disasters.  For this reason, a review 
was conducted of the literature related to types of household recovery and associated problems, 
the functions and roles of local governments, NGOs, CBOs, and religion-based organizations, and 
sources of household recovery assistance.  
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Chapter 3: 2009 and 2011 Flash Floods in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
3.1 Location and Size   
 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is located in a highly strategic geographical 
position in the extreme southwestern part of Asia.  The KSA occupies about 80 % of the Arabian 
Peninsula and, with 1,960,582 km2, is counted the third-largest Asian country by area after China 
and India.  The KSA shares its northern boundary with Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait.  The 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and the Arabian Gulf lie on the eastern borders.  Oman 
and Yemen are the southern neighbours, while the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea form natural 
boundaries to the west.  As shown in Figure 3.1, the KSA enjoys long, rich coastlines and land 
borders, whose lengths are estimated to be 2,640 km and 4,431 km, respectively (World Atlas, 
2011).   
 
Figure 3.1: Location of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (World Atlas, 2011) 
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3.2 Saudi social hierarchy 
The Saudi population is characterized by a high degree of cultural homogeneity and a similar 
degree of social class division. The history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia begins properly on 
1932, when by royal decree the dual kingdom of the Hejaz and Najd with its dependencies, 
administered since 1927 as two separate units, was unified under the name of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. The territory that was formed in Saudi Arabia in 1992 was composed of four 
distinct regions and diverse population groups. Each region maintained a nomadic and original 
population: in 1950, an estimated half of the Kingdom's population was nomadic (Metz, 1992).  
Hijaz (western region) is home to the holy sites of Islam, and a host of pilgrimage. The 
populations of Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah have been infused for centuries by descendants of 
foreign Muslims who had come for the pilgrimage and stayed. In Makkah there were large 
Indian and Indonesian communities, and Jeddah had descendants of Hadramis (from Hadramaut, 
or Aden), as well as Africans and people from other parts of the Arabic-speaking world e.g. 
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The cities of Hejaz have benefited from donations from religious 
Muslims around the world and have become major centers of Islamic scholarship and learning. 
Jeddah was almost unrivalled as a commercial center in the Kingdom until the 1960s, and in all 
the cities of the Hijaz cities, business families comprised powerful elite (Metz, 1992). 
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The values and practices of Islam were at the core of cultural harmony between societies. Society 
as a whole, valued the behaviour that shows generosity, hospitality and willingness to support 
other family members. In addition, Saudi communities are characterized by a high degree of 
family cohesion. This description was reflected in the common Arabic language and in 
adherence to the teachings of Islam. Above all, the cultural homogeneity of the Kingdom was 
based on the dissemination of family values and attitudes, in particular the values and attitudes 
concerning relations within the family and family relations with the rest of society. 
The family was the most important social institution in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For Saudis 
in general, the family was the basic foundation of identity and status for the individual and the 
direct focus of individual loyalty. Families have formed alliances with other families that share 
common interests. 
The structure of Saudi households is traditional and patriarchal, where males are heads of 
household and responsible for duties that are usually outside the family, such as protecting and 
providing for their family. The identity of the family is also associated with the father and, 
therefore, has custody of the child if the matter arises. 
Women are taught to participate in roles that affect life in the household, such as housekeeping, 
childcare and some decisions on child-rearing. It is not limited to these roles, as evidenced by the 
growing number of successful women entrepreneurs. In Saudi Arabia, the role of women is 
essential to maintain the family structure and thus society (Long, 2003). 
 
3.3 Saudis and Non-Saudi Populations 
Estimates of the population holding Saudi citizenship have varied widely. The 1992 Saudi census 
indicated an indigenous population of 12.3 million people and a growth rate of 3.3 % (Mets, 
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1992). The Saudi Department of Statistics and Information announced last year (2016) that the 
Saudi population was estimated at about two thirds of the population 67 %, about 20.7 million 
people, while the non-Saudi population accounted for about one third of the population, 33 %, 
about 10.1 million people (Saudi Arabia Centre of Statistics and Information , 2017). 
 
 
 
3.4 Illegal Immigrants 
Illegal immigration to Saudi Arabia is one of the challenges facing local authorities. For five 
decades, the kingdom has become the target of massive and illegal immigration from some 
African and Asian countries, and infiltrators across the border with Yemen, including large 
numbers of Somalis, Ethiopians and Eritreans (Al-Arabiya, 2017). There are also large numbers 
of people who remained in KSA illegally after their pilgrimage and Umrah (Alyom, 2012).  
Efforts are on in full swing to ensure that no visitors overstay their visas and that other illegal 
immigrants also leave the country. Saudi Arabia has developed an Amnesty scheme to encourage 
illegal immigrants to leave KSA. For those living in remote areas of the Kingdom, help centers 
arranged necessities such as water, food and housing to arrange for their deportation. Community 
organizations have proposed chartering private trips and providing free transportation during 
repatriation. The current initiative is different from the one in 2013 in two important ways. First, 
this time the violators of local laws can leave for their home country without any penalty. 
Second, there is option for those repatriated to become expatriates in the kingdom again (Arab 
News, 2016). 
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3.5 Topography 
 The narrow plain of Tihamat ash-Sham runs parallel to the Red Sea coast, and the Hijaz 
Mountains to the north have elevations ranging from 910 m to 2,740 m.  The Asier region in the 
south has the highest mountains, which reach upward to more than 2,740 m.  To the east of the 
Hijaz Mountains lie the central uplands (Najd).  The Dahna desert separates Najd from the 
lower-lying Hasa plateau to the east.  Approximately one-third of the country is sandy desert.  
The KSA has neither lakes nor permanently flowing waterways except for the artesian wells in 
the eastern oases. 
3.6 Overview of the KSA Climate  
 According to the Kopper-Geiger climate-classification world map provided in Figure 3.2, 
the KSA belongs to the semi-arid category (Peel, Finlayson, & McMahon, 2007).  This type of 
climate is generally characterized by hot summers and warm-to-mild winters.  Influenced by 
seasonal sea breezes, summer temperatures in the City of Jeddah are often above 40º C during 
the daytime and decline to an average of 30º C overnight.  Average daily temperatures during the 
winter are around 23º C to 33º C, dropping to16º C at night (Zerbonia, Zatari, Al Fawaz, & 
Daggag, 1986). 
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Figure 3.2: Kopper-Geiger Climate Classification Map (Peel et al., 2007) 
Jeddah’s rainy season occurs between October and April of each year, with annual mean rainfall 
ranging between 30 mm on the coastal plains and 60 mm in the inland areas, which are more 
mountainous (Şen, 1983; Bayumi, Alyamani, Subyani, Al-Dakheel, & Al-Ahmadi 2000; Subyani 
& Al-Dakheel, 2009; Subyani & Al-Modayan, 2011).  Because the precipitation is below the 
potential evaporation level, rainfall is sparse, irregular, and temporally and spatially 
variable.  As indicated in Figure 3.3, the average annual precipitation level can reach more 
than 600 mm in the mountains but decreases to 120 mm on the coastal side to the west and 
to 100 mm toward the east (Youssef & Maerz, 2013).  Due to its higher rainfall amounts, the 
southwestern region of the KSA has the greatest extent of water resources, including 
renewable waters, and is as well the most populated and cultivated area.   
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Figure 3.3: 1998–2009 Annual Rainfall Distribution in the KSA (Al-Mazroui, 2010) 
In the Jeddah area, rainfall is rare and highly variable (Momani & Fadil, 2010).  For example, 
according to the Presidency of Meteorology and Environment (PME), the total rainfall in 2008 
was only 26.3 mm.  
3.7 Climate change in the KSA 
Climate change is already felt in the Middle-Eastern countries and KSA is no exception. As per 
the recent documents published in international journal (Youssef and Sefry 2015), climate and 
precipitation conditions have been changing since 1970.  Another study (Sharif, 2015) has 
demonstrated that mean surface yearly average temperature has changed almost 0.8°C in the time 
window of 1950 to 2000. The study also depicts that the eastern part of the country suffers the 
most with an average increase of temperature to 1°C in 50 years period of time (Sharif, 2015).  
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Different climate models also support this notion and in case of Jeddah, it is revealed that the 
global climate model has predicted an increase of up to 2.5°C mean surface yearly average 
temperature in next 50 years. The average yearly rainfall (precipitation in this case as it does not 
snow in Jeddah) has also changed. In 1970, the yearly average rainfall has been recorded as 36 
mm whereas in 2011, the average yearly rainfall is recorded 125 mm. The notion from this 
information implies that the pattern of average yearly precipitation and temperature is changing 
in the City of Jeddah based on historical data. As the climate is changing, the population is also 
increasing, and poor land use planning is putting a greater number of people in harms way. 
Natural disasters such as flash floods are therefore increasing and leading to escalating impacts 
(Sen, 2017).  Table 3.1 shows annual daily maximum rainfall for Jeddah between 1970 and 
2011. 
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Table 3.1 Annual Daily Maximum Rainfalls for Jeddah (source: Youssef 2015) 
 
  51 
 
3.8 History of Disasters in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 According to and International Disaster Database (IDD) records of disasters in the KSA, 
most major KSA disasters stem from low levels of resilience and failure to learn effectively from 
previous events (Hahne, & Group 2002; Thompson et al., 2004; Aguilera, Perrocheau, Meffre, 
Almulla, 2008; Lerner et al., 2007; Alamri, 2010; International Disaster Database (IDD), 2010).  
Table 3.1 lists, in chronological order, significant KSA disasters for the past 50 years.    
Table 3.2: Top 10 Disasters Causing Major Damage in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
between 1960 and 2010 (NDA = No Data Available) (Alamri, 2010) 
Type of Disaster Date No. Affected No. Killed Estimates of 
Effect 
Heavy rains April 1964 1,000 20 NDA 
Fire during Hajj December 1975 NDA 200 NDA 
Militant occupation of 
Holy Mosque in Makkah 
November 1979 600 250 NDA 
Fl ods in northwestern 
Saudi Arabia 
December 1985 5,000 At least 32 $450,000 
Ir nian riots during Hajj July 1987 649 402 NDA 
Stampede inside 
pedestrian tunnel during  
Hajj 
July 1990 NDA 1,426 Compounded by 
failure of 
ventilation system 
inside the tunnel 
Fire during Hajj April 1997 More than 1,500 343  
Rift Valley fever 
outbreak 
September 2000 500 87 NDA 
Jizan floods April 2004 430 5 Destroyed 2,680 
km2 of housing, 
land, and roads 
Jeddah floods 
 
November 2009 More than 10,000 
 
116 
 
$1.5 billion 
Jeddah floods January 2011 5,000 10 $2.5 billion 
 
3.8.1 Flash Flood Hazards in the KSA 
 The majority of KSA areas receive most of their rainfall in the form of one or two 
intense, short-lived heavy thunderstorms.  However, in areas such as the Jizan Mountains, 
Sarawat, Abha, and Taeif, rainfall occurs much more often.  Flash flooding is thus relatively 
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frequent in the steeper areas of the western escarpments, mainly between the Yemen border and 
the City of Jeddah (Youssef & Maerz, 2013).   
3.9 Saudi Disaster Response Plans           
The KSA national government has disaster-planning offices in the capital city of Riyadh.  These 
offices provide guidance and representation for each of the provinces, which are indicated in 
Figure 3.4.  The principal formal disaster-planning responsibility was under the jurisdiction of 
the Municipality of the City of Jeddah during the 2009 and 2011 floods, but has since changed. 
 
Figure 3.4: Map of the Saudi Provinces 
3.9.1 Saudi Disaster-Management Planning 
 Saudi disaster-management planning has grown from a narrow focus on fire response, 
and its mandate now includes comprehensive disaster-management responsibilities.  The first 
KSA emergency response team was formed in 1926 in the city of Makkah, which later was 
declared a presidency in the General Security Service organizational structure.  The fire brigade 
presidency evolved into the General Directorate of Firefighting under the Ministry of the Interior 
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(MoI) in 1960, and the name was changed to the General Directorate of Civil Defense in 1986 
(MoI, 2013, p.1; Abosuliman, 2014).  In 1963, the first fire brigade was established in the City of 
Jeddah, and the cities of Al Madinah and Riyadh also acquired brigades.  The KSA Directorate 
of Civil Defense is nested under the Civil Defense Council, which draws up civil defense plans 
and policies (Ministry of Interior, 2013).  When a disaster occurs, the orders of the Directive 
Council for firefighting, ambulance services, and search and rescue are implemented by the 
Regional Committees for Civil Defense, which have the authority to lead and direct military and 
civil organizations, as well as to exploit appropriate resources as necessary.  The regional 
committees execute local response plans, communicate with all relevant organizations, and direct 
all response activities and tasks (Saudi Arabia Ministry of Interior, 2013; Abosuliman, 2014). 
3.10 City of Jeddah 
 The City of Jeddah is located between 21o 20’and 21o 30’ north latitude and 39o 06’ and 
39o 25’ east longitude on the Red Sea coast at the western edge of the KSA.  The city has a 1,765 
km urban boundary that encloses a total land area of roughly 5,460 km2.  After the capital, 
Riyadh, Jeddah is the second-largest city in the KSA and is the country’s commercial centre.  
The city is well known mainly because it is the common entry port for Muslims who travel from 
around the world to the two holy Islamic cities of Madinah and Makkah (Jeddah Municipality, 
2011). Figure 3.5 shows the location of Jeddah. 
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                                     Figure 3.5: Location of the Jeddah Study Area 
According to the Saudi Central Department of Statistics & Information (CDSI), the population of 
the city was recently estimated at 3.4 million (CDSI, 2010).  Figure 3.6 indicates the growth of 
Jeddah’s population in modern times. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Population Growth for the City of Jeddah (CDSI, 2014) 
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3.10.1 History of Jeddah 
 The foundation of Jeddah dates back about 3,000 years to the times when fishermen 
would stop there after their excursions.  About 500 years later, the 'Quda'ah' tribe arrived and 
established their first settlement.  In 647 CE, the third Caliph, Othman Bin Affan, ordered Jeddah 
to be turned into a port in order to welcome Hajj visitors on their pilgrimage to Makkah.  
Eventually, Jeddah was transformed into a commercial hub and became a trading centre (Jeddah 
Municipality, 2011).  The Ottoman Turks occupied the city in 1517 (Pesce, 1977; Alsiary, 2015).  
Although many changes have occurred in the operation of Jeddah and the western part of the 
KSA in general, its character, size, and functions were preserved for the next several hundred 
years (Facey, 2005).  Figure 3.7 is an aerial photograph of Jeddah in 1938. 
   
 
Figure 3.7: Jeddah in 1938 (Facey, 2005) 
Significant development did not begin in Jeddah until 1955, when the KSA’s King Abdul Aziz 
Al Saud ordered the defensive wall of the city to be demolished, with the intention of expanding 
the city beyond it.  
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 Historically, Jeddah was an important seaport for shipping spices and luxury goods 
between the Far East and Europe, and was a trade hub for spices and incense (Taylor & Ghazi, 
1994; Alsiary, 2015).  Over time, the city became a well-known focal-point trade destination 
because of its industrial, economic, and tourism endeavours and modern development, as well as 
its function as a center for Saudi financial services (Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(JCCI), 2013).  According to the statistics collected by the Saudi Ports Authority (SPA), in 1946 
the port of Jeddah processed approximately 150,000 tons of cargo, which had increased 
substantially to more than 8 million tons by 1977.  By 2009, that number had reached roughly 28 
million tons (Saudi Ports Authority (SPA), 2014). 
 During the last five decades, the total area of Jeddah has increased from 18,315 ha in 
1964 to 54,175 ha in 2007, with the residential areas expanding from 1,945 ha to 21,365 ha over 
the same period.  Likewise, the commercial areas have also enlarged by about five times from 
298 ha in 1964 to 1,555 ha in 2007.  Following the more recent fast growth of the city, as 
depicted in Figure 3.8, in 2009 the Municipal Strategic Planning Department of the City of 
Jeddah enacted policies to decrease the costs of development and encourage more mass 
transportation and modern development (Abdullah, 2012; Aljoufie, 2014).  As a result, Jeddah is 
now considered a very modern city (JCCI, 2013; Alsiary, 2015). 
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Figure 3.8: Jeddah: (1936 – 1998) (SGS, 2014). 
3.10.2 Flooding in Jeddah  
 Several decades prior to 2009 (i.e., 50 to 75 years ago), the country had not experienced 
such devastating events.  According to Maghrabi (2012), the main floods which happened in 
Jeddah are: The floods of 1968, which came from the valleys east of Jeddah and destroyed many 
constructions as well as the walls of the old airport.  However, the built-up area was not then as 
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large as the current area.  The flood of November 1972: the quantity of rain reached 83 mm in a 
short period of time and left its destructive action on the streets of the old districts and formed 
swamps, which polluted the environment.   Flood of 1979, which resulted from continuous rain. 
The water rose in the streets above 1 meter, and life stopped for three days.  Flood of November 
1985, which happened after heavy rain over Jeddah and the surrounding area.  The two flash 
flood events during 2009 and 2011 in the City of Jeddah were the most serious natural disasters 
in the history of that city and had a considerable effect on the people, civilian areas, and 
infrastructure.  In the wake of the 2011 floods, the region witnessed similar events in 2015 when 
floods hit the western and northern parts of the kingdom. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Watersheds and Flooding in the City of Jeddah, 2009 (Al Saud, 2010) 
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3.10.3 Physical and Geographical Factors Affecting the Jeddah Floods 
 It is important to study regions that have been exposed to repeated natural disasters in 
order to identify the mechanisms of their occurrence and to evaluate the extent of their impact.  It 
is apparent that the rainfall was concentrated in specific geographic locations during the two 
flood events that occurred in Jeddah during November 2009 and January 2011.  According to Al-
Saud (2015), the study area clearly shows the existence of two principal regional basins.  As 
depicted in Figure 3.10, the first basin is rocky, semi-closed, and located in a mountainous area.  
This basin is surrounded by several mountain chains with altitudes about 300 m to 550 m above 
sea level.  The second basin is a large, flattened basin close to the northern side of a rocky basin.  
It is located in a flat region with an altitude of less than 150 m. 
 
Figure 3.10: 3-D Map of the Study Area (Ministry of Interior, 2015) 
The cross-section of the area contains two major terrain shelves, one flat and the other somewhat 
elevated, as illustrated in Figure 3.11 (Al-Saud, 2015).  It is clear that the structure of the terrain 
played a key role in the rapid flow of the floodwater toward the city (Figure 3.11). 
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Figure 3.11: Cross-section Showing the Major Shelves in the Study Area (Al-Saud, 2015) 
The two basin areas encompass several wide valleys formed as a result of faults and extending 
for a number of kilometers.  They are characterized by thick deposits of sediments and sand as a 
result of aeolian erosion processes.  Alluvial fans created by run-off water from the adjacent 
mountains are another common component of the study area.  Al-Saud (2015) noted that the bed 
load of these valleys features an enormous amount of sediment consisting of different-sized 
particles.  An additional factor is that unstable and non-combined rocks and sediments are easily 
eroded during flood events, causing an increase in the bed load transported by the flood water, 
which in turn, as in the 2009 and 2011 floods, caused severe damage to Jeddah’s infrastructure. 
3.10.4 2009 Jeddah Flood  
 The City of Jeddah has experienced two recent major thunderstorm-based flash flood 
events.  The first one was on November 25, 2009, with a rainfall amount of 90 mm, and the 
second was on January 26, 2011, with 111 mm.  The flooding caused 116 deaths in 2009, and 
although the amount of rainfall was greater, only 10 in 2011 (; Murphy, 2010; Wagner, 2011; 
Swiss Reinsurance, 2012; Abosuliman, 2014).  In the wake of the 2011 floods, the region 
witnessed similar events in 2015 when floods hit the western and northern parts of the kingdom, 
and the civil defense authority announced the deaths of 12 people.  The local valleys of the city 
usually serve as flood-draining channels, especially in the foothills of the Hijaz (Al Saud, 2010).  
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According to the statement made by the Deputy Mayor in the wake of the 2009 flood, “a third of 
the city had a drainage system which could handle just 25 mm of rain, and the Municipality 
planned that Jeddah would be flood-free by 2014” (Momani & Fadil, 2010; Abosuliman, 2014).  
As a result, the poor preparedness and inadequacy of the city infrastructure were revealed.  The 
northern parts of the city (i.e., the Al-Azahra, Al-Shati, and Al-Arawdah districts) were relatively 
prepared and sustained the least damage.  In contrast, the central area of Al-Azziyiah was poorly 
equipped and hence severely impacted (Wagner, 2011).  Table 3.2 presents the timeline of the 
2009 disaster (Momani & Fadil, 2010).  Figure 3.9 indicates the watershed areas and the extent 
of the flooding during the 2009 event. 
Table 3.2 Events Relating to the 2009 Jeddah Floods (Momani & Fadil, 2011) 
Date (2009-
2010) 
Actions 
Nov. 25 Rain swamped the City of Jeddah from 8 am until noon, with initial reports of 10 
deaths and more than 100 rescued. 
Nov. 26 The Saudi Civil Defense Authority reported that the death toll had reached 48, with 
900 rescued from flooded properties using inflatable boats. 
Nov. 27 The Director of Health Affairs of the City of Jeddah warned people to stay away 
from flood water because it was polluted by sewage overflows and reported that 
rescue operations were continuing.  
Nov. 28 The death toll reached 122. As a result, a local lawyer declared that he would sue the 
Municipality of the City of Jeddah on behalf of the flood-impacted families of 
casualties that resulted from the failure of the sewage system. 
Nov. 30 At transportation nodes, floods stranded Hajj pilgrims trying to return home. People 
were still being reported missing. Accordingly, King Abdullah announced the 
formation of a commission led by the governor of the province of Makkah to 
investigate the disaster. He authorized a reimbursement payment of one million SAR 
($US 267,000) to the family of each casualty. He also directed that accommodation 
be provided for those unable to return home. 
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Dec. 1 A special commission was established to provide emergency assistance for flood-
affected people. An investigative task force was sent to Lake Musk, which is the 
sewage-treatment station in the Jeddah foothills to ensure its security and 
functionality during the rainfall. 
Dec. 2 The search for missing people continued on the ninth day. The names of the 116 
dead were announced. 
Dec. 3 The mandated High-Level Disaster Committee held its first meeting and nominated 
subcommittees to pay the families of the casualties and to monitor the emergency 
response. 
Dec. 5 The disaster committee called for citizens and residents to provide information about 
the floods. The Municipality cancelled leave for engineers and experts so that they 
could help with the investigations. 
Dec. 9 Civil Defense announced 133 deaths, 39 missing, and 7,167 people in temporary 
accommodation provided by the authorities. An additional 221 families were 
sheltered and another 784 individuals were affected. 
Dec. 10 Death toll reached 138. 
Dec. 23 Businesses and schools in Yanbu were closed as a result of an electricity blackout 
due to further heavy rainfall.   
Dec. 25 King Abdullah called for an investigation into the Jeddah disaster, with those 
responsible for the sewer failures to be held accountable. He insisted that there 
would be no compromise for anyone remiss in this respect. 
Dec., 30 25 employees of the Municipality of the City of Jeddah were taken into custody. 
Feb. 20 The Ministry of Transport began to investigate actions by contractors who restricted 
the operation of the disaster-management plan and to set up safeguards for future 
occurrences. 
 
The flooding had a widespread, devastating impact, including numerous damaged residences and 
public institutions across the city.  For example, some facilities at King Abdulaziz Hospital and 
King Abdulaziz University, as well as the King Abdullah Bridge in the southern part of Jeddah 
were severely affected.  A large number of medical records, specimens, and equipment were 
either badly damaged or destroyed.  The high waves and floodwaters shown in Figures 3.12, 
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3.13, and 3.14 blocked streets and highways around the city, washing away many cars in their 
path.  
 
Figure 3.12: Flood Wave in the City of Jeddah, 2009 (Civil Defense, 2010) 
 
Figure 3.13: Photo of the 2009 Flooding in Jeddah (Civil Defense, 2010) 
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Figure 3.14: Most of Jeddah Flooded  
From a broader perspective, telecommunications and the power supply and service were also 
completely disrupted, causing an all-inclusive blackout for the entire western area of the KSA, 
including the cities of Jeddah, Medina, and Makkah.  As a result of the power blackout and the 
disconnection of communication networks, many residents found themselves trapped alone and 
unable even to make a phone call to ask for assistance from police, medical services, or civil 
defense forces.  About 116 people died from the floods, either due to car accidents or drowning 
(Arab News, 2011).  Approximately US$900 million was needed to help affected communities 
and restore the functioning of the city (Momani & Fadil, 2011).  The flooding indicated that 
Jeddah had no mandatory or inclusive disaster-management systems or frameworks in place 
(Momani & Fadil, 2011). In addition, the Civil Defense department was poorly prepared to carry 
out its responsibilities effectively during such events (Abosuliman, 2014). 
 Following the disaster, the Municipality of the City of Jeddah was widely criticized by 
media broadcasters, who condemned its poor planning and the ineffective responses of its 
emergency teams (Howard & Hussein, 2010; Murphy, 2010; Al Saggaf, 2012; Al Saud, 2012; 
  65 
 
Spitzberg, Tsou, An, Gupta, & Gawron 2012; Wagner, 2012; Abosuliman, 2014).  In his report 
submitted to the Arab Forum for Environment and Development, Assaf (2010) stated that the 
effects of and damage caused by the flooding would have been minor if the drainage 
infrastructure systems had been properly planned and built.   
3.10.5  2011 Jeddah Floods  
 On January 26, 2011, according to the King Abdulaziz University Meteorology 
Department, the eastern part of Jeddah was again flooded as a result of a 111 mm heavy rainfall.  
Although infrastructure assets and residences sustained significant damage during this incident, 
quick action by the Civil Defense Department kept the death toll to only ten (Agence France-
Presse, 2011; United Press International, 2011).  According to the Director General of the Civil 
Defense Department, General Saad bin Abdullah Al-Tuwaijri, his ground teams were able to 
rescue 1,451 people, the rescue helicopters saved 498 residents, and more than 1,500 families 
were provided with temporary shelter.  Approximately 5,000 residents were without power. As 
reported by the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), as of the afternoon of Thursday, January 27, 
power had been restored to 65,000 customers (CNN, 2011).  Al-Dhibyani (2011) reported that by 
March, the governor of the Province of Makkah had approved the establishment of a Centre of 
Crisis Management to coordinate the collaborative responses of different service and security 
authorities (Abosuliman, 2014). 
3.11 Summary 
 As explained earlier, during the 2009 flooding in Jeddah, there was a lack of appropriate 
preparedness and effective responses on the part of the relevant authorities, as well as poor 
coordination and networking among various emergency and aid organizations.  This tragic 
situation led to an excessive number of deaths and an enormous amount of damage (Abosuliman, 
2014).  In addition, although under the rule of law in the KSA, those in charge of disaster 
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management are held liable for any failures or misconduct that occur under their jurisdiction, the 
authorities failed to communicate openly with the public, thus exacerbating the situation (Al-
Saggaf, 2012).  However, with respect to the 2011 Jeddah floods, the responses were much 
improved, partly as a result of the criticism on social media after the 2009 disaster, which 
expressly pointed out the gaps and failures and helped change the attitude of the government 
authorities.  While a number of infrastructure improvement projects were still under construction 
during the 2011 flooding, there was much better coordination and training among crews and the 
various emergency teams, such as health and security organizations.  Despite the heavier rainfall, 
the enhanced coordination resulted in fewer deaths and much less destruction than occurred 
during the 2009 flood (Alriyadh, 2012).  
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Chapter 4: Research Methods 
4.1 Background 
 The primary objectives of the research were to acquire an understanding of and to 
evaluate the importance and role of the household capacity, organizational capacity, and social 
capital, assessment dimensions.  The investigation also covered the impact of these dimensions 
and that of networking mechanisms with respect to building resilient post-disaster recovery.  To 
achieve these objectives, a field case-study approach was adopted as a means of exploring and 
analyzing the role and importance of these three dimensions and their detailed aspects during and 
in the aftermath of the 2009 and 2011 Jeddah flash floods.  
 According to Bryman (2001) and Joakim (2013), when the focus is on understanding 
social communities through their actors and stakeholders, qualitative research techniques are 
helpful tools for examining and analyzing these communities.  Likewise, Denzin and Lincoln 
(2005) claimed that qualitative approaches enable researchers to determine and understand how 
people perceive events, identify their impact, and feel about them (p.3).  For these reasons, the 
primary research tool chosen for data collection for this study was a qualitative-based approach 
in combination with quantitative assessment techniques.   
 To achieve the research goals, facilitate the necessary networking during the fieldwork, 
and save time and effort, a short-term collaborative relationship was developed with the 
Department of Environmental Science at King Abdul-Aziz University (KAU).  This relationship 
provided access to several sites impacted by the flooding, which were severely damaged and 
received outside assistance during the post-disaster period.  Through this collaboration, the 
researcher was able to contact stakeholders who were actively involved in the post-disaster 
recovery process.  In general, the fieldwork carried out provided abundant opportunities for 
exploring and comparing the recovery processes of differently impacted communities, including 
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the identification of weaknesses, strengths, learned lessons, and more.  Through the examination 
of these events and the opportunity to work and interact with people who experienced them, the 
Jeddah flash floods also presented an all-inclusive situational example and important case study 
for surveying, exploring, analyzing, and establishing principles for building a resilient disaster-
recovery framework.  The work was conducted within a context of learning and change aimed at 
increasing the sustainability of effective future recovery and risk-reduction initiatives and 
strategies. 
4.2 Development of the Conceptual Framework for Assessing Post-Disaster Resilience 
 In this section, a preliminary conceptualization of a resilient post-disaster recovery 
framework is developed.  For the purposes of this research and in line with its scope and 
objectives, community disaster resilience refers to the ability of the community to withstand, 
respond to, adapt to, and recover rapidly from a disaster event (Joakim, 2013).  Resilient post-
disaster recovery can thus be defined as the capacity and readiness of individuals, communities, 
and institutions to collaborate in order to resist, respond to, recover from, and adapt to a disaster; 
to restore conditions following an event; and to maintain their capacity and structure in order to 
deal with future disasters.  Likewise, the key principles of resilience – resistance, recovery, and 
creativity – were considered to relate to the ability of households, communities, and 
organizations to absorb the impact of disasters; to recover quickly afterward; and to learn, 
transform, reduce risk, and adapt to future stresses and shocks (Adger, 2000).  
 Despite the considerable advanced body of literature related to the concept of resilience 
and its principles and areas of application, the term and the idea of resilient post-disaster 
recovery are rarely understood or applied in the context of disaster management in the KSA.  
This deficiency could be rooted in its absence from relevant Arabic literature, the lack of 
translated research studies into Arabic, the lack of recognition of the concept in formal disaster-
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management documents, and other factors.  The word “Morunah” in Arabic has the closest 
meaning to the word “Resilience”.  The framework developed for this thesis is used to evaluate 
post-disaster recovery in Jeddah City, KSA. The first version of the Resilient Post-Disaster 
Disaster Recovery Assessment Framework (RPDR-AF) whose structure is illustrated in Figure 
4.1 depicts the foundations of the conceptual modeling of the framework used to guide the 
empirical research phase.  
 
Figure 4.1: Resilient Post-Disaster Recovery Assessment Framework 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the focus of this research is on three dimensions: household capacity, 
organizational capacity, and social capital. The final framework, refined and modified based on 
the empirical analysis of the case study and the research results, is presented in subsequent 
sections of this chapter.  An approach that incorporates the notions of resilience and recovery and 
that elaborates on the dimensions of households, organizational capacities, and social capital was 
adopted in building the framework.  This method was applied for the assessment of flash flood 
resilience in the local Jeddah community because that city offers opportunities for the critical 
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analysis of resilient post-disaster recovery procedures and operations.  The analysis afforded an 
opportunity to discover the advantages of these dimensions in the context of disaster recovery 
and to obtain insights with respect to the nature of the relationships among these dimensions in 
the context of the City of Jeddah.  The framework developed provides a method for holistically 
evaluating whether recovery efforts have effectively increased the capacity of the city to 
withstand future events, and also addresses some of the causes of slow recovery and low 
resilience observed during previous events. 
  The assessment was based on the collected and analyzed data, which were obtained 
through: (1) interviews with local residents and other key stakeholders in the zones affected by 
the Jeddah floods; (2) municipal documents, inter-ministerial responses, and contingency plans 
that were reviewed as secondary sources of information, along with other sources such as media 
and NGO reports; and (3) direct field observations that provided additional data to build on real 
experiences and lessons learned.  Conclusions were then drawn and recommendations developed 
in order to build an effective, systematic, resilient post-disaster recovery assessment framework. 
4.3 Research Methodology 
 The research methodology employs a case-study approach, using four sites within the 
City of Jeddah. Joakim (2013) stated that case-study methodologies offer an exceptional tool for 
comprehending how individuals’ knowledge enables recognition to be given to human beings, 
organizations, and social and political experiences.  In this way, case studies provide a perfect 
opportunity to uncover the interactions among different small- and large-scale social, economic, 
political, and environmental operations that are associated with disasters and that affect post-
disaster recovery (Yin, 2003, p.2).  A case-study approach also gives a diverse range of actors in 
the post-disaster recovery process the chance to share their unique perceptions, experiences, 
values, professional expertise, and further thoughts.  Based on the 2015 Sendai Declaration that 
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promotes the development of sustainable disaster recovery and resilient principles (UNISDR, 
2015), this study assessed a variety of perspectives with respect to households, social capital, and 
organizational capacity.  In addition to the experiences and opinions of local residents, CBOs, and 
NGOs, the assessment process also incorporated input from decision-makers and implementers, 
those who were involved in ensuring sustainable development, and urban planners. The research 
methodology included the following tasks: 
1. Literature review: The literature review highlighted current knowledge regarding resilient post-
disaster recovery and identified key gaps that this research was designed to address. This task 
included the following elements to be completed by the researcher: 
a. Develop an awareness of all aspects of the contextual characteristics and features of the events as 
well as the varied post-disaster recovery experience of the impacted communities. 
b. Build a background for understanding and assessing the impact and importance of social capital 
and networking as well as households and organizational structure mechanisms with respect to 
flood resilience during post-disaster periods by using specific case studies from the 2009 and 
2011 flash floods. 
c. Select the best tools and techniques for collecting and analyzing data, as well as identifying best 
practices for building a resilient post-disaster recovery assessment framework. 
2. Field investigation of the four sites selected, using a case-study approach: This task included the 
following steps: 
a. Select the assessment dimensions, which include household capacities, organizational capacities, 
and social capital.  
b. Define, explore, and model the detailed concepts and factors associated with these three 
dimensions in order to provide a basis for building the resilient post-disaster recovery assessment 
framework. 
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3. Definition of data-collection tools: These tools included interviews, formal and non-formal 
documents and sources, and field observations, all of which were used for investigating how the 
roles of the three dimension contributed during and after the events.  
4. Data analysis: Drawing from the identified framework themes, empirical analysis began 
with the development of a Likert scale assessment to undertake a review of the interview 
data using frequency counts (e.g. 15 of 40 interviewees) and identify the pertinent 
sections of the interview recordings that needed translation from Arabic to English. 
Following this step, the recordings were reviewed again to identify further important 
themes and passages for translation and thematic organization. Additional insights were 
drawn from the secondary data and field observations to verify the interview data and 
provide additional depth to the results. 
5. Results and discussion: With the case-study outcomes and empirical analysis as a basis, the 
knowledge gained, experience shared, and lessons learned were examined so that conclusions 
could be drawn to assist with the review and revision of the conceptual framework. The role and 
involvement of religion and religious leaders and institutions was explored, and the way they 
affected resilience and recovery during and after the Jeddah flash flood disasters was examined.  
4.4 Interview Approach 
 Interviewing is the one of the most common methods used in social research (Warren & 
Karner, 2010; Joakim, 2013).  Interviews are an appropriate method for obtaining information 
about events, opinions, and experiences and how these may vary among different groups (Dunn, 
2010; Joakim, 2013).  In-depth interviews offer an opportunity to go beyond the data gathered 
and obtain a deeper understanding of the complex behaviors, motivations, and decisions of the 
individuals and communities under study (Dunn, 2010; Joakim, 2013).  Particularly in the 
context of post-disaster recovery, the interview method allows the impacted population to share 
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their experiences of, and their thoughts and opinions about, the recovery process and the 
programs implemented by local, regional, national, or even foreign organizations.  For these 
reasons, in this research, interviews, specifically semi-structured household interviews, were 
used as a tool for examining the in-depth experiences of households and communities who were 
impacted by the 2009 and 2011 flash floods and subsequent recovery efforts.  Due to the nature 
of the cultural structure of Saudi society and the fact that direct personal contacts are the primary 
form of communication when local residents interact with one another, individual semi-
structured interviews were considered a suitable option for collecting the required data.   
Interviews can take a range of forms, including structured, semi-structured, and unstructured, as 
follows: 
1. Structured interviews are centered on focused questions that are directed at all participants in the 
same order.  
2. Semi-structured interviews are interviews in which the questions are used as a guide, while 
follow-up questions are content-focussed and deal with issues judged to be relevant to the 
research questions. 
3. Unstructured interviews are ones that are interviewee-focused and that highlight personal 
perceptions and histories (Hay, 2010, pp. 109-111; Joakim, 2013).   
During the semi-structured interviews conducted for this research, a series of open-ended and 
targeted questions were asked, with the goal of looking for additional detail and specific 
contextual facts, information, and particulars.  During interviews based on open-ended questions, 
respondents are not confined to selecting an answer from a limited number of predetermined 
choices; more rational and contextual interpretations and validation are required (Altheide & 
Johnson, 1998, p.286).  The answers obtained from the respondents provided rich, in-depth 
information which proved a valuable source for understanding the uniqueness of situations and 
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event conditions; the common circumstances in which the participants lived, suffered, and 
recovered; and the values and meanings that they attributed to their experiences and that shaped 
how they perceived events.  
 In line with the objectives of this research, the interviews were classified into two sets of 
semi-structured interviews.  The first set dealt with flood-affected residents, while the second set 
was targeted at key informants.  
4.6 Household Interviews 
 Given the background of Saudi Arabian society, customs, and traditions, the most 
appropriate interviews were deemed to be with members of households located at the four 
selected sites, identified in a subsequent section.  Participants were selected based on a purposive 
sampling technique (approximately ten interviews were conducted per site) in order to identify 
people who had been directly impacted by the flash flood events.  They were chosen to be 
representative of the various key actors in the community and a variety of levels of wealth, 
political power, and effort exerted during the events.  Also included were the groups most 
impacted, whose household incomes were low and dwelling locations are considered high-risk.   
 The ten interviewees for each site were chosen based on the guidance and connections of 
the imams in the mosques and key informants from that locale.  Each site included three or four 
mosques, and the imams were able to identify local households and individuals who had been 
impacted directly by the flooding.  The key informants facilitated the classification of the 
interviewees selected.  Additional participants not on the original lists were solicited by the 
researcher, who walked around the four sites in order to identify households that fell into the 
classified categories (time lived in the area, age, damage from the flood, etc.). 
 The household interviews took place from June 2015 until mid-September 2015, 
approximately four years following the second flash flood disaster.  Although the interviews were 
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conducted over a three-month period, the researcher was also involved in community meetings 
and visits with leaders and households at each site for a seven-month period beginning in early 
July 2014.  Each interview was two to three hours long, depending on the amount of 
collaboration and the interpretation of the responses from the interviewee.  The purpose of the 
semi-structured household interviews was to obtain demographic information (household size, 
education level, age, period living in the area, etc.), information about their recovery experience 
and daily living conditions, and the ongoing characteristics of their social connections and 
resilience capacity.   
 Drawing from themes identified in the literature, Figure 4.2 outlines the themes that 
guided the interview questions.  The first section of the interview was a set of questions that 
followed a standard question format focused on exploring the aspects of the three assessment 
dimensions, as well as insights into the recovery process, social connections, and resilience issues 
of the respondents.  The second set were tailored questions, which were designed to provide a 
flexible structure that allowed the interviewer to investigate and extract further detail or to engage 
in further discussion on relevant topics (Dunn, 2010; Warren & Karner, 2010; Joakim, 2013).  
The interviews were conducted in Arabic; a copy of the English interview instrument is available 
as Appendix 1.  
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Figure 4.2: Detailed Aspects of the Three Assessment Dimensions 
4.6 Key Informant Interviews 
 Key informants can offer a great deal of help with research, because they can provide 
access to other members of the community and/or share important information with respect to the 
issue under investigation (Wahab, 2012).  The ten key informants chosen for this research 
belonged to the following groups: government officials, leaders of community-based 
associations, managers and members of CBOs, religious leaders, and other stakeholders.  With 
consideration of the specific research objectives and methodology tasks, the key informants were 
chosen to provide particular insights and expertise about post-disaster recovery in the City of 
Jeddah after the two floods.  Unstructured interviews were conducted using a topic-based 
interview guide.  The information supplied essential background knowledge for assessing the 
overall recovery effort and evaluating the resilient post-disaster recovery assessment framework.  
 The content of the interviews varied from a few questions to extended interviews.  The 
interviews lasted from 60 minutes to 3 hours.  The author conducted the interviews in Arabic, 
either in person or, in the case of interviewees who had moved in order to work outside of Jeddah, 
over the telephone.  A copy of the English interview instrument is available as Appendix 2.  
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4.7 Field Observations and Secondary Data Collection 
 Many scholars have emphasized the importance of direct field observations during a case 
study.  Although household interviews and key informant interviews represented the major 
source of data collection, this research also included direct field observations and the collection 
of secondary data as a means of acquiring additional information related to the overall post-
disaster recovery effort (Meredith, 1998; Pettigrew, 1990; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999).  
Direct observation was used as an ongoing research method for enriching the overall 
understanding of the people and cultural context of the City of Jeddah, as well as the post-
flooding recovery experiences of the stakeholders involved (Angrosino, 2005, p.741; Joakim, 
2013).  The field observations also comprised informal discussions for a more in-depth grasp of 
the daily living conditions across the city on the one hand, and a deeper appreciation of the issues, 
elements, and processes in the recovery that occurred after the flooding on the other.  The 
informal discussions were held with community leaders (Omdah), local volunteer research 
assistants and academics, and a variety of other individuals from Jeddah.  These observations and 
informal discussions were documented through field notes, journal entries, and photos.  The 
gathered information is presented and discussed in the Results chapter. 
 Selected secondary data sources for providing further information about the specifics of 
the recovery effort constituted the third data-collection tool employed for this study.  These 
secondary sources included information from NGOs, humanitarian aid organizations, and 
academic and government institutions.  During each interview with a key informant, the 
respondent was asked whether they had access to any documents, case reports, or evaluations 
related to the recovery operations and activities, because the information contained in these 
documents could be a valuable addition to the research.  Many of the humanitarian organizations 
provided copies of their annual reports and internal assessments.  Likewise, academic institutions 
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such as KAU provided access to their flood-related resources and facilities, which granted the 
researcher the opportunity to access a number of reference materials and documents to support 
this study.  These documents were useful for placing the recovery experiences of each of the sites 
within the context of the larger-scale recovery efforts, and they also provided qualitative and 
quantitative information about reconstruction, restoration, and other recovery programs. 
4.8 Research Ethics 
 To meet the requirements of the Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University 
(WLU), ethical guidelines were integrated into the design of the questions for the interviews and 
the implementation of this study.  The primary ethical concern was to avoid exacerbating any 
painful psychological feelings by asking the interviewees to recall sad and distressing memories.  
Extra attention was paid to dealing with the interviewees while they were reflecting on the 
traumatic events.  The research methods adopted were submitted to the WLU Office of Research 
Services for review and authorization.  The submission process involved the completion of a 
number of required forms, the submission of an outline of the research proposal that incorporated 
the details of the study and research methods, as well as the identification of potential risk to the 
participants.  The process requirements also included provisions for informed consent, a 
methodology format that maintained the anonymity of the participants, and steps for ensuring the 
confidentiality of the data and the dissemination of research results.  Recruitment scripts and 
interview guidelines were reviewed by the WLU Research Ethics Board.  To improve the quality 
and the procedures involved in recruiting potential participants and obtaining consent, a few 
minor recommendations were made.  The approved informed consent documents were then 
translated into Arabic by the researcher.  To guarantee confidentiality, the names of all 
interviewees were replaced with pseudonyms, with the exception of Mr. Tayseer Alhibshy, who 
agreed to have his full name and title published. 
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4.9 Case Study Sites 
 When considering the vulnerability of local communities, it is very important to 
consider the different characteristics of the population affected by the natural disasters: gender, 
age, education, income, ethnicity, marital status, and family size (Ivanov & Cvetkovi, 2014).  
The 2009-2011 flash floods attracted unprecedented local and international coverage and 
assistance, which highlighted the crucial need for an effective long-term disaster recovery plan.  
The 2011 event provided a real-life opportunity for a large number of recovery practitioners from 
government and humanitarian aid organizations, to implement the lessons they had learned from 
the 2009 flash floods.  The rationale for adopting a case study approach and selecting the sites 
was: 
1. The flash floods had a tremendous impact on the communities at those sites, which provided 
an important opportunity to explore the intersections among the three concepts employed as the 
basis for defining a resilient post-disaster recovery framework. 
2. These sites offered the chance to explore long-term recovery operations and the role of 
participating stakeholders in the context of a shifting approach to the mitigation of disasters in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). 
3. The recovery efforts at those sites gave governments and humanitarian aid organizations an 
occasion to implement and enhance what is called a recovery cluster system, which was first 
used by the relief and recovery operations in Jeddah in 2011.  
4. The sites are good examples for testing the effect of increased recognition by the Saudi 
government officials of the need to implement a formal disaster-management framework, as well 
as to set in place risk-reduction initiatives, as opposed to simply restoring communities to their 
previous condition.  
5. The sites satisfy the parameters of what scholars have noted with respect to the long-term 
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nature of post-disaster recovery and the period required for rebuilding, which usually takes at 
least 4 to 5 years from the date of the disaster event to a subsequent ideal time for research 
evaluations.  For these cases, the field research was carried out between 2015 and 2016, which 
aligns with the recommended 4 to 5 years post-disaster needed for the unfolding of the 
reconstruction (Joakim, 2013).  In fact, by the time of the study, the majority of reconstruction 
projects had been completed and many organizations had left the area or had begun phasing their 
work into longer-term development initiatives (Edgington, 2010).   
 At the beginning of the site-selection process, a total of nine sites were visited for initial 
assessments.  Pilot meetings and investigative discussions were held with local residents, 
community leaders, and key informants.  Since the impacted sites were relatively new to the 
researcher, Mr. Tayseer Alhibshy, who was the head of the Civil Protection Volunteer Institution 
for Disaster Management, was approached and asked to be a mentor for the site visits.  Mr. 
Alhibshy was an experienced professional with exceptional knowledge of the affected areas.  He 
was very helpful and voluntarily agreed to assist with the conducting of the field visits.  His 
experience was extremely valuable because of his significant participation in the rescue 
operations and in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the affected areas during the 2009 and 2011 
flash floods. 
 Based on the high levels of damage in the eastern part of Jeddah, the decision was made 
to focus on this area and to select the most representative four sites for data collection.  The four 
sites selected for the case studies provided an opportunity for data gathering with respect to the 
three assessment dimensions: household capacity, social capital, and organizational capacity 
during the post-disaster recovery period.  The four sites selected included communities that 
satisfied the following criteria: (a) they were located within the City of Jeddah, (b) they 
experienced the flash flood disaster, and (c) they comprised varied socio-economic status and 
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ethnic backgrounds.  After several visits to the affected areas by the researcher and Mr. Alhibshy, 
the four case-study sites were identified; they are listed along with their characteristics in Table 
4.1.   
Table 4.1: Characteristics of the Case Study Sites 
Site Site area Number of households Total population 
Nakheel 0.67 km2 530 1923 
Rughamah 0.71 km2 620 3430 
Goyzah 0.96 km2 970 10,000 
Mraykh 0.23 km2 1215 854 
 
The geographical locations of all sites in the City of Jeddah are indicated in Figure 4.3. They can 
be described briefly as follows: 
1. Site #1 (Rughamah): middle-class residents and ethnic diversity 
2. Site #2 (Mraykh): lower-class community in terms of income and education; a good 
example of a hub hazard and an overcrowded district that lacks organization, has poor 
infrastructure, and is inhabited by low-income and illegal immigrant residents  
3. Site #3 (Nakeel): well-organized upper-class neighbourhood of modern dwellings, 
whose residents have high educational levels 
4. Site #4 (Goyzah): randomly organized district inhabited by people with low income and 
educational levels 
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Figure 4.3: Geographical Location of the Four Selected Sites (Google Earth, 2016) 
The following sections provide an overview of each of the selected sites, with the goal of 
providing sufficient background information about each site for the reader to acquire a 
comprehensive understanding of: (a) the similarities and differences among the sites; (b) the 
recovery experiences at each site after the 2009 and 2011 flash floods; and (c) information about 
the sites that the leaders and community members felt was important to share regarding the 
characteristics, history, and conditions at each site.  
4.9.1 Rughamah Site 
 The Rughamah district (Site 1) is 7 km from the Goz Valley, which threatens the district 
when it is filled with rainwater.  With an area of 0.71 km2, a population of approximately 3,430 
people, and about 720 houses, Rughamah was an ethnically diverse district whose residents 
represented many different nationalities.  The majority of the populations were middle class in 
terms of income and education.  
Site # 1  
Rughamah  
Site # 2 
Mraykh 
Site # 3 
Nakheel  
Site # 4 
Goyzah 
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 Because it is located adjacent to the Goz Valley, the Rughamah district was severely 
impacted by the flash floods.  Over 70 % of the buildings in this community were destroyed or 
damaged.  Regardless of the limited coordination of the distribution of aid, just several hours 
after the floods hit, the affected population received assistance in the form of generous food 
donations and health services from the government and major relief organizations.  Figure 4.4 
shows examples of the severe damage caused by the 2011 floods. 
 
Figure 4.4: Rughamah District: Impact of the Flooding (Okaz, 2011) 
4.9.2 Mraykh Site 
 The second site selected was one of the poorest in Jeddah.  The main reason for 
choosing Mraykh was a preliminary impression that the site very obviously exhibits a lack of 
resilience and adaptive capacity.  Located approximately 4 km east of the Al-Haramain express 
road, which connects the cities of Jeddah and Makkah, Mraykh covers the smallest site area 
selected for this research: about 0.23 km2.  The population at the time of the research was 
estimated to be approximately 1,215, living in about 750 houses.  This site lacked proper public 
infrastructure, such as water and sanitation facilities, and was very vulnerable because of its 
location downstream of many surrounding mountain and valley drains, which put it at serious 
risk of flash flooding.  Figure 4.5 presents photographs of the poor conditions around this site. 
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Figure 4.5: Poor Conditions in Mraykh (Source: Okaz) 
The majority of the inhabitants of Mraykh were illegal immigrants, engaged mainly in seasonal 
or part-time labor.  Their income and education levels were very low, with many lacking even 
elementary school education or skills.  During the first two to three weeks of the initial 
emergency period, i.e., during the initial relief and early recovery operations, limited relief was 
provided to the Mraykh site.  The greatest concern for many individuals, community leaders, and 
community-based groups was therefore ensuring that enough food and money could be secured 
to meet their daily needs.  In acts of solidarity, other communities, along with friends and family 
members from other areas, gave small donations and personal assistance.  A few days later, 
assistance was provided in terms of more substantial food supplies, donations, and health 
services from the government and other large organizations.  However, there were accessibility 
difficulties related to reaching the site, as well as limited logistical coordination, which disrupted 
the distribution of this aid.  As a result, most of the houses remained unrecovered following the 
flash flood, many without even floors or finished walls. Figure 4.6 shows residents of Mraykh 
being interviewed about their experiences. 
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Figure 4.6: Interviewing Households in Mraykh (Author, 2015) 
4.9.3 Nakheel Site 
 The third site, the Nakheel district, was selected because it is representative of a modern 
neighbourhood approved in accordance with the urban planning guidelines of the Municipality of 
the City of Jeddah.  The site was inhabited by approximately 1,930 people, whose average 
education levels were fairly high.  The majority belonged to the upper middle income class.  The 
area is at risk of flooding because it is located on the upper side of the Goz Valley.  During the 
2009 flood, the dam at the eastern boundary of the district overflowed and was breached by the 
flooding, immersing all nearby neighbourhoods.  Hundreds of homes and vehicles were either 
destroyed or severely damaged, as depicted in Figure 4.7.  More than 90 % of the homes at this 
site were totally inundated, and entire families were forced to climb to their roofs to escape the 
rising floodwaters.   
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Figure 4.7: Breached Dam near Nakheel (Al-Madinah, 2011) 
Civil Defense teams used rubber boats and heavy equipment to evacuate residents from their 
homes, as depicted in Figure 4.8.  The General Directorate of Civil Defense authorized the use of 
furnished apartments in another part of Jeddah for the accommodation of families whose homes 
had collapsed or were damaged by the flooding. 
 
Figure 4.8: Using Rubber Boats to Evacuate Residents at the Nakheel Site (Al-Madinah, 2011) 
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4.9.4 Goyzah Site 
 The fourth and largest site selected for this research is Goyzah, located south of the 
Rughamah district, with an area of 0.96 km2, a population of approximately 10,000 people, and a 
total of 970 dwellings.  The majority of the populations were lower middle class with respect to 
income and education.  A core residential area surrounded by the Goz Valley, the Goyzah site is 
characterized as a semi-randomly patterned neighbourhood, in which the majority of houses are 
located in close proximity to one another.  Following the disaster, officials acknowledged that 
Goyzah was situated on a floodway leading to the valley, which should not be the case.  A 
number of documents were released to state that over a hundred people had died and thousands 
left homeless.  As depicted in Figure 4.9, the scenes of massive property destruction gave the 
impression of the impact of a hurricane or a tsunami rather than just a heavy rainstorm. 
 
Figure 4.9: Massive property destruction in the Goyzah District (Civil Defense, 2011) 
As buildings in this area began to collapse, the Civil Defense authorities were unable to reach or 
operate in this district, and they declared the district a closed site so that no vehicles were 
permitted to enter or exit.  These conditions prompted the Civil Defense authorities to call on 
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people to move to stronger buildings that were still standing and not to leave the area for safety 
reasons (Asharq al-Awsat, 2011). 
4.10 Initial Quantitative Analysis 
 For an effective evaluation of the various data sources, a series of separate data analysis 
techniques were implemented.  The analysis helped with the comprehension of the large amount 
of data collected, the classification of comments according to common themes, and the mining of 
the data sets in order to generate theories about the disaster recovery process.  The following 
sections outline the processes involved in organizing and analyzing each type of dataset.  The 
researcher reviewed all of the data, information, documents, and written and audio records, with 
the goal of finding significant ideas, hypotheses, and compelling facts.  The review also helped 
the researcher become more familiar with the properties and characteristics of the research 
materials and all of the dimensions involved in the research objectives.  Due to the complications 
of translating the interview data from Arabic into English, the initial round of analysis adopted a 
quantitative technique using Likert scale analysis to parse the data and locate the key themes.  
This provided a clear and simple method to undertake an initial analysis.  A Likert scale is 
defined as “a psychometric response scale primarily used in questionnaires to obtain participant's 
preferences or degree of agreement with a statement or set of statements. Likert scales are a non-
comparative scaling technique and are unidimensional (only measure a single trait) in nature” 
(Pohl 2008, pp.41- 63).  For this research, drawing from the framework’s key themes, Likert 
scale measures were used for quantifying household participant answers in a more systematic 
manner in order to facilitate the analysis and discussion of the results. 
 The five-point levels of the Likert scale technique were applied in three formats.  The 
first format used was a set of questions, for which the interviewee’s answers were ranked 
according to the following scale: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither agree nor 
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disagree, (4) agree, and (5) strongly agree (see Fig. 4.10).  The second format involved a set of 
questions that asked the interviewees to choose one of the five prepared model answers, which 
the researcher then ranked on a scale from 1 to 5.  Depending on the nature and objective of each 
question, an answer ranking of 1 could mean the best, highest, etc., or the worst, lowest, etc.  
Likewise, a ranking of 5 for a model answer could mean the best, highest, etc., or the worst, 
lowest, etc.  The third format was used by the researcher to evaluate additional sets of data, 
information, observation scripts, and his personal reflections in order to rate their usefulness.  A 
ranking of 5 was defined as “containing information very useful for analysis”, while a ranking of 
1 was defined as containing information not at all useful for analysis.  
4.11 Analysis of Household Interviews 
 Once the Likert scale data was incorporated into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, 
descriptive statistics were generated.  A visual representation of the data was provided through 
the use of graphs.  A sample MS Excel spreadsheet of household interview responses is provided 
in Figure 4.10, and of key informant interview responses in Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.10: Sample MS Excel Spreadsheet Record of Household Interview Responses 
According to the answers to Question 9, people in all four sites showed their strong social 
bonding and connections, as participants indicated that about 65% of the community members 
were very helpful to each other, while from the answers to Question 10, it is noted that Mraykh 
had the lowest level of government assistance in comparison to the other three sites.  
 Although the government announced a generous compensation program to help recovery 
in all affected sites across the city of Jeddah, the residents of Mraykh community were not able to 
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apply as many were illegal immigrants, and thus they were not able to provide the formal 
documentation required to support their applications.  It was noted that the only sources to help 
the residents of the Mraykh community were NGOs and CBOs.  Another decisive factor for the 
fast recovery of Mraykh was that most of its residents were construction labor, in contrast to the 
other sites.  Those residents had the required skills and tools to start rebuilding their damaged 
houses, which in fact were very simple structure-wise.  In contrast, recovery took longer in the 
other sites, as since most of the residents were employees, professionals, etc., they had to depend 
on hiring external contractors as well as receiving the government compensation to start their 
rebuilding activities.  However, some residents in Rughamah, Nakheel, and Goyzah used their 
personal savings, links, and bridging contacts to secure some initial and basic funds to start 
rebuilding while waiting for government compensation.   
4.12 Key Informant Interview Analysis 
 The idea was to access as much valuable information as possible with respect to specific 
issues and aspects of the assessment dimensions from key informants who had detailed insights 
and reflections about a number of specific questions and problems related to resilient recovery.  
The results of these interviews were also recorded in MS Excel spreadsheets, an example of 
which is provided in Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.11: Sample Spreadsheet Record of Key Informant Interview Responses 
For example, according to the answers provided (Q. 2), 80% of the key informants indicated that 
there were strong connections between all studied communities, and they were willing to help 
each other. This suggests that all sites were strongly bonded. People and volunteers were actively 
collaborative with even local residents in searching and exchanging information in providing the 
necessary rescue and recovery assistance to neighbors and other residents in coordination with 
the key informants as quick as possible within the time and capacity frames. In addition, from the 
answers provided for question 3, key informants indicated that overall recovery was better in 2011 
than 2009. This can be contributed mainly to the increased coordination and collaboration 
between NGOs and government authorities,  and also due to increased levels of risk awareness 
and preparedness initiatives in the community.  With respect to how fairly the aid from different 
sources was distributed, 80% of the key informants agreed that it was fair enough taking into 
consideration the priority, linking, and bridging capacities of the community members, except 
for the Mraykh site, where residents lacked outside connections with other communities as many 
were illegal immigrants.  However, most of the NGOs put the residents of Mraykh at the top of 
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the assistance list to ensure fair distribution of the aid.  
4.13 Challenges, Limitations, and Mitigation  
 A variety of research challenges and limitations were encountered.  The following list 
summarizes the challenges involved in conducting the research and the limitations associated 
with the data collected, as well as the mitigation strategies employed to circumvent those 
challenges and limitations. 
(a) Household and the key informant interviews: Many of the interviews and other secondary 
data sources were conducted in Arabic or derived from Arabic sources.  Although the 
researcher is a KSA citizen and Arabic is his mother tongue, difficulties still arose with 
the translation of some specific concepts into English.  For example, extra effort was 
needed first to understand the ideas expressed by the participants and then to translate 
them into English.   
(b) What could be called a sort of social distance was encountered in the form of a lack of 
bilateral trust with respect to some of the affected illegal immigrants who were 
interviewed, since they believed that the researcher might belong to a governmental 
agency and might report them for deportation.  The researcher was therefore required to 
be alert to any misunderstanding of the questions asked.  With the help of the key 
informant Mr. Alhibshy, the majority of the participants appreciated the significance of 
the research and actively participated and shared their ideas and perceptions.  Most 
interviewees viewed the researcher as a potential advocate who would express the needs 
of their community and shed light on their experiences.  
(c) The concepts of resilience and the role of the household capacity, organizational capacity, 
and social capital are relatively new and have not often been discussed in Saudi 
communities, so another challenge was the struggle to put these concepts and related 
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ideas into understandable and plain language that could be comprehended by the 
interviewees, some of whom had poor educational backgrounds.  To overcome this 
challenge, the author presented and explained the research proposal using colloquial 
language that could be easily understood, and also provided more detailed answers with 
respect to any questions or aspects that were unclear to the participants.  
(d) The location of the selected case study sites in the City of Jeddah created a challenge 
related to the unstructured diversity associated with the hierarchal order of the local 
society with respect to class, income, education, and ethnicity, which constituted 
additional assessment aspects that required consideration during the data collection 
process and the conducting of the field case-study procedures. 
(e) Due to the limitations of Saudi culture, it was not possible to interview female household 
members. 
4.14 Summary 
 This chapter has outlined the case-study methodology adopted for the investigation of the 
four case study sites selected for the field study.  It also outlines the conceptual resilient post-
disaster recovery assessment framework that was initially developed based on the literature 
review.  Data and information collected during the empirical phase were then used to test and 
revise the framework.  The revisions to the final framework are explained further in Chapter Six. 
 Data collection included the case-study interviews, field observations, reflections of the 
researcher, observation of a variety of participants, and analysis of secondary sources.  A total of 
40 household interviews were completed across the 4 case study sites.  The interviews with 10 
key informants, such as experts, government officials, and NGO practitioners, provided larger-
scale perspectives on issues related to recovery, resilience, and social capital.  These methods 
were utilized for collecting data and gathering important relevant information and details about 
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experiences in the four selected sites, which were severely impacted by the 2009 and 2011 
Jeddah flash floods.  The assessment of each affected community was focused on three main 
dimensions: household capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital.  
 All the data and information collected from the different sources were organized, 
archived, and coded using MS Excel spreadsheets, which formed a database for further analysis 
and the reporting of simple statistics.  A Likert scale technique was adopted as the clearest and 
simplest data-gathering technique for providing a comprehensive understanding of the recovery 
efforts from the multiple perspectives and viewpoints of the interviewees.  A number of 
challenges and limitations associated with the conducting of the research were discussed and 
detailed.  Examples of these challenges include time limitations as well as language and cultural 
barriers.  Mitigation strategies were presented in order to show the accommodation of the 
participants and the active facilitation of the implementation of the research.  
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Chapter 5: Results 
 This chapter presents the results obtained from the assessment of the three research 
dimensions.  The assessment was based on the case-study interviews with households and key 
informants and on the collection of data and information through field observations, the 
reflections of the researcher, and secondary sources.  As explained, these results were 
summarized, organized, and coded into categorized files for producing further analysis beyond the 
quantitative analysis and, where possible, were subdivided with respect to the four selected case-
study sites in order to provide a more distinct perception of the post-disaster recovery phase and 
assessment.  
5.1 Household Capacity 
 Based on the definition suggested by Lim et al. (2016), household characteristics and 
capacity-related factors were investigated.  These characteristics and factors included: (1) age 
and education, (2) household occupation, (3) number of years of residence in the house, (4) home 
ownership, (5) individual faith, and (6) access to information and communication.  The use of six 
indicators is important within the context of Saudi society for a number of reasons.  Age and 
education was included since the literature suggests that these two factors can impact post-
disaster recovery (Schlehe, 2010).  Saudis are also very stable residents in their home 
communities, meaning that moving from one city to another is not a common practice and home 
ownership is high.  The literature suggests that these two factors will likely affect the level of 
their sense of belonging and their willingness to help one another.  In Saudi society job type is 
important, since it is associated with hierarchal social status and access to resources.  An 
evaluation of resilience will enable the authorities to be better prepared at earlier stages in the 
disaster cycle, which could minimize the impact of potential disasters. 
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5.1.1 Age and Education of Interviewees 
 Improved health and educational status helps to increase resilience and limit the loss of 
life during natural disasters (Ivanov & Cvetkovi, 2014).  The fact is that a better-educated 
population generally behaves more appropriately to warnings and in accordance with the 
evacuation orders (Ivanov & Cvetkovi, 2014).  Age is an important factor that can determine the 
level of household capacity and thus affect overall community resilience.  On the one hand, 
seniors residing in a community might have lower self-evacuation capacities, and require higher-
priority assistance from the community.  On the other hand, community elders can provide 
subject-matter wisdom based on their extensive expertise and historical knowledge of past events 
(Thomas, 2006).  In contrast, if the community is dominated by younger age groups, since they 
can more easily help one another physically during and after a disaster, the community might 
have superior resources for a resilient recovery.  An individual can thus rely on the lessons 
learned, reflections, and opinions of key informants and households with older people, who can 
offer practical tips and useful information about their communities and recovery operations, 
while younger household members can provide the heavier work associated with disaster 
recovery and reconstruction.  Figure 5.1 indicates the average age of the interviewees.  
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                             Figure 5.1: Average Age of Interviewees 
Most of the participants stated that young people were able to provide extensive assistance 
during the flash floods.  Based on the collected data, and as shown in Fig. 5.1, most interviewees 
in the Mraykh area were young residents, and that was one of the factors that contributed to a 
faster recovery compared to other areas.  Youths and young men offered volunteer support to 
trapped residents during the events.  In contrast, older people were more vulnerable to severe 
physical harm and in need of special care, especially during evacuation and sheltering processes, 
which require strong collaboration and coordination among families and community members.  
Figure 5.2 shows younger community members forming a human chain to rescue others.  As 
stated by Ali (all names of the interviewees are pseudonyms), a 65-year-old resident of Goyzah: 
 My son and my two grandchildren helped me and my wife to evacuate our house. The[y] 
 hosted us in their house for more than three weeks before we return[ed] to our restored 
 home … and …I think we were not able to make it if they didn’t come on [sic] time.   
   
  99 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Young People Forming a Human Chain (Alriyadh, 2011) 
In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), as in the vast majority of other cultures around the 
world, seniors are highly respected, and it is understood and appreciated that they can positively 
influence the decisions of younger generations with respect to future milestones in their lives.  
During natural disasters such as flash floods, seniors can thus play an important role in providing 
wisdom and advice.  In Saudi society, weekly family gatherings at the house of the older family 
member are a sign of respect for elderly people.  These sentiments constitute strong evidence of 
a sense of attachment and belonging, which strengthens social bonds between family members 
and contributes to higher level of household capacity.  Figure 5.3 is a photograph taken during a 
field investigation and interview in Jeddah with a senior head of household.     
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Figure 5.3: Author interviewing a senior in Rughamah 
As explained by both key informants and several participants, because of the teachings of the 
Islamic religious faith, in the KSA older people are generally well taken care of by their children 
and blood relatives, who are accountable based on their religious obligation to do so.  The culture 
of respecting and helping seniors in the community is a social norm for younger people, 
performed with pleasure and esteem.  As noted by one key informant, neighbourhood 
associations can also take the initiative in encouraging seniors to come forward to provide 
expertise and wisdom to the community with respect to the tasks involved during potential future 
floods.  For example, seniors could be highly influential with respect to future community 
decisions related to emergency management plans and post-disaster recovery operations.   
 With respect to education and disaster resilience, Chester et al. (2010) stated that people 
may use educational qualifications and sophisticated perceptions of the science to rationalize 
disasters or other traumatic events.  Ivanov and Cvetkovi (2014) argued that a better educational 
status helps to reduce the vulnerability and limit of the loss of life during natural disasters.  A 
better-educated population is more inclined to follow warnings, and generally has a better access, 
understanding, and capacity to promote information related to the disaster from a variety of 
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sources, such as websites, social networking sites, and they behave properly in accordance with 
the evacuation orders.  There were significant differences in the level of education between 
household members in each of the four selected sites, as shown in Fig 5.4.  In terms of education 
analysis, the selected sample of interviewees showed that Nakheel had the highest educational 
levels, followed by Goyzah and Rughamah, while Mraykh had the lowest mean educational 
levels.  Based on the gathered information, these low educational levels can be attributed to social 
and demographic features, such as large populations of foreign laborers, residents, and illegal 
immigrants.  Further discussion is included in Chapter Six. 
 
Fig. 5.4 Average levels of education in the selected areas 
5.1.2 Household Occupation 
 The study provided evidence that many of the interviewees held jobs working with a 
variety of employers.  The distribution of occupations was diverse, with Mraykh seeming to have 
less prestigious professions and the only site where participants held service provision jobs (e.g., 
construction, maintenance workers, etc.).  As shown in Figure 5.5, most of the interviewees in 
the four sites under investigation worked for government and non-government organizations in 
the public service sector.  Others were employed by real-estate companies and the construction 
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industry, while a number were university or college professors.  The results revealed that people 
who worked in service jobs stated that they had a wide network of relationships, because they 
routinely dealt with customers on a one-to-one basis.  Real-estate and construction industry 
workers and staff explained for example, that they practiced building social relationships in their 
daily work connections and therefore have a greater social bridging and linking capacities to 
exploit in times of disaster.  As a result, they acquire high levels of social capital and resources 
that enable them to connect with others in their local communities, people in other 
neighbourhoods, and high-profile government officials during disaster, restoration, recovery, and 
development phases. 
 
Figure 5.5: Occupations of the Interviewees 
5.1.3 Length of Residence in the Dwelling Unit 
 As noted by several key informants, the length of residence correlates positively with the 
resilience capacity of a community because the longer people reside in a specific place, the more 
likely they are to become aware of local problems and challenges, and to have a comprehensive 
understanding of the various needs and demands of their local community through their daily 
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social interactions with other members of that community.  Longer-term residents have a special 
bond with their place of residence, which facilitates the opportunity to know and build social 
relationships with their neighbours.  These relationships provide backup support that is available 
whenever they need to seek assistance during a crisis.  As is evident from Figure 5.6, most of the 
participants had lived in the same house for more than five years.  However, in the Mraykh area, it 
is clear that most of the interviewees lived there less than five years because the majority was 
illegal immigrants who kept changing residences due to their work and immigration status.  
 
Figure 5.6: Length of the Interviewees’ Residence in the Community 
Most interviewees in Nakheel, Rughamah, and Goyzah expressed a stronger sense of togetherness 
and friendship when compared to Mraykh.  It was observed that social relationships and 
integration created stronger social bonds among community members.  Participants argued that 
because they usually meet in the masjid to pray together, and also meet during special social 
occasions, they feel more connected to one another and forge bilateral links.  In addition, common 
public spaces, such as coffee shops, stores, and shopping malls–as well as recreation activities and 
cultural events–were other places residents usually gather for scheduled or unscheduled meetings 
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and chats.  Over time, these opportunities increased a sense of community which was found to be 
helpful during the flood evacuations and recoveries.  In Nakheel, Rughamah, and Goyzah, most 
people were very proactive in evacuating their neighbours (despite the fact that they too had been 
impacted by the floods).   Several respondents noted that the length of stay in the neighborhood 
allowed residents to know each other closely, how the members of each family, their age and 
status, and whether there were elder people in need of special assistance. 
 As mentioned, most Mraykh residents were illegal immigrants who had resided there no 
longer than two to three years.  During the interviews, it became clear that the Mraykh residents 
did not have a sense of togetherness, which hindered their capacity and led to limited access to 
help from their neighbours. 
 In contrast to the other three sites, residents of Mraykh mentioned that, because the whole 
district was impacted by the floods, during the flash floods they had to rely heavily on nearby 
communities instead of seeking help from their immediate neighbours.  They therefore waited 
anxiously for evacuation support from these nearby communities. Zakariya, a building laborer 
who had lived in the Mraykh area for two years said: 
 My house was flooded with water and I tried to seek help from my next-door neighbour; 
 however, I found him in a situation not better than me. There was no relief or rescue staff 
 to ask for their help. We had to wait for seven hours before people from nearby 
 community and other volunteers [came] to rescue us.  
5.1.4 Housing Ownership 
 As Brown and Crawford (2006) argued, home ownership is one of the important elements 
of resilience in human societies with respect to recovering from disasters.  Collective ownership 
of a multi-storey building may also help reduce environmental degradation, which increases 
susceptibility to natural disasters, e.g., several people can share the same land, infrastructure, and 
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utility services.  People are psychologically more likely to invest in places where they can achieve 
long-term stability for themselves and their dependents. In the Saudi culture, investing in 
ownership of a house or a place in a specific community makes citizens more stable.  Owning a 
home is also one of the important factors that determine an individual’s local status in Saudi 
society.  Owning a house represents a valuable asset that residents are strongly willing to defend.  
They are thus keen to return home following a disaster, especially those who grew up in that 
location and have created memories and long-lasting social relationships as they have grown 
older.  
 One interviewee from Goyzah noted that people who rent an apartment or house develop a 
weaker attachment to the community and fewer social relationships, especially if their motivation 
to live in that community was driven by the availability of a job.  Therefore, when their homes are 
damaged during a disaster, the chances are that they will be more willing to relocate and the 
sooner the better, since they do not own any assets to worry about.  Because of the human need 
for a safe place to reside, they are therefore more willing to consider settling in other communities 
rather than waiting a long time for the completion of the recovery process.  As indicated in Figure 
5.7, on average, most of the people interviewed in the Rughamah, Nakheel, and Goyzah districts 
owned their homes.  Only about 18 % lived in rented housing, while private property owners 
represented about 82 %.  Based on the field observations, most of the residents of these sites were 
Saudis, and large numbers of them were blood relatives with strong social relationships.  
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Figure 5.7: Home Ownership Status of the Interviewees 
Other dimensions of why home ownership is important were observed in the Nakheel community, 
where almost 60 % of homeowners had hazard and disaster insurance policies.  They also 
displayed an additional organizational capacity in the form of interactive ties through local 
homeowners’ societies.  The interview data suggests that these assets were crucial for resilient and 
fast recovery since insurance policies and societal organizational capacity provided immediate 
sources of relief and aid.  According to the statement from Sameer, a retired resident of the 
Rughamah area: 
 I owned this house for more than eight years. I know almost everyone [who] lives in the 
 area. We used to pray together in the masjid five times a day. All my three children grew 
 up in this house and they are attached to it. They used to walk to school with their peers, 
 neighbours, and friends. Simply, I can’t leave this community. 
Sentiments such as these constitute strong evidence of a sense of attachment and belonging, 
which strengthens bonding social capital and contributes to post-disaster resilience. 
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 As expected, none of the Mraykh participants reported that they owned their home.  This 
finding is expected, given that the majority of the residents are illegal immigrants from different 
nationalities.  Notwithstanding the comments made above by Saudi citizens, and although the 
participants of the Mraykh area (Site 2) were considered the poorest (with the lowest social status 
and shortest period of residence), the post-disaster recovery of the site was the fastest because it 
contained predominately small, single-storey separate dwellings, and most of residents owned 
inexpensive furniture and vehicles, few electronics and appliances, and almost no collectibles.  
According to Ghulam, a Mraykh resident, “It took me only five days to come back to my house.” 
He added, “I only rebuilt the wall, [and] cleaned the house; the aid I received from the NGO 
[food, clothes, and some household items] was enough for me to come back to my house.”  Figure 
5.8 offers an example of the aid supplies distributed by NGOs to the residents of the Mraykh site.  
Based on field observations, the primary motivation for the Mraykh residents, who were illegal 
immigrants, to return to their home was that they had no other place to go.  Thus, despite the fact 
that interviewees had frequently changed their residence in the past, most said that after the floods 
they preferred to repair damaged homes and return to that location in order to avoid dealing with 
Saudi authorities.   
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Figure 5.8: Distributing Housing Supplies in the Mraykh Area (Arab News, 2011) 
For the other three sites – Nakheel, Rughamah, and Goyzah – the level of post-disaster recovery 
varied depending on the severity of the damage and according to financial assets, size of the 
home, and the contribution of NGOs and other government agencies.  A sample of the comments 
from the field observations includes one from Mr. Ali Khan: “I lost everything because of the 
flash flood. I spent all of my savings to build this house, purchase [the] best furniture and 
appliances, and a new car. Unfortunately I lost everything…”  Likewise, another resident 
mentioned that he had installed a new sewer system that was completely ruined due to the 2011 
flood.  He also claimed that he had bought a taxicab to operate as a way of earning additional 
income.  It was noted during the field observations that the amount of damage to the 
infrastructure systems was the most influential factor that determined the speed of the post-
disaster recovery and the restoration of a community, e.g., sewer system, electricity, and main 
water pipes.  Well-designed, planned, and protected infrastructure systems as well as the 
availability of additional assets and easy access to emergency and aid resources therefore 
increase the levels of resilience and facilitate post-disaster recovery. 
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5.1.5 Individual Faith 
 In a country dominated by Muslims and in the context of Saudi Arabian culture, Islam is 
itself an important and powerful form of household capacity.  In line with their religious 
teachings, people are very enthusiastic about volunteering their help and assistance in any 
emergency or crisis, and this was made evident during the post-disaster recovery.  Research has 
shown that established religious faith can be an important a positive contribution to community 
resilience (Joakim & White, 2015).  According to the results of the field case studies and the 
observations of the researcher, the strong religious faith evident in each of the four selected sites 
influenced and promoted the levels of resilience in those communities.  
 One interpretation of the interview results suggests that lower levels of resilience could 
be seen in interviewees who tended to believe in destiny and assumed a fatalistic attitude toward 
the occurrence of disasters and hazards.  Based on definitions expressed by Taylor (1962) and 
Joakim and White (2015), fatalism is defined as the belief that there is nothing people can do to 
alter their fates, and that future events are subject to the will of God.  The results of the 
interviews showed that all 40 of the participants (100 %) attributed the flash flood disasters to 
the will of God.  They also believed that it was written in the Book of Destiny that God had 
scripted all events from the beginning of time until the Day of Judgment.  Thus, due to this 
belief, some people argued that nothing could or should be done to prepare for disasters.  As an 
interviewee from the Goyzah area put it, “For humans, they cannot do anything. Anything that is 
the will of God will happen and humans can’t stop that.”  Rami, another respondent, who is from 
the Nakheel area, said,  
 Everything that happened in the world, especially the disasters – God already arranged  
 for that. What happens next has already been arranged. If I will live or die, it has been 
 already written in my Book of Destiny so I don’t feel afraid.  
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Despite this fatalism, when investigated interviewed in further detail, with respect to the 
supportive anticipatory and preparatory measures that could have averted or mitigated the impact 
of the disaster, the majority of household respondents believed that there were a number of 
proactive measures that could have helped reduce the amount of damage and the number of 
casualties.  These measures included improved building codes, construction standards and 
specifications, community familiarity with basic first aid, and knowledge of emergency 
evacuation procedures.  Interestingly, this belief corresponds with Islamic teachings, which insist 
on advance preparedness in all aspects of the life of a Muslim believer.  As stated by Imam 
Ahmed, leader of the Rughamah Mosque, the historical religious scholar Anas Ibn Malik 
reported that “A man said, O Messenger of Allah, should I tie my camel and trust in Allah, or 
should I untie it and trust in Allah?”  Imam Ahmed went on to say, “True believers should follow 
the Hadith Sharif of the Prophet Mohamed (Teachings) on reliance narrated by Anas Ibn Malik: 
“Trust in Allah, but tie your camel and give regard to worldly causes.”  The interpretation of this 
reading is that a person must prepare by implementing all potential preventative measures, must 
be ready to react according to a plan, and then must rely on God. 
 In addition, many of the participants underscored the role of prayers and honest faith, as 
well as the desire to be a good person, as psychological preparation for any future disasters.  It 
has been observed that, after experiencing the risk of death and suffering, people will turn to 
their religion and prayers, a phenomenon called “religious comfort seeking” (Sibley & Bulbulia, 
2012; Joakim & White, 2015).  As claimed by Grandjean et al. (2008) and Joakim and White 
(2015), this behavior usually helps people develop a sense of control and allows them to create 
strategies for coping with a disaster.  This perspective offers evidence that faith-based 
interpretations of a disaster can provide spiritual resilience for the people affected.  For example, 
Mohamed from the Nakheel district noted,  
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 In a difficult time or unexpected time, maybe people need someone that can make people 
 attached with [sic] one another [and] create a comfort space and a hosting community, 
 which preferably would have the same religion. People therefore will feel closer than 
 before. Sometimes they will have more trust because they have known each other in 
 previous relaxed times. 
Thus, while fatalism appeared to suggest an unwillingness to mitigate risk and low levels of 
resilience, the role of religious beliefs was much more nuanced.  Participants noted that no 
matter how well the community was prepared or how well homes were constructed; there was 
still the potential for them to be affected by a disaster because the will of God would prevail.  
The interviewees also recognized that there is always some degree of a risk of failure associated 
with any technology or human-made structure regardless of whether that failure can be attributed 
to the power of nature or to some sort of divine intervention.  The data suggests that religious 
belief systems, when combined with interventions designed to reduce risk, can serve to enhance 
resilience capacities.  
5.1.6 Communication and Access to Information  
 Information can be collected from various formal and informal sources such as news 
media, experts, government officials, friends and families (Howe, 2011).  The case-study 
investigations revealed that most of the interviewees learned about the floods from sources other 
than official authorities or local government agencies (Figure 5.9).  Family members, 
neighbours, friends, social media, and other media broadcasters were the primary sources of 
immediate information.  Avenues of acquiring news included phone calls and text messages 
received from close family members and other relatives who were living in other districts in 
Jeddah.  Flood footage shot by rescuers and relief volunteers went viral on social media and were 
instantly seen by millions across the KSA and even worldwide.  These videos have contributed 
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to identifying affected areas, facilitating faster aids delivery, and enabling them to accelerate 
recovery.  According to the interviewees, none of them received any notification warning them 
of the flood risk from any government or non-government sources.  The data therefore suggest 
that social networks, supported by mainstream media and social media were the primary way for 
interviewees to obtain information during the response period. 
 
Figure 5.9: How Information about the Floods was obtained by the Interviewees 
5.2 Organizational Capacity 
 Broadly defined as the ability of an organization to meet its goals. Organizational 
capacity has been a particular focus of scholars who seek to understand of the variables that 
impact the organizational performance of a community (Bryan, 2011).  This topic has also been 
of interest to outside funders, such as charities, who have been increasing their efforts in building 
the effective capacity of communities, especially with respect to organizations that provide 
services to the general public. 
5.2.1 Role of Government Organizations 
 With respect to organizational structure, the KSA is an absolute monarchy, with the 
central national government located in Riyadh, the capital of the country.  Through a number of 
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ministerial departments, the national government supervises 13 provincial governments across 
the KSA.  The ministerial departments exercise some local power, perform local functions, and 
also have representation in each of the provinces (Saudi Arabia Ministry of Interior, 2013).  Part 
of the function of the ministerial departments in the province of Makkah is to direct the 
provincial government and supervise city municipalities across the province, such as the City of 
Jeddah.  
 In the oil-export-based KSA economy, the government previously provided substantial 
subsidies and bursaries to its citizens.  However, due to the 2008 recession and recent drop in oil 
prices, the government has introduced numerous reforms and budget cuts.  Unfortunately, 
especially for the 2009 flood, at that time the government also lacked a comprehensive and 
effective disaster-management framework.  Accordingly, in the case of the City of Jeddah, some 
respondents mentioned that if they could have relied on assistance from government 
organizations and received necessary information in time, their resilience could been have 
significantly improved.  Several participants pointed out that the recovery frameworks of 
government organizations should be transparent and widely disseminated to local citizens so that 
they can trust them and rely on them.  They could then also be part of a post-disaster recovery 
plan, which would certainly enhance the resilience of the impacted communities.  Faleh, a 65 
year-old resident of Goyzah, said, “Government agencies were not expecting a disaster of this 
magnitude.”  He also added that “government agencies [should] learn from this lesson and be 
more prepared for future events.”  
5.2.2 Compliance with Building Regulations and Bylaws 
 According to the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MMRA), a real estate 
developer must obtain building permits in accordance with the Master Zoning Plan of the City of 
Jeddah and related bylaws, which must comply with technical standards approved by the 
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MMRA.  Any building permit must include proof of compliance with all planning, architectural, 
and engineering technical requirements and specifications, including design criteria, standards, 
and specifications; population density studies and expected number of units; estimated 
consumption of water, electricity, telephone lines, and sanitation; and number of parking spaces 
required (Municipality of Jeddah, 2010).  These regulatory provisions are mandatory legal 
requirements for the approval of any building permits, development projects, subdivision 
planning, city growth, or economic development activities in the City of Jeddah.  However, due 
the absence of effective bylaw enforcement, regular building oversight auditing, and proper 
engineering supervision, builders neglect the regulatory requirements of the bylaws and other 
organizational policies when constructing new buildings (Jeddah Municipality, 2010).  For 
example, as noted in the field observations, a multi-story building is being constructed to block a 
flood drainage channel, which is an explicit violation of the building bylaws and codes, as well 
as the ethics and values of the construction industry (Figure 5.10). 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Housing Construction in a Flood-Prone Area (Saudi Gazette, 2009) 
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In such situations, there seems to be a combination of factors at play, including the absence of 
bylaw enforcement; the prevailing culture of ignoring building codes, professional ethics, and 
values; as well as lack of government oversight and implementation mechanisms.  As a result, all 
of the communities affected are dramatically vulnerable to flooding, and the resilience capacity 
of city dwellers with respect to any future disasters is negatively impacted. 
 An additional perspective to consider is whether community development has been based 
on proper urban planning or on random development.  Figure 5.11 clearly demonstrates the 
effect of planning: the difference between the housing at Site #1 (Rughamah, which was 
carefully planned) and that at Site #4 (Goyzah, which evolved haphazardly) is obvious.  
According to the field case-study results, Site #1 relief and rescue operations were more effective 
and faster than those at Site #4.  Areas that developed without careful planning thus experienced 
generally greater difficulty in recovering than those that benefited from prior urban planning.  
Well-organized and -planned areas are accessible and aid can be delivered more easily and 
quickly, as well as repairing damaged infrastructure, which contributes to faster recovery.  
 
Figure 5.11: Evidence of Planning Discrepancies that can Affect Recovery (Google Earth) 
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Examples of these problems were noted in the statements of key informants and interviewees and 
were also observed by the researcher:   
- Some houses were built on flood-prone areas either without permission from the 
municipality or with permission that was obtained via corruption or “favours.” 
- In many apartment buildings vulnerable to flooding, the ground floor was used for 
residential purposes, whereas safety regulations stipulate that those areas should be for 
parking or open space. 
- Electricity meter boards located close to street level were inundated by the floods, 
causing electrical hazards, which led to some casualties and deaths. 
- Some home owners installed anti-theft steel guards on the windows, which hindered the 
effectiveness of rescue and evacuation operations. 
- Due to poor sanitary infrastructure and a completely blocked system, flood water became 
polluted due to back-flooding from sewers and residential septic tanks. 
- Habitation ratio limits were ignored. The number of residents living in some houses 
exceeded the maximum legal capacity of the dwelling unit, a violation that led to 
increased fatalities in the areas affected. 
5.3 Disaster Management 
 The Municipality of the City of Jeddah is responsible for all local community affairs, 
including disaster planning and emergency response through the Regional Committee for Civil 
Defense (RCCD).  In the event of a natural disaster, the RCCD implements the directives of the 
city council with respect to firefighting, search and rescue, and ambulance services.  The RCCD 
has broad powers to instruct civil and military organizations, determine the use of public 
resources, and coordinate all disaster intervention and recovery operations as required.  The 
RCCD therefore prepares local emergency response plans, directs all response teams, and 
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coordinates communication with all government and non-government organizations in order to 
provide efficient response and recovery activities.  To meet its commitments, the RCCD is also 
responsible for sourcing and training appropriate teams, as well as implementing, enforcing, and 
overseeing all aspects related to occupational health and safety regulations (Saudi Arabia 
Ministry of Interior, 2013).  
 Based on the field case-study observations and interviews with key informants, some of 
the affected residents were located post-disaster in temporary shelters while others stayed with 
friends and relatives.  As indicated in Figure 5.12, about 80 % of participants affected by the 
2009 or 2011 flash floods took shelter in government-provided temporary housing, in some cases 
for as long as three months.  The remaining 20 % were split between staying with relatives and 
being accommodated by friends.  
 Government response and recovery initiatives were praised by the interviewees at the 
three wealthier sites.  Here, the government provided not only compensation but also shelter and 
necessary living supplies such as food, drinking water, blankets, beds, medicine, and non-
perishable food supplies.  However, in the Mraykh area, there were no government-provided 
shelter initiatives.  The most likely reason for this discrepancy is that most of the residents were 
illegal immigrants.  Residents of this site were therefore forced to live in their damaged houses 
and share them with other affected neighbours.  Some of the impacted residents lived in their 
neighbours’ homes for several weeks. 
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Figure 5.12: Accommodation of Affected People During and after the Flooding 
Clear variations were also evident in interviewee responses regarding questions about sources of 
help and aid during the flood events and the importance of the role of government initiatives 
following the disaster.  As indicated in Figure 5.13, government initiatives during the post-
disaster recovery period for all sites except Mraykh were regarded as influential and generous.  
Half of the interviewees at the Rughamah, Nakheel, and Goyzah sites reported that government 
ministries responded quickly to distribute drinking water, necessary medicine, and temporary 
shelters, and to provide transportation services to hospitals and healthcare centres.  In general, 
these interviewees believed that government initiatives were well organized with respect to their 
response to the disaster and during the post-disaster recovery period.  
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Figure 5.13: Government Initiatives 
 
Figure 5.14: Government Compensation Applications in Progress (Sada News, 2011) 
As well, for those who receiving government assistance, the local governments in the disaster 
areas played an important role by disbursing compensation to the people who had lost significant 
portions of their property.  The amount of compensation given was based on the reported loss of 
wealth and assets.  Thousands of people were compensated for their damaged properties, and 
families who lost relatives received SR1 million (approximately $350K CDN) for each death, as 
shown in Figure 5.14 (Okaz, 2012).  Although the compensation system was somewhat delayed 
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by bureaucratic inefficiency, the monetary amount was significant and important to note.  Local 
governments also helped with the distribution of relief aid and were the first to respond, even 
with limited manpower.  According to key informants, within 24 hours, volunteers were 
prompted to join the local government team to deliver relief such as drinking water, to find safe 
places for children, to transport the injured to health centres and hospitals, and to provide 
necessary first aid and medicine. 
 Two days after the disaster, local governments also set up reporting centres where people 
could report problems and emergency needs, and they established communication resources to 
facilitate contact with friends and relatives living elsewhere.  Temporary shelters were organized 
for the affected communities before their residents were placed in other areas.  A large number 
of volunteers, ranging in age from 20 to 55, helped local government officials and rescue teams 
to evacuate people from flood-hit areas.  
 However, all of this aid is in direct contrast to the Mraykh site.  There were no 
government initiatives at this location because it was a community of illegal immigrants and 
government aid could not be provided according to government mandates.  Most of the aide 
received at the Mraykh site came from NGOs and relatives or friends. 
5.4 Additional non-Governmental Capacity: NGO, CBO and Emergent Organizations 
 Recent political and social reforms have provided an opportunity for the establishment and 
strengthening across the KSA of many social organizations which serve to supplement 
governmental DM capacity at both the local and national levels: interest-based youth, women’s 
groups, organizations for people with disabilities, special needs groups, labor organizations, and 
others.  The following are examples of these organizations, groups, and clubs in the City of 
Jeddah:  
  121 
 
- Emdad-SA (Risk and Disaster Management Team): This non-profit organization was 
established in 2010 after the 2009 flash flood.  Its main goal is to manage crises and disasters in 
Jeddah.  Members are committed to their core values and principles of neutrality, humanity, 
impartiality, and independence in providing their services.  They support the efforts of local 
communities to strengthen their capacities with respect to monitoring disasters and providing 
early warnings as well as counseling afterward in order to reduce the risk of natural disasters, 
increase preparedness, and enhance mitigation efforts.  According to the case-study results, 
Emdad-SA was actively engaged in providing support during the 2011 Jeddah flash flood (Yahya, 
2015). 
- Civil Protection Volunteer Institution: This group is another youth team whose goal was to 
provide humanitarian services and rescue operations for communities affected during the 2009 
and 2011 Jeddah flash floods.  Mr. Tayseer Alhibshy, one of the key informants for this research, 
was head of the team and provided information about the role of his organization during the post-
disaster recovery.  
-           Jeddah Islamic Education Foundation is a charitable cooperative under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, which aims to provide Islamic education in several languages to 
Muslims and non-Muslims communities.          
-          City of Jeddah Literary Club: Established in 1995, this group aims to strengthen the roles 
of cultural and national identity.  It is one of the most important literary and cultural clubs in 
Jeddah and is open to all local intellectuals and scholars.  The club runs a variety of programs and 
activities that encourage and nurture literary talents, help build networks, and maintain closer 
links with writers and intellectuals across the city and throughout the country. 
- Literary Girls Book Club: This female-only book club meets once a month.  It was started 
by a group of friends who wanted to nurture their passion for reading.  The initiators were 
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motivated by the need to inspire and encourage women to read so that they could become more 
knowledgeable and strengthen their capacities and social skills.  The club usually chooses a theme 
for each meeting, and members are then encouraged to explore a variety of books that fall within 
that theme. Although the meetings are casual, they are nonetheless informative and educational. 
 During the 2009 and 2011flash floods, these organization and many more were actively 
involved in providing relief, aid, and assistance services.  Other organizations included the World 
Assembly of Muslim Youth, Muwatana, and Friends of the City of Jeddah all of which provided 
extremely valuable help by conducting field surveys, distributing donations, cleaning homes, and 
dispensing information brochures, as portrayed in Figure 5.15 (Arab News, 2009).  In addition, 
men, women, and teenage volunteers were very active in helping needy residents by handing out 
relief aid and other humanitarian assistance, as shown in Figure 5.16. 
 
Figure 5.15: Volunteers from the City of Jeddah (Asharq al-Awsat, 2012) 
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Figure 5.16: Delivering Food and Medicine to Affected People in Shelters (Alriyadh, 2012) 
The interviewees mentioned that they received different types of assistance from both government 
and non-government organizations.  As shown in Figures 5.16 and 5.17, both government and 
non-government organizations distributed housing supplies and provided relief and other services, 
such as non-perishable food supplies, drinking water, blankets, beds, medicine, economic and 
mental support, monetary help, and shelters (Alriyadh, 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.16: Collection of Relief Supplies and Provision of Social Assistance (Alriyadh, 2011) 
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Figure 5.17: Aid Distribution (Okaz, 2010) 
Based on the findings and interview results, it can be noted that in most of the areas, affected 
residents received substantial relief and recovery assistance from either government or non-
government organizations.  Indeed, NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) were 
active in Rughamah and Goyzah, providing basic needs to people affected by the floods.  
However, government aid was evident primarily in Nakheel, where the municipal officials 
resided, and access to government services was available immediately following the event.  In 
contrast, due to the illegal status of the population in Mraykh, the main source of aid was from 
NGOs and CBOs with some help from neighbours.  The perception of the participants from all 
sites was that the NGOs were very active and had an effective network for providing aid and 
assistance to the affected inhabitants. “I think they did everything possibly [sic] they [NGOs] 
could do,” said a wife of a head of household with three children whose Goyzah-area house was 
damaged by sewer water during the flood.  “I'm not into blaming individuals; there is plenty of 
blame to go around. But that’s not the issue. Let’s make sure it never happens again,” she added.  
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 Because of the cultural and religious background of Saudi society, local people were 
accustomed to forming a number of community organizations, either formal and registered or 
informal and unregistered.  Registered community organizations include but are not limited to 
youth associations, daycare centres, clubs, and recreational and leisure-based organizations.  
Other registered local organizations that are usually outreach extensions of the masajid are 
orphan’s associations, social dispute councils, Quran memorization centres, and others.  In 
contrast, unregistered community organizations include groups of volunteers and gatherings of 
female household members who meet with the goal of improving housekeeping and other 
vocational skills.  
 In Saudi society, these community organizations help develop robust relationships that 
strengthen societal bonds and the sense of belonging among different classes of community 
members.  These organizations usually keep some emergency reserves, which are offered to their 
members in emergency situations at both the individual and community levels.  Therefore, the 
more people are involved in community organizations, the more the community will have access 
to emergency resources during both disasters and post-disaster recovery periods.  The roles and 
responsibilities of these organizational resources become crucial, especially when recovery 
programs following massive disaster events are slow or impeded.  Many participants mentioned 
that the contributions of the CBOs helped households maintain considerable resilience and 
strength so that they could recover psychologically from the disaster, as well as rehabilitate their 
communities.  
 CBOs were identified and classified by the KSA and the City of Jeddah, and this then 
provided a structure upon which the government could work with these organizations post-
disaster.  Their primary tasks were to provide a platform for the community to come together, 
analyze the causes of problems, work toward feasible solutions, communicate with decision-
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makers, raise community awareness with respect to environmental and disaster issues, monitor 
relief and recovery operations, and provide contextual evaluations.  Featured CBOs who 
participated in the Jeddah disaster recovery efforts included: (1) the Women's Charity Society, 
(2) the Faisaliah Charity Feminism Organization, (3) Neighborhood Society Centres, (4) the First 
Women's Charity, (5) Charity House, and (6) the Al-Ber Society.  Based on the data collected, in 
general, Jeddah CBOs played a prominent and active role in providing humanitarian services to 
the affected households.  They were able to provide cash and in-kind donations, organize and run 
fundraising events, and offer emotional support.  
 According to the case-study results, a number of CBOs focussed on different areas of 
interest, and actively participated in specific aspects of the recovery efforts.  They were part of 
the team that assisted with the distribution of relief aid and the implementation of recovery help 
programs.  The contribution of the CBOs clearly emphasizes the social capital that contributes to 
the resilience of their communities.  Neighbourhood leaders spearheaded the collection of data 
and the distribution of aid in their areas, and women’s organizations and female volunteer groups 
provided a significant contribution by helping impacted females and children, since social and 
religious custom generally restricts men from interacting with these groups.  Women’s 
associations provided many services to the affected communities, including maternal and child 
health, social care, and assistance with financial matters. 
 As observed during the field interviews, most CBOs worked closely with masajid and 
other religious organizations across Jeddah, because in most cases, members of the CBOs were 
also members in their local masjid.  In the Muslim culture, the masjid, in addition to functioning 
as an empathy-promoting center, plays a role similar to an investment incubator, especially 
during emergencies, disasters, or social conflicts.  This effect is attributable to Islamic teachings 
that encourage all people to take part in doing good deeds so that they will reap great rewards 
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from God.  Residents therefore assumed responsibility for helping the needy in their community 
because of their religious beliefs.  
 On other occasions, emergent volunteer groups of young men provided towing services 
to those who were stranded by flooding, as can be seen in Figure 5.18.  Their services included 
pulling cars from flooded streets and delivering food and medicine.  Another group of volunteers 
drove a truck displaying a large photograph of a sport utility vehicle with two contact phone 
numbers to call, as well as a written statement: “If your car got stuck don’t hesitate to call the 
volunteers.”  The group also continually urged owners of four-wheel-drive vehicles to come 
forward and help stranded citizens (Arab News, 2015).  
 
Figure 5.18: Group of Young Men Providing Towing Services (Arab News, 2011) 
Mr. Tariq Alabdullah, one of the volunteers, said that he asked several young drivers to use their 
4x4 vehicles to help members of the community.  He said that the group had assisted the elderly, 
people suffering from hypertension and diabetes, and others stranded in their homes or cars.  Mr. 
Abdullah added that the group tried to recruit the owners of large vehicles across the city so that 
each person would be responsible for a specific area, and they provided contact numbers to the 
public.  Hisham, a young volunteer, said that the group prioritized the elderly and sick, including 
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dialysis patients who could not be late for their appointments and motorists who were stranded 
with children inside their cars.  Hisham added that they printed Google Maps identifying 
severely damaged areas, took photographs of closed or damaged roads, and warned people to 
avoid these locations (Arab News, 2015). 
 According to the results collected, more than 90 % of the household members interviewed 
strongly believed that the community volunteers accelerated the recovery process, and most 
residents expressed their gratitude to the volunteers for their immediate response.  Salem, a 
grocery shop owner in the Goyzah area, said, "I think they tried everything [with] the [greatest 
possible] effort."  Another respondent named Abdurahim added, "I'm surprised what progress has 
been made; I think volunteers have done a great job."  When the interviewees were asked what 
values and norms the volunteers shared, Abdulaziz, a resident of the Nakheel area, suggested that 
“reciprocity and helpfulness were the most common values.”  Omar, a local masjid imam, told 
me that more than 40 people came to help clean the Rughamah Mosque after it was heavily 
damaged by 1.5 m of water.  Residents of Goyzah and Mraykh spoke with great appreciation 
about the efforts of the volunteers in the aftermath of the floods.  They praised the helpfulness of 
strangers and fellow citizens, since they had been unable to help out their neighbours personally 
because of facing similar conditions themselves.   
 Most of the key informants identified a crucial link that was completely lacking: a relief 
and recovery coordination center.  They claimed that many people wanted to volunteer and offer 
their help, but did not know whom they should contact, and no information was available with 
respect to what exactly was needed to help the people in the disaster areas.  Due to a lack of 
coordination and management between the local government and NGOs, on one hand, and the 
volunteer groups, on the other, most volunteers ended up going to the sites and standing around, 
not knowing what to do.  Key informant Tayseer Alhibshy reported that these would-be 
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volunteers just documented, videotaped, and photographed the scenes with their cell phones.  
According to Mr. Alhibshy, due to a lack of professional rescue supplies, the volunteer SUV 
drivers, who were asked to help in the rescue efforts, were unable to drive because the water was 
so muddy and visibility was very limited.  
5.5 Religious Institutions and Cultural Practices 
 In Saudi culture as religious institutions founded 14 centuries ago with the rise of Islam, 
the masjids and jawami (mosques) offer physical space for worship, host other collective 
religious activities and weekly congregational, e.g., Jumma prayer.  In addition, Masjid and 
jawami buildings usually have multi-purpose spaces and rooms that can accommodate a wide 
range of social and religious activities and meetings.  During emergencies and disasters, these 
spaces are convertible resources that can be used for storing and distributing aid supplies and for 
coordinating relief efforts.  These spaces can also be utilized as meeting places where religious 
leaders and health professionals can offer emotional support and healing (IRIN, 2013).  
 As Joakim and White (2015) also found, media resources, such as loudspeakers, recorded 
speeches, open gatherings, and other audio systems were used as effective tools for providing 
important mass communication channels to the Jeddah public.  As indicated by many 
participants, relief and directive information was disseminated from the mosques through 
loudspeakers and the imam’s speeches in public areas.  Masjid and jawami resources were used 
prior to the disasters as early warning systems, as well as afterwards with respect to organizing 
relief, rescue, aid, and recovery efforts.  Saudi religious beliefs direct that others be helped 
regardless of their ethnicity, colour, gender, or any other characteristics or background, and 
respondents witnessed that the masjids and jawami played an active role in rebuilding and 
helping the community with respect to cultural and financial aspects, because the imams and 
members of these institutions took the lead in setting an example for the sake of God.  Most 
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imams are regarded as very trustworthy individuals in their communities, so that residents tend 
to believe an imam’s opinions, listen to their messages, and follow their instructions.  These 
institutions thus offer effective opportunities for facilitating successful and sustainable relief and 
recovery efforts. 
 Culture includes a set of organized approaches, practices, and beliefs that support the 
functioning of different societies and many of the cultural attributes in Jeddah provided important 
post-disaster support.  Local culture can be characterized by aspects such as shared religious 
beliefs, histories, heritage, values, knowledge, traditions, rituals, and ideologies (Daskon, 2010; 
Throsby, 1999; Joakim, 2013).  KSA is a culture is underpinned by an Islamic belief system that 
involves respect for older people and decisions made by the head of the household, generally a 
male, since Saudi society is patriarchal.  An ideal Muslim society is based on the fundamental 
belief that Islam is not only a worshipping practice but also a complete system of life and 
behaviour, a philosophy that the believer should constantly act upon.  Therefore, local cultural 
organizations and groups that represent individuals with common interests, such as retirees, 
journalists, volunteers, or landlords, often reflect Islamic teachings within their area of expertise.  
For example, commonly featured programs would include the following: 
• Reciting and memorizing the Holy Quran 
• Evening clubs for exchanging views about religion and contemporary political and social 
concerns 
• Cultural heritage preservation groups 
According to the collected data and results, such groups meet frequently – once or twice in a 
month – particularly in the Goyzah community, which is known locally as having the most 
religious activities because a number of strong religious leaders reside there.  
 The field observations revealed that these social organizations were highly effective with 
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respect to providing services to community members during and after the floods and were 
therefore an important factor in increasing organizational capacity and resilience at the 
community level and for the City of Jeddah in general.  For example, Civil Protection Volunteer 
Institution and Emdad have contributed significantly to the establishment of several courses and 
programs to educate the community in how to deal during and after disasters in order to increase 
resilience level. 
5.6 Social Capital 
 In line with the claims of scholars such as Putnam (2000) and Aldrich (2012), in Saudi 
society, social capital includes various formal and informal social connections that exist within a 
single community and/or enable it to bridge to other communities.  Based on shared cultural 
backgrounds and deeply rooted Islamic beliefs, Saudi social capital offers households and 
communities a concrete foundation of feelings of reciprocity, trust, and connections that 
fundamentally provide a basis for healthy and mutually beneficial social and economic 
interactions and activities.  Unfortunately, due to recent immigration laws, illegal immigrants are 
not included.  The case-study and related empirical analysis methodology entailed the 
exploration and evaluation of the following specific aspects of this topic. 
5.6.1 Religious Leadership 
 Religious leaders played a significant role in alleviating psychological trauma while 
helping those affected by the disaster.  They delivered speeches and lectures and offered spiritual 
recommendations to their community members in a variety of formats, such as media broadcasts, 
focused meetings, and weekly congregational services for Jumma prayers.  According to the 
results and observations, the key informants appreciated the importance of the speeches, lectures, 
and messages delivered by the religious leaders because they felt that the leaders demonstrated a 
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sense of responsibility for rebuilding the spirit and motivation of the people in their 
communities.  As Fahad from Nakheel stated,  
 The imam gave a comprehensive understanding of the flash flood and how people should 
 perceive it in order to preserve their faith and their feelings, as well as how they should 
 be more patient and react in a proactive way. In addition, religious leaders through their 
 respected status, encourage people to be more optimistic and build on the trust in Allah 
 and not be fearful, sad, or depressed as everything is written in their destinies by Allah. 
Omar from Goyzah also claimed that “Our mosque religious leaders addressed a factual 
understanding of the flash flood and how to rescue the people and myself. So I learned how to 
prepare for the flood from the religious leader.” 
 Based on the field observations as well as on the knowledge acquired about the current 
social structure of the Jeddah communities, different clans and groups of people live in the same 
communities.  This mix of residents sometime created conflicts with respect to the distribution of 
government development funds and other relief and recovery financial incentives.  However, the 
religious leaders mediated between the parties, helping them by reflecting on, and reminding 
them, about the Islamic teaching of preserving good neighborly relations, which makes people 
more respectful and understanding of the critical aspects of a situation and enhances the sense of 
community.  In many cases, government officials utilized a religious leader’s social status and 
mediation skills to achieve common understanding, fair compromises, and acceptable trade-offs.  
Some of the participants did not feel that this function falls within the mandate of a religious 
leader as opposed to government organizations.  However, as Joakim and White (2015) pointed 
out, others believe that coordinated and unified messages and efforts from government, social, 
and religious institutions together strengthen acceptance and acknowledgement of the best 
approaches to relief and recovery for their communities.  As a result, this can collectively help 
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reduce the risk of disaster and also improve the resilience and organizational capacities of the 
community. 
5.6.2 Social Connections 
 As suggested by Joakim (2013) and as evident in the case-study results, during the 
recovery work after the 2009 and 2011 Jeddah floods, many respondents noted that connections 
between residents and external networks (i.e., bridging capital) constituted a primary method of 
accessing external assistance.  In addition, communities that had higher levels of external 
connections were able to obtain more aid than those that did not.  Examples of such external 
networks and social connections were ones with religious leaders, NGOs, and high-
profile government officials, who were key resources with respect to obtaining further 
assistance and thus increasing the resilience of the community. 
5.6.3 Access to Funds 
 As soon as a disaster occurs, the communities and people impacted need immediate 
access to cash (monetary help) for purchasing important items such as food, medicine, water, and 
baby supplies, as well as other forms of instant relief aid.  However, during the 2009 and 2011 
floods, it was observed that banks were closed and cash machines were disabled for security and 
safety reasons so that people were prohibited from retrieving their own savings.  In most cases, 
people therefore asked for help from relatives or friends who could afford to offer cash quickly.  
The religious beliefs prevalent in a Saudi community mean that, in such situations, neighbours 
and relatives play a pivotal role in providing such help, based on their values of solidarity and 
duty.  The feedback received during the field interviews demonstrated that people who had 
access to cash immediately following the disaster were more resilient than those who did not, 
especially in the lower-income communities such as Goyzah and Mraykh, where many residents 
were financially unprepared for such a sudden disaster and lacked emergency financial 
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resources.  Immediate access to cash enabled them to rebuild their homes and recover faster than 
others. 
5.6.4 Access to Help from Relatives, Friends, and Neighbours 
 As Kirschenbaum (2006) identified, family relationships, empathy, and neighbours are a 
critical social mechanism for increasing resilience to disasters, particularly during the post-
disaster period, and also represent a resource for material and non-material support.  This 
assessment is supported by the data collected and the results of the analysis.  Almost all the 
people interviewed stated that they received immediate assistance from family members, blood 
relatives, and neighbours during the aftermath of the disaster.  Assistance took a variety of forms 
of emergency support, including cash, food supplies, and household goods.  Ali, a resident of the 
Nakheel district, said “My brother who lives in [the] northern part of the City of Jeddah, offered 
[that I could] stay in his house until I can rebuild my house.”  In fact, when asked what gave 
them strength to recover from the disaster, the majority of interviewees stated that the assistance 
of family and neighbours was an important support mechanism.  Tangible (cash money, 
appliances) and non-tangible (spirit and motivation) donations from friends and family members 
provided a number of households with more assistance than they needed, so the aid recipients 
would, in turn, share whatever they received with their neighbours and other community 
members in need.  Some interviewees also mentioned that they received significant help from 
outsiders such as volunteers from other communities. 
5.6.5 Access to Help from Formal Organizations 
 The results from the field case studies, observations, and discussions with the 
interviewees in each of the four communities revealed that all interviewees had reasonable levels 
of social capital, although some lacked bridging and linking social capital to enable them to 
communicate with and benefit from external communities.  As mentioned, Mraykh was 
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dominated by illegal immigrants, thus making it impossible for them to connect with government 
officials.  They also tended to refrain from any communication with NGOs or other 
organizations located outside their communities and networks. 
 A similar situation was evident in the Goyzah district, where the majority of the 
population was elderly and of lower middle class in terms of income level and education.  These 
factors resulted in poor and very limited connections with outside resources and to those in 
authority because the residents were lacking bridging and linking capacities.  As noted by Faleh, 
from the Goyzah district,  
 If we were sustainably connected with government authorities and officials, we would’ve 
 been much better. The people who have some sort of connection with authorities received 
 all kind[s] of assistance immediately. This is not fair. Our houses are still even without a 
 sewage system. 
On the other hand, communities like Nakheel and Rughamah successfully employed bridging 
social capital to connect with influential people in government and non-government 
organizations in order to obtain additional resources and other assistance from outside their area. 
5.6.6 Trust and Sense of Togetherness in the Local Communities 
 During the field case study, it was observed that the spirit of giving, support, and 
solidarity that are grounded in Islamic beliefs and teachings contributed to feelings of 
togetherness within the communities at the four selected sites.  Several household members 
mentioned that this was an essential source of social and spiritual support during and after the 
flash floods.  About 90 % of the interviewees confirmed community solidarity as a factor in 
providing strength for effective recovery.  Unexpectedly, many of the participants believed that 
the flash flood and recovery experiences brought their community closer together.  Additionally, 
as stated by Dr. Malawi, a homeowner in Nakheel district, who had lived in the area for more 
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than 20 years, “Neighbours are not just neighbours; they are circles of friends, colleagues, and 
confidantes who often [in] time form our [greater] family.”  Key informant Yahya, the founder 
of Emdad, a crisis- and disaster-management team, agreed, saying “Overall, there was a sense of 
community here … the wider sense of community comes in [a] large part from the shared norms, 
values, and experiences.”  According to Hassan and Badr from the Rughamah community, these 
shared values included reciprocity and helpfulness.  Likewise Anwar, who lived in the Nakheel 
district, commented, “I feel that Nakheel is better after the flood; people learned from the 
disaster that togetherness is very important [– helping] each other. No one can live alone in this 
world. Our people and neighbours make us stronger.”  
5.6.7 Willingness to Help One Another within the Community 
 Based on Saudi society norms and Islamic teachings related to voluntarily helping 
panicked and frightened people, as depicted in Figure 5.19, people who live in the same 
community will usually help one another during events such as disasters.  
 
Figure 5.19: Levels of Neighbourhood Social Capital Connections 
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The behavior exhibited in impacted communities in the City of Jeddah conformed to the Saudi 
and Muslim expectation: people helped one another to some extent.  However, poor 
coordination, lack of advance preparation, short response time, and limited capacities meant that 
people could not always help others living in the same community because the floodwater 
entered their houses very quickly, too, and rendered them helpless themselves.  As can be seen 
from Figure 5.19, in all four study areas, the interviewees replied that they were ready to help 
neighbours and others inside their community during the floods.  It was observed that people 
received support both from within their own community and from other communities unaffected 
by the floods (e.g., the northern districts of Jeddah). Relatively, there were more people who 
disagreed in Mraykh, compared to the other areas. From the field observations, this disagreement 
appeared to arise because the area includes illegal immigrants from different nationalities and 
races, and, therefore, lacks the harmony and mutual trust more evident in the other field sites. As 
depicted in Figure 5.20 and supported by the interview data, people gathered voluntarily to help 
anyone in need, regardless of who they were and what the situation was.  Thus, the common 
understanding was that everyone would be willing to help restore the impacted communities.  
However, some people were unable to help their neighbors or friends or to ask for help for one or 
more of the following reasons: 
1. They were themselves struggling to cope with the situation and did not receive any relief 
response from either the community or government entities.  As a result, they were not in 
an ideal position to offer help to others. 
2. They did not have enough relief aid to share with others. 
3. They thought that other people were struggling with the same situation, so they felt that 
they could not ask others to offer what they already could not afford.  
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Figure 5.20: Neighbours helping others inside their community (Okaz, 2011) 
5.7 Summary 
 This chapter has presented the investigation of a variety of aspects and levels of the three 
key dimensions of the assessment framework (household capacity, organizational capacity, and 
social capital).  The results drawn from the field case studies, interviews with households, key 
informants, the researcher’s observations, and secondary sources were organized according to the 
post-disaster recovery assessment framework.  Where appropriate, the findings have been 
summarized into bar graphs in order to provide a visual presentation of the data collected and 
information gathered.  Likewise, where possible, the data and related information were subdivided 
to represent the four selected areas in order to reveal a more nuanced picture for the creation of a 
resilient post-disaster recovery assessment framework. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
 This chapter highlights the complex relationships among social capital, resilience, and 
post-disaster recovery that have been experienced in the City of Jeddah since 2009.  First, this 
thesis outlined the literature review that was conducted with an interest on establishing the 
connections between household capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital and its role 
in flash flood disaster recovery.  Second, the thesis described the data collection, analysis 
methods and case study locations as well as the initial resilient post-disaster recovery framework 
used to guide the research.  Research results were laid out in chapter five, a chapter which makes 
connections between the City of Jeddah and flash flood data collected from the field and 
academic literature to provide both case-specific insights into resilient post-disaster recovery as 
well as insights for other jurisdictions and hazards.  The chapter concludes by outlining the 
modifications to the conceptual framework.  One of the goals of this study is to open new 
avenues for researchers to explore when assessing the post- disaster resilience of communities, 
based on evidence. 
 Starting with empirical contributions, the first section of this chapter provides an 
assessment of the long-term recovery efforts after the 2009 and 2011 Jeddah flash floods, which 
clearly links the evidence in chapter five to the concepts of household capacity, organizational 
capacity, and social capital outlined in chapter two (Literature Review chapter).  This section also 
examines how the research provides further evidence to support and extend previous research.  
The second section of this chapter reviews the methodological contributions of using the resilient 
disaster recovery approach as a framework for assessing long- term recovery efforts.  The RPDR-
AF was developed to be able to connect post-disaster recovery to the key concepts in light of the 
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literature related to disasters and hazards.  This section emphasizes the positives, as well as the 
difficulties associated with the research’s conceptual framework.  Presented at the end of the 
chapter, insights from the results section are utilized to modify the RPDR-AF model.  
6.1 Post-Disaster Resilience 
 Many scholars refer to resilience as the resources and capacities that allow communities 
and societies to withstand a disaster event or to be restored following an event (Paton, 2006; 
Ronan & Johnston, 2005; Foster, 1995; Joakim, 2013).  In Chapter Two, one of the key 
conceptualizations of resilience focused on three themes: recovery, resistance, and creativity.  
These themes emphasized the capacity of individuals, households and communities to absorb the 
effects of hazardous events, to recover rapidly after disasters, as well as to have the capability to 
learn, renovate, mitigate and adjust to future stresses and shocks (Adger, 2000).  The following 
section explores resilience related to these three themes.  Further discussion related to several of 
these ideas is explored in more detail throughout this chapter.  
6.1.1 Recovery, Resistance, and Creativity 
 The role of religion in supporting the recovery efforts is a key finding of this research.  
During the interviews, the spirit of giving, support, and solidarity grounded in Islamic beliefs and 
teachings were consistently expressed, all of which contributed to feelings of togetherness within 
the communities at the four selected sites.  Several household members mentioned that this was 
an essential source of social and spiritual support during and after the flash floods.  About 90 % 
of the interviewees confirmed community solidarity, founded on religious teachings and 
encouraged by the imams, as a factor providing strength for effective recovery.  Religious 
leaders also played a significant role in alleviating psychological trauma while helping those 
affected by the disaster.  
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 Social capital relationships and organizational capacity was also a key during the 
recovery period.  Almost all the people interviewed stated that they received immediate 
assistance from family members, blood relatives, and neighbours during the aftermath of the 
disaster that helped their recovery.  In addition, more than 90 % of the household members 
interviewed strongly believed that community volunteers accelerated the recovery process.  The 
field observations also revealed that social and religious organizations were highly effective with 
respect to providing services to community members during and after the floods, and were 
therefore an important factor in increasing organizational capacity and effective recovery to the 
community within the City of Jeddah.  
 At the three wealthier study sites, Rughamah, Nakheel, and Goyzah, the recovery 
processes were hindered due to the extended time and greater effort needed to rebuild the homes 
in those sites: many of these homes had not been originally built in compliance with local bylaws 
and building codes, and these wealthier communities had much more to lose and rebuild as 
compared to poorer communities.  Thus, although these areas generally demonstrated higher 
levels of household capacities, their recovery processes were hindered due to the longer time and 
greater effort needed for rebuilding the homes in those sites compared to Mraykh, as well as the 
higher costs of returning to pre-disaster levels.  As previously quoted (Section 5.1) by Ali Khan, 
one of the survey participants, some residents lost everything they had worked hard to build and 
acquire.  Following the floods, this has prompted many residents in these areas to more carefully 
abide by the building codes as they rebuild, and to avoid building on the lands located in the 
likely path of future torrents and water aggregation locations.  In this sense, the floods can be 
seen as a ‘window of opportunity’ where the household-level post-reconstruction actions have 
the potential to contribute to higher levels of future disaster resilience.  
  142 
 
 When comparing across the four study sites, it was clearly evident that the status of 
Mraykh as a community of illegal immigrants negatively impacted their household-level post-
disaster recovery.  Factors that led to increasing vulnerability, thereby reducing resiliency levels 
included: 1) the community’s geographical location at the foot of the mountains, where watershed 
flood water gathered and rushed towards the city; 2) the semi-isolation of the area from the other 
neighborhoods of Jeddah city; this is a  place where illegal immigrants have less visibility from 
government agencies responsible for prosecuting illegal immigrants; 3) the lack of government 
response and recovery support; 4) low education and literacy levels; and 5) decrepit houses and 
lack of infrastructure (see Figure 4.5).  
 Paradoxically, despite these vulnerabilities, the Mraykh community participants claimed 
that they recovered more quickly than any of the other three communities: almost 80 % faster.  
According to the interviewees, Mraykh’s faster recovery rate not because of their high resiliency 
level, but due to the simple structures of the their houses (e.g., brick walls and light wooden 
ceilings), which did not require a huge amount of time, effort, or money for repair or 
reconstruction, in addition to their skills in the constructions work, as most of them are workers in 
the construction and maintenance jobs.  Moreover, because most of the residents were illegal 
immigrants, they had comparatively less furniture; old models of low value vehicles, electronics, 
and appliances; and almost no collectibles (Section 5.1, Figure 5.7).  
 As indicated in the comments from Mraykh resident Ghulam, (Section 5.1), residents 
could not recover on their own so they needed the assistance of NGOs, while wealthier 
communities did not need outsiders help as much.  That said, it should also be emphasized that 
this rapid recovery returned residents to their low pre-disaster resilience levels and that, restoring 
a community to such pre-disaster levels should not be considered sufficient; vulnerability to the 
risk of future disasters remains high.  Since recovery operations and efforts in the aftermath of a 
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disaster event create critical conditions and windows of opportunity to increase resilience to 
future events (Wood et al., 2013), returning Mraykh residents to a vulnerable condition is 
counter-productive to long-term sustainability for the City of Jeddah.   
   Returning to the key dimensions of resilience, the capacity to absorb and withstand an 
initial impact is another essential element (Haimes, 2009).  Many studies have surveyed a wide 
range of hazardous events including technical and natural disasters, and several researchers 
indicate that addressing risk perception can be used either to reduce the risk or to improve 
resiliency (Ho, Shaw, Lin, Chiu, 2008; Martin, Martin, & Kent, 2009).  In the case of the 2009 
and 2011 Jeddah flash floods, the secondary data including the information from NGOs, 
humanitarian aid organizations, and news channels shows that the majority of residents of the 
four selected sites did not acknowledge living in a flood area.  In addition, participants noted that 
they were unaware of the emergency procedures or did not know what to do in the event of a 
disaster, as a result of lack of awareness and training (e.g. some interviewees noted that training 
“does not exist” and others indicated that there is no disaster education programs in schools).  It 
is argued that this lack of knowledge and awareness lowers the capacity of residents to absorb 
and withstand the initial impacts of disasters (Alshehri et al., 2013).  
 In order to increase the ability to absorb shocks, hazard awareness must be raised among 
the community through lectures, workshops and cooperative training courses, and through the 
publication and distribution of educational brochures and booklets on risk education (e.g., short 
disaster risk reduction videos distributed via social media).  This program should entail close 
cooperation with community organizations, in particular local households.  In addition, as 
Pelling and Dill (2010) and Minamoto (2010) observed in their studies, some participants 
believed that more effective coordinated efforts and unified messages from government, NGOs, 
CBOs, and religious leaders can effectively support and promote community acceptance of 
  144 
 
initiatives aimed at reducing the risk of disasters.  Therefore, it would also likely be important 
that any awareness and education initiatives for residents in Jeddah are undertaken with unified 
and coordinated messaging. 
 Following the floods, civil defense authorities have become cognizant of the need for 
such awareness-raising.  Recently, they have introduced a program integrated with those of other 
relevant government departments and non-government entities, to raise and maintain public 
awareness through lectures, short workshops, and interactive training sessions and through the 
publishing and distribution of educational brochures and booklets about risk awareness.  These 
programs will entail close cooperation with community-based organizations, in particular local 
households. 
 Another important approach to increasing resistance is through the implementation of 
flood-resistant building standards, appropriate land use, and a properly planned building drainage 
infrastructure system.  Interviewees and field observations suggested that most of the damaged 
houses in all four sites appeared to have been constructed without adherence to building codes 
and in contravention of city bylaws.  Thus, enforcement of current policies, especially during 
post-disaster reconstruction, should be a crucial first step towards increasing resilience.  In the 
future, developing a building code that requires hazard resistant building practices would further 
avoid loss of wealth and lives, and strengthen resilience.  For instance, as noted from the field 
observations, re-designating a building’s ground floor for parking and storage from its pre-flood 
use as residential apartments might diminish flood losses. 
 The third theme identified with resilience, creativity, is related to the idea of increasing 
the functionality and resiliency of the community after a disaster event.  In this sense, creativity 
is the process of mitigating and “adapting to new circumstances and learning from the disaster 
experience” to create communities that have achieved greater resiliency and functionality 
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through the recovery process (Maguire & Hagan, 2007, p.17; Adger, 2000).  In terms of 
household and organizational capacity as well as social capital, creativity and resilience for 
Jeddah City during and after the flash flood of 2009 and 2011, several external and technical 
adaptive measures have been implemented.  From the field research, it was observed that many 
households have begun to purchase four-wheel drive vehicles capable of handling some flood 
inundation instead of ordinary passenger cars.  Based on several incidents, it should be noted that 
four-wheel drive vehicles cannot withstand the torrent in some sloping places characterized by 
rapid decline.  In terms of homes, most of the home owners, especially those located near major 
flood pathways have begun to install water suction pumps inside their houses' yards which 
enable them to extract water from inside their houses in case of future floods, and to minimize 
losses and unwanted surprises.   
 Other indications of creativity and adaptability are also notable across the three 
dimensions of the RPDR-AF.  These include the aforementioned upgrades to the homes in three 
of the areas and the emergence of several weather prediction sites (e.g., Arab weather, Jeddah 
weather, ask Jeddah, etc.), a topic that has become the daily concern of the community that did 
not exist in the past.  In addition, the emergent growth of groups and organizations that can 
provide humanitarian assistance services and rescue operations for the community is another 
important development, e.g., Emdad-SA, Civil Protection Volunteer Institution, Jeddah Volunteer 
Club, Dallah Academy for Volunteerism, etc. 
 To summarize, the role of social capital and religion in supporting the recovery efforts is a 
key finding of this research.  Social capital relationships and organizational capacity was also a 
key during the recovery period.  Almost all the people interviewed stated that they received 
immediate assistance from family members, blood relatives, and neighbours during the aftermath 
of the disaster that helped their recovery.  The field observations also revealed that social and 
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religious organizations were highly effective with respect to providing services to community 
members during and after the floods, and were therefore an important factor in increasing 
organizational capacity and effective recovery to the community within the City of Jeddah.  On 
the other hand, it is argued that this lack of knowledge and awareness lowers the capacity of 
residents to absorb and withstand the initial impacts of disasters.  Another important approach to 
increasing resilience is through the implementation of flood-resistant building standards, 
appropriate land use, and a properly planned building drainage infrastructure system.  In terms of 
household and organizational capacity as well as social capital, creativity and resilience for 
Jeddah City, several external and technical adaptive measures have been implemented e.g., 
upgrades to the homes and the emergence of several weather prediction sites. 
6.2 Integrating Religion into Household Capacity, Organizational Capacity, and Social     
      Capital 
 As the research unfolded, it became increasingly clear that it was important to bring 
religion into the three dimensions of the model (household capacity, organizational capacity, and 
social capital).  The contemporary literature outlines several prominent reasons for the damage 
caused by the floods in the City of Jeddah; much of which emphasizes the spatial and geographic 
physical features of the city area.  For instance, Youssef et al. (2016) maintained that important 
factors include: (1) Geological setting of the city; (2) Abrupt rainfall and insufficient natural 
drainage in the existing watershed; (3) Topographic features; (4) Settlement in the vulnerable 
areas; (5) Less preparedness beforehand, and (6) Lack of citizen and authority awareness.  
 While all of these factors are clearly important, tone of the key focus of this research has 
been on a missing link that is fundamental to understanding and assessing resilience within the 
context of KSA and the City of Jeddah; the role of religious influences and associated social 
capital, and its integration into all aspects of decision-making and disaster resilience.  Hence this 
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work builds on studies by such researchers as Joakim and White (2015), Minamoto (2010), and 
Eriksson et al. (2009).  This is in contrast to much of the available research in English, which has 
often been conducted in secular societies.  In these studies, models of resilience tend to play down 
religion or include it as a minor category (e.g., Murphy, 2007; Al Saud, 2010).  
 The results from this research place the role of religion front and center and suggest that 
the integration of religious leaders and religious organizational structures into disaster 
management planning could help minimize the impacts of future flash floods or other disaster 
events.   
 It is important to note that one of the reasons religion has contributed substantially to 
disaster resistance during the floods is that this society in Saudi Arabia is almost homogeneous in 
terms of faith and Islamic religious beliefs, although there are a few non-Muslims residents.  The 
literature has demonstrated that internal coherence increases social bonding and decreases disaster 
response and recovery complexity (Section 2.6.4.1).  Thus, in many communities it was less 
complicated for the governing organizations, volunteers, non-profit organizations, and religious 
institutions to take quick actions; it might not be this easy and clear-cut for disaster recovery 
efforts in other socio-economic and geographic contexts.  In KSA the civil chain of command was 
highly reliant on the support from religious leaders.  Residents obeyed the decisions when these 
came from the religious leaders in their community, which might not be the case in other 
jurisdictions.  
 Given the ongoing importance of Islamic practices as playing a key role in Saudi daily 
life, one of the novel contributions of the RPDR-AF is the explicit inclusion of religion as one of 
the influential aspects in all dimensions of post-disaster recovery.  Within households, religious 
beliefs are considered an important pillar of the integration and protection of family members, as 
well as a factor in the preservation of the coherence of the family through an authoritative 
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organizational structure, whereby the head of the household usually makes major decisions.  The 
family meeting several times a day to perform prayers collectively also has a profound impact in 
increasing family cohesion.  In addition, the Holy Quran is the supreme authority that governs the 
various facets of daily life, as well as social, political, and economic interactions.  According to 
the educational curricula, religious studies are taught at all school levels as well as in colleges 
and universities (Alshehri et al., 2013).  Study participants continually highlighted the 
importance of religion.  For instance, in the aftermath of the flash floods, several participants 
noted that (1) they trusted in the imams and that following the instructions given by the clerics 
increased household capacity to facilitate reconstruction; (2) religious clerics gave religious tips 
quoted from the Holy Qur'an and the Prophet Hadith to local organizations and the younger 
people who took those teachings seriously were prompted to increase their flood response 
volunteer efforts; and (3) the community was grateful for the use of religious buildings and 
organizations to distribute aid and assist in reconstruction efforts.  
 Indeed, religious leaders have a very strong influence in the Saudi society.  The results 
section of this study demonstrated that, due to the trustworthy characterization of the religious 
leaders in the community, they played a strong, pivotal, instrumental role in raising awareness 
about disaster resilience and disseminating information about how to prepare for disasters and 
recover from their impact.  In the result section (5.6.1) of this study, it is interesting to note that in 
all of the four studied communities, almost 90% or more respondents agreed that they could easily 
rely on the religious imams for future guidelines for the rebuilding processes of the communities.  
These results are similar to Bagir (2012) who found that when communities need trusted figures 
for guidance and support, religious leaders may act as authority figures, particularly in situations 
involving a lack of trust between communities and government agencies. 
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 As discussed in Chapter 2, at the organizational level, religious activities and spaces can 
provide a key contribution to disaster resilience (Clarke, 2006).  In Islamic culture, Masjids and 
Jawami are not only buildings or places for static worship but also have a continual role in the 
teaching and memorization of the Quran, the encouragement of socializing among the community 
members, the hosting of a number of social and religious events and celebrations, and more.  
Likewise, in KSA society, people trust and are highly dependent on the messages and 
recommendations of the religious leaders during disasters and difficult times.  In KSA, the 
Masjids and Jawami (mosques) can play a crucial role in delivering important messages to local 
residents, who usually come for prayer five times daily, as well as every Friday.  It is important to 
note that Friday is one of the important days of Islamic culture when every Muslim is obliged to 
perform prayer at noon in the Masjid.  So, if the authorities want to introduce disaster 
management plans, it is important to start working with the religious leaders to involve people 
during Friday prayer with some brief important messaging towards the community.  
 While the impact of religion was observed at all four field sites, the influence in the 
Goyzah community is particularly notable.  The site is known locally as having the most religious 
activities due to the number of strong religious leaders residing there.  The residents of Goyzah 
tend to be strongly committed to attending mosque for all five daily prayers, which participants 
felt contributed significantly to increasing their knowledge of religious teachings as well as 
deepening linkages between residents and between residents and local authorities.  According to 
several interviewees, this contributed to increased social capital benefits including opportunities to 
exchange information on how to obtain the necessary assistance and compensation for better and 
faster reconstruction and recovery.  
 Despite views that would appear to suggest a negative impact from fatalism tied to 
religious beliefs, the majority of interviewees reported that their religious faith provided them 
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with a source of strong resilience and recovery mechanisms when the 2009 and 2011 flash floods 
occurred and also during the post-disaster periods.  On the one hand, some pessimistic religious 
leaders may misconstrue the disaster as a punishment from God (Alshehri et al., 2013).  Referring 
to the literature review of this research, such promotion could diminish disaster mitigation and 
hinder preparations because it denies human responsibility for creating low levels of resilience 
(e.g., choosing unsafe locations such as floodplains for buildings, employing poor construction 
materials and techniques, etc.) 
 On the other hand, in the case of the four field sites, the trust and belief of people in Allah 
(God) provided very strong motivation for residents to accept and acknowledge proactive 
participation and risk-mitigation processes.  As Joakim and White (2015) also concluded, the field 
observations and survey results for all communities revealed that the Islamic religious faith and 
worship practices were important elements of response during the disaster events and post-
disaster recovery processes following the flash floods.  As mentioned in the literature review 
(Section 2.6.5), for many religions, the practice of praying during critical times and disasters is a 
spiritual link between the believers and the God who controls the world around them according to 
their Islamic beliefs.  The majority of household members at the selected sites stated that their 
shared Islamic beliefs and reflections on the worldview and perspectives of the events increased 
their solidarity and accordingly strengthened their recovery.  According to the imam’s sermon, 
this event awakened the society from their ignorance of religion and worship and reminded them 
that on the Day of Resurrection everyone will return to God.  In the wake of the floods, his words 
prompted residents to do more giving and good deeds that will be of benefit to them on the day of 
Day of Resurrection.   In summary, the research demonstrated that any disaster-related negatives 
associated with religious fatalism were more than counteracted by the positives associated with 
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religiously-based social capital, organizational structures, and religious leaders, all of which could 
be tapped into during times of disaster. 
 The findings of this research are also similar to that of Chester and Duncan (2010) who 
explored some missing links related to disaster response and recovery that psychological trauma 
was not clearly identified within religious dimensions.  Likewise, in this study many household 
members indicated that they had struggled with issues of psychological trauma, access to 
available resources, and lack of hazard awareness.  The research demonstrated that religious 
leaders played a significant role in alleviating psychological trauma while helping those affected 
by the disaster.  They delivered speeches and lectures and offered spiritual recommendations to 
their community members in a variety of formats, such as media broadcasts, focused meetings, 
and weekly congregational services for Jumma prayers. 
 In addition, the results of this research are also consistent with the work of Joakim and 
White (2015), who studied the influence of religious confidence, leadership, and networks on the 
response and recovery of disaster-affected populations affected by the 2006 earthquake in 
Yogyakarta.  They concluded that religion provided an important source of resilience in the 
aftermath of the earthquake, particularly by providing spiritual and psychological strength, and 
that religious interpretations of disasters do not necessarily have to be seen as a source of 
vulnerability, but can be understood as alternative worldviews that provide opportunities to 
facilitate disaster risk reduction and preparedness for future events.  They found that faith and 
religious reactions were important elements in post-disaster responses and the development of 
strategies for a resilient recovery.  In the same way, many participants in this research expressed 
their appreciation for the role of prayers and sincere faith, as well as the desire to be a good 
person and to prepare psychologically for future disasters.  
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 In agreement with the notion proposed by Putnam (2000), who suggested that religious 
participation is an important source of social capital, empirical analysis of the results of this 
research included an examination of the relationship between the participation of religious leaders 
in terms of providing emotional and psychological support that acted as spiritual healing for 
alleviating the trauma, and the various aspects of social capital, including volunteering, inter-
organizational networking, provision of support for families, and involvement in support groups.  
 While it has been demonstrated that this research corroborates the findings of several 
existing studies, it is also important to point out how the current study extends the existent 
literature about the role of religion as a key element of resilience.  As the research unfolded it 
became increasingly clear that it was important to bring religion into the three dimensions of the 
model (household capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital).  Post-disaster recovery 
systems usually deal with economy, environment, society, and the rebuilding process of health 
and addresses trauma that were experienced by the communities (Olshansky & Johnson 2012).  
However, religion did not come up as a predominant theme in the majority of the literature.  For 
instance, in this case of this research, it was experienced during the interview processes and 
informal and formal talks with the community members that they were high highly motivated 
and influenced by religious decisions and directives instead of government initiatives alone. 
Therefore, it became increasingly clear that religion should be highlighted as a key component of 
all aspects of post-disaster recovery, rather than treating it as a separate category.  
6.3 Household Capacity 
 According to Lindell (2013), the four main social entities involved in the recovery of a 
community after disaster events are government agencies, civil society organizations, local and 
national businesses, and household capacities (and this research argues that a fifth entity, 
religious organizations, is also important in some contexts).  Businesses and households are 
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responsible mainly their own recovery, while government and civil society organizations share 
collective responsibility for post-disaster operations and the recovery of the overall community 
(Lindell, 2013).   
 The main consideration associated with post-disaster household recovery is the 
effectiveness and sustainability of household capacity, which, at minimum, refers to the ability of 
household members to return to their normal lifestyle after recovery.  According to research 
studies, the capacity of households is affected by the number of people living in a given home, 
their levels of education, their access to community organizations, and their connection to local 
religious and social associations (Haviland, 2003).  From a disaster risk reduction perspective, 
post-event, the ultimate goal would be to progress beyond current resilience levels and increase 
capacities to deal with future events.  
 As demonstrated in the results chapter, many factors contributed to household capacities 
in the City of Jeddah.  At the broadest level, according to emergency-management experts and 
disaster planners, household emergency assistance and relief aid can sometimes be delayed.  For 
that reason, they advise that individuals and families should be prepared to be self-sustainable and 
self-recoverable for at least the first 72 hours after a disaster, (Muttarak & Pothisiri, 2013).  In the 
Jeddah research, many respondents were either unaware of emergency procedures and measures 
or unprepared through a lack of disaster drills and thus did not know what to do or how to act in 
the event of a disaster.  For example, some participants stated that no disaster resistance or 
recovery training programs existed.  Others indicated that there were no proactive practical 
training programs, such as fire and hazard drills in schools or other public buildings.   
 Significantly, it was observed in this research that some of the household aspects related to 
household composition seemed to have greater impact than others (e.g., age, education, and 
individual faith).  Empirical analysis of the results (see 5.1 of the Results section) suggests that 
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people with higher education were more likely to be aware and had a better capacity for effective 
and efficient recovery in the study areas.  For example, the Nakheel neighbourhood was inhabited 
mainly by people with higher educational qualifications (see 4.9 of characteristics of the case-
study sites and Fig. 5.4).  As explained during the interviews, they were able to access, 
understand, and promote information related to the disaster from a variety of sources, such as 
websites (Civil Defense, Presidency of Meteorology and Environment, and Saudi Geological 
Survey (SGS), social networking sites, and the media.  As a result, they were considerably more 
likely to cope with disasters and thus reduce the burden on the government during disasters and 
pave the way for a rapid recovery after the disaster.  For instance, a faculty staff member who was 
trapped inside the university building for several hours due to the submergence of all streets 
around the university used his cell phone to communicate with government agencies and friends 
to find the safest route and to determine the appropriate time to exit the building.  As a result, he 
was able to get home faster than others who did not have access to information, enabling him to 
more quickly being his recovery activities.  
 Since literacy rates are associated with a certain degree of formal education and linked to 
vulnerability reduction (Ivanov & Cvetkovi, 2014), this research supports the need to increase 
literacy rates for all its citizens.  Based on the collected data, literacy rates among the older people 
were quite low (less than 15% as discussed in the Results section).  Of the four sites, the lowest 
levels of education and associated reduced literacy rates were particularly observed during the 
field work at the Mraykh site where interviewed participants had greater difficulty understanding 
the questions posed to them by the researcher, as compared to the other three sites.  In this regard, 
the research suggests benefiting from the services of the Jeddah Islamic Education Foundation, 
which aims to provide Islamic education in several languages to Muslims and non-Muslims 
communities by delivering booklets and organizing awareness seminars for the residents of these 
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communities.  In addition the literacy rates among women are lower than for men, especially for 
elder women who are known to have the highest levels of illiteracy.  In KSA women did not have 
the opportunity before 1960 to get an education; instead, they only received basic literacy and 
numeracy skills (AlMunajjed, 2009).  While progress has been made in women's education, more 
needs to be done by the government to allow women equal opportunities in education this will 
contribute to raising the capacity for well-informed decision-making throughout Saudi society. 
(Al Munajjed, 2009).  As a result of the higher level of education, women will be more likely to 
cope with disasters, thereby reducing vulnerability and increasing resiliency across KSA. 
 Older people are often overlooked in disasters and conflicts, and their concerns are seldom 
addressed by emergency programs or planners (Hutton, 2008).  Until recently, the needs of older 
persons in situations of disaster and conflict were addressed only through broader health and 
humanitarian programs for adults.  This has changed as many recent emergencies have 
highlighted the vulnerabilities of this population group (Hutton, 2008).  In the literature, Ivanov 
and Cvetkovi (2014) stated that improved health and educational status helps to increase 
resilience and limit the loss of life during natural disasters.  Furthermore, while community 
elders can provide wisdom based on their vast experience and historical knowledge of past 
events, seniors residing in a community might require higher-priority assistance from the 
community due to diminished physical abilities or health needs (Thomas, 2006).  The results of 
this research confirm that, because they are highly respected in local communities, senior citizens 
played decisive roles during and after the flash floods, since younger people were generally 
accustomed to obeying their recommendations and advice (Section 5.1.1; Figure 5.1).  Older 
study participants also clearly indicated that they relied on the younger generation volunteers 
during the disaster to provide evacuation and rescue services during the flash flood, reducing the 
death toll.  Although younger age groups had the strength and stamina to undertake more 
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physically challenging work during response and recovery efforts, they also benefited from the 
sage advice from their elders.  
 Simultaneously, the results also show that, in many cases, young people can take on 
leadership roles, providing extensive assistance and offering volunteer support during and after 
the events.  For example, Figure 5.16, 5.17 shows collection of relief supplies and provision of 
social assistance of younger community members.  It was also evident that younger people had 
better access to information through the use of mobile phones and the Internet (see result section 
5.4), enabling them to communicate with relief organizations to obtain  available resources, which 
will contribute to higher resiliency level.  Taken together, these factors have the potential to 
increase disaster resilience. 
6.4 Organizational Capacity 
 As defined by Bryan (2011), organizational capacity is the ability of an organization to 
meet its goals.  Organizational capacity has been a particular focus of scholars who seek to 
acquire an understanding of the variables that impact the organizational performance of a 
community (Bryan, 2011).  Organizational capacity is a concept that has received increased 
attention from public and non-government organizations and has been the subject of studies 
published in the literature over the last several years (Bryan, 2011).  The analysis of 
organizational capacity in this study identified problems associated with the limited cooperation, 
integration, and coordination among various stakeholders involved, including relevant 
governmental departments.  Also highlighted was the negative impact of corruption and 
incompetence associated with some government agencies. 
 Over many decades prior to the 2009 floods (i.e., 50 to 75 years ago), the country had not 
experienced such devastating events.  An earlier light flash flood in 2007 did offer the policy-
makers significant opportunity to develop new policies and measures for building more disaster-
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resistant and recovery-resilient communities; unfortunately, the opportunity was not utilized.  The 
2009 and 2011 flash floods provided additional momentum and valuable experience for the 
implementation of mitigation and resilience improvements (Abosuliman, 2014; Momani & Fadil, 
2010). 
 Although emergency management plans for the City of Jeddah suggest the required 
resources were in place (Section 5.2), the reality was very different, and the flash floods of 
2009/2011 exposed many weaknesses.  However, these plans were not technically detailed with 
respect to specific forms of intervention, staff participation, or required logistics, nor were 
problems prioritized, response procedure scenarios prepared in advance, or flood training drills 
conducted.  For example, while the mandate of the Ministry of Defense was to defend the country 
and maintain a strong chain of command, the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Interior 
had established as a priority the preparation of regional emergency master plans and their 
implementation through a regulatory framework, including in the City of Jeddah (Chapter 3).  
According to the research findings provided in Section 5.2, none of these organizations had, in 
fact, set any truly useful priorities for emergency or rescue responses as a disaster unfolded.  
People were also unaware of the tasks to be performed by the different government organizations 
during events such as flash floods.  As a result, they were often confused with respect to which 
organization to turn to for help (see Section 3.7).   
 According to Momani and Fadil (2011), no comprehensive disaster warning system was in 
place.  The Civil Defense Department was ill-prepared for tasks under its purview, such as 
retrieving human remains and addressing the inadequate and ill-maintained drainage system 
(Abosuliman, 2014) (Section 3.6.2; Table 3.2).  In addition, lack of cooperation, integration, and 
coordination between the Civil Defense Department and other relevant government organizations, 
such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Transportation, and the Ministry of Municipal 
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Affairs and Rural Areas, resulted in the lowered resilience and greater vulnerability of the 
impacted communities. 
 The field observations also revealed that social and religious organizations were highly 
effective with respect to providing services to community members during and after the floods 
and were therefore an important factor in increasing organizational capacity and effective 
recovery to the community within the City of Jeddah.  As shown in Figures 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17 
and corroborated by interviewees these organizations actively contributed in distributing housing 
supplies and providing relief and other services, such as non-perishable food supplies, drinking 
water, blankets, beds, babies’ supplies, medicine, etc.  Religious institutions were used as centers 
to receive and distribute aid to those affected people and since imams have extensive knowledge 
of the families in the neighborhood surrounding  the mosque, their role was  important in guiding 
social organizations and volunteers during the delivery of aid to families in need.  
6.4.1 Post-Disaster Capacity Improvements 
 Based on the conclusions drawn from the interviews with citizens, residents, key 
informants, and major stakeholders who play a part in disaster-management decision-making 
processes, it was found that several awareness-building initiatives, which had been repeatedly 
neglected prior to the 2009 flood, were subsequently put in place by government authorities.  
Since 2009 the Saudi government has also carried out a number of major infrastructure projects in 
an effort to guard against such disasters (Arab News, 2012).  These include the building of seven 
dams, the expansion of existing canals in Jeddah, and the construction of a new canal near to King 
Abdulaziz International Airport north of the city (The National, 2014). 
 According to one key informant,  the Makkah Area Crisis and Disaster Management 
Center (CDMC) has been set up in Jeddah City, which will improve the capabilities of the Civil 
Defense and other government and non-government agencies to manage crises and disasters.  It 
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will offer improved technologies for communication between the agencies to gather and 
disseminate information about the nature and extent of crises (ARUP, 2012).  The Center also 
monitors the weather and weather conditions, as well as sensitizing citizens and residents to 
potential dangers through various media and social media through the Emirate website in the 
Mecca area.  Recently, a training plan has been developed, including training courses and lectures 
for the Center's staff and visits to the government sectors to exchange experiences and work on 
self-development (Al-Zahrani, 2014). 
 Within the social sphere, recent political and social reforms have provided an opportunity 
for the establishment and strengthening across the KSA of many social organizations at both the 
local and national levels, interest-based youth groups, women groups, organizations for people 
with disabilities, special needs groups, labor organizations, and others (e.g., CBO, NGO, social 
and religion organizations).  According to the case-study results, these organizations focused on 
different areas of interest, actively participating in the recovery efforts.  They were part of the 
team that assisted with the distribution of relief aid and the implementation of recovery help 
programs.  The contribution of the CBOs clearly emphasizes their growing importance to post-
disaster recovery with the City of Jeddah and KSA.  Neighbourhood leaders spearheaded the 
collection of data and the distribution of aid in their areas, and women’s organizations and female 
volunteer groups provided a significant contribution by helping impacted women and children, 
since social and religious custom generally restricts men from interacting with these groups.  
Women’s associations provided many services to the affected communities, including maternal 
and child health, social care, and assistance with financial matters.  As observed during the field 
interviews, most CBOs worked closely with masajid and other religious organizations across 
Jeddah, because, in most cases, members of the CBOs are also members in their local masjid.  In 
addition, many social organizations (e.g., World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Muwatana, and 
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Friends of the City of Jeddah), were actively involved in providing relief, aid, and assistance 
services.  They also provided valuable help by conducting field surveys, distributing donations, 
cleaning homes, and dispensing information brochures. 
6.4.2 Access to Help from Formal Organizations 
 As noted in the literature review and revealed by the research results, connections between 
the selected Jeddah communities and local, provincial, and federal government organizations 
were critical to effective disaster response, but very difficult to manage during the disasters.  For 
example, there was no prior coordination or meetings between representatives of these 
organizations on how to deal and coordinate aid during disaster events. 
 Although the formal entity most responsible for helping their constituents during and after 
a disaster is the local government prior to 2009, senior government officials lacked expertise in 
disaster management, so they were unable to deal with the situation as effectively as needed 
(Abdullah & Othman, 2015).   Nonetheless, the local government of Jeddah did respond after the 
2009 and 2011 disasters by offering a number of forms of assistance to increase the resilience of 
the communities: monetary compensation, relief aid, the establishment of reporting centres and 
communication systems, the provision of temporary shelters, and organization of rescue teams. 
 Overall, according to the statements of the interviewees and the research findings, 
government initiatives during and after the 2009/2011 floods were generally praised by the 
majority of Jeddah residents.  Access to government help was provided to many who were 
affected and included not only compensation but also shelter and necessary living supplies such as 
food, water, blankets, beds, and medicine.  
 Despite the generous help provided, the participants maintained that the government 
response tended to favours some groups over others, which was especially evident in the 
marginalized Mraykh community (Site 2).  In the Mraykh area, there was no government-
  161 
 
provided shelter initiative.  Most of the aid received at the Mraykh site came from NGOs and 
relatives or friends.  Government authorities confirmed the fact that most of the populations of 
Mraykh were illegal immigrants, which translated into a lack of detailed information about their 
numbers and the type of assistance needed.  Interestingly, despite this fact, imams and religious 
leaders continued to urge people to provide aid and assistance to affected people regardless of 
their ethnic and religion backgrounds, and reminded residents of these acts as mentioned in the 
holy Quran and by the Profit Hadith. 
6.5 Household and Organizational Compliance with Regulations and Bylaws 
 Jeddah’s urban and land-use planning bylaws and rules were professionally developed and 
documented by the councils of the municipality of the City of Jeddah.  Yet, the research 
demonstrates that the lack of government enforcement of land-use planning regulations and 
building codes, as well as administrative corruption, were important factors that increased the 
scale of the disaster, the number of casualties, and the amount of physical damage and monetary 
loss. These findings are in line with the views of Wagner (2010, Table 3.2).  As reported by Arab 
News (2011), King Abdullah ordered the prosecution of about 50 municipal directors and 
individuals for corruption resulting from improper land use and illegal construction projects. 
Corruption has also been blamed on how to allow homes to be built on flood plains.  Although 
Saudi culture encourages strict moral behaviour, the historical context of nepotism (the practice 
among those with power or influence of favoring relatives or friends) has contributed to high 
levels of corruption in government and public spheres (The National, 2014), suggesting there are 
limits to the influence of Saudi culture on morality.   
 In addition, the research results confirmed that due to the absence of or poor building-
inspection practices, bylaw enforcement, and routine sewer line inspections, homeowners also 
paid very little attention to respecting and obeying urban and land-use planning bylaws or 
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building codes and regulations (Section 5.2.2; Figure 5.9).  According to the regulations 
governing building permits and living standards prescribed by the Municipality of the City of 
Jeddah, damaged buildings are deemed unsafe for habitation until they are returned to a livable 
condition and declared safe to reside in, as assessed by the municipality.  Despite these 
regulations, as observed during the field work, some people had rebuilt their dwellings on unsafe 
land lots and continued to live inside their damaged houses. Some respondents reported that they 
had never heard of any building codes or construction licenses, nor had they ever seen any 
oversight or inspection bylaws enforcement officers.  It is thus evident that the lack of 
enforcement of municipal legislation related to urban and land-use planning, building codes, and 
regulations represents a major contributing factor in increasing household vulnerability and 
decreasing community resilience.  
6.6 Social Connections, Social Capital, and Recovery 
 Lin (1999, 2001) states that social capital consists of social connections and commitments 
between members of a group characterized by two major features: robust social networks and the 
availability of resources that can be shared via the network ties.  It is generally understood that 
individuals who are networking successfully in their personal life are also considered to have 
better social connections with their immediate community network than those who do not.  A 
number of scholars have described networking as an essential element of social capital (Bhuiyan, 
2005; Burt, 2000; Putnam, 2007; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).  According to Sobel (2002), 
strong bonding, bridging and linkage relationships have proved to be a positive contribution to 
the overall recovery of the community.  In line with the claims of scholars such as Putnam (2000) 
and Aldrich (2012), in Saudi society, social capital includes various formal and informal social 
bonding connections that exist within a single community and/or enable it to bridge and link to 
other communities. 
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 Culturally, the Saudi people usually first trust and rely on those individuals and groups 
who are known and familiar, with broader organizational interventions becoming a factor only 
later on.  Moreover, common feedback from most interviewees emphasized the importance of the 
role of cultural organizations and groups in providing relief and recovery assistance for impacted 
residents of different cultural and ethnic backgrounds, which could indicate a tempering of the 
common tendency to focus on providing aid to those from within one’s own circle, rather than to 
outsiders.  Moving forward, these social networks can be strengthened even further, for example, 
through the organization of social activities that engage community members on a regular basis. 
Such social events and gatherings would provide residents with the opportunity to get to know 
one another and develop a stronger sense of togetherness and inclusion. 
 The majority of the interviewees (both household members and key informants) placed 
considerable emphasis on the value of the bonding social capital they experienced during the 
recovery process.  The generous relief aid and recovery help offered by household members and 
kinship networks were indicative of the close relationships among the residents of the four 
selected sites, which played an important role in their post-flood recovery.  Likewise, when the 
interviewees were asked what gave them strength to recover from the disaster, the majority of 
respondents mentioned that relationships and social bonding within the community made their 
neighbours feel like part of their extended family, and that these relationships were regarded as 
an important support mechanism.  
 In regard to linking and bridging social capital, 80% of the key informants stated that 
these relationships were robust for all of the impacted areas, except for the Mraykh site, where 
the illegal status and location relatively far from the other three sites (see Figure 4.3), somewhat 
isolated them from any other neighbourhood areas.  The lack of linking and bridging social 
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capital negatively impacted the amount of aid and recovery initiatives that were provided 
in this location, thereby reducing resilience levels.  
 Most interviewees strongly endorsed the importance of bridging social capital during the 
disasters.  For instance, the interviewees reported that the residents of the affected sites used cell 
phones as a first means of communication to spread news about the flooding and ask for help.  
From Figure 5.8, it can be inferred that in all four areas of study, participants noted that the rapid 
communication of mobile phones enabled them to seek help from relatives and friends who live 
across the city who own trucks that can help them get their vehicles out of the flood, and provide 
them with the necessary assistance (e.g., food supplies, drinking water, blankets, medicine.. etc.).  
Continuous communication through cell phones and social media encouraged everybody to help 
so that reconstruction efforts could proceed efficiently and effectively.  
 As suggested by Joakim (2013) and as evident in the case-study results, during the 
recovery work after the 2009 and 2011 Jeddah floods, many respondents noted that connections 
between residents and external networks (i.e., bridging and linking social capital) constituted a 
primary method of accessing external assistance.  Communities with higher levels of external 
links tend to be able to obtain the necessary support and resources. For instance, within Nakheel 
site, where a number of residents had external connections with religious leaders, cultural 
organizations, NGOs, and high-ranking government officials, these networks were key resources 
with respect to obtaining needed assistance.  As a result, Nakheel residents have been able to 
recover efficiently and increase the resilience of the community. 
6.6.1 Emergent Volunteer Support  
 As mentioned in the literature review, disaster-affected people often do not have 
immediate access to basic needs, especially if the disaster is very intense and continues for several 
days (Dynes, 2006; FEMA, 2004).   However, in the case of the Jeddah flash floods, the 
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floodwaters abated relatively quickly so that, with the help of volunteers, impacted residents had 
relatively quick access to information and evacuation centres.  In spite of the outstanding efforts 
of all stakeholders including volunteers, damaged roads dramatically hindered rescue operations, 
preventing ambulances from entering some parts of the study areas and delaying rescue and relief 
operations.  According to the research findings, emergency and relief operators were often either 
not knowledgeable enough about the extent of the damage or were unable to deliver aid within a 
reasonable length of time.  In the wake of this situation, phenomenal community volunteerism 
was one of the major success stories related to the 2009 and 2011 post-disaster activities.  The 
research findings confirm that more than 90 % of the household members interviewed strongly 
believed that community volunteers definitely accelerated the process of post-disaster recovery. 
Residents expressed satisfaction with the immediate community response (Section 5.4; Figure 
5.18). 
 Beyond the general community efforts, the floods also led to the development of new 
volunteer organizations.  According to Tierney (1989) and Murphy (2007), emergent 
organizations are groups that evolve to meet the needs of those affected by disasters that are 
believed to have been unmet by other respondents.  These groups show new functions and 
structures (e.g., ad hoc groups formed to provide search and rescue services, shelter victims, etc.).  
Emergent organizations are examples of the development of new social capital in the aftermath of 
the crisis (Dynes, 2002; Murphy, 2007).  These organizations are often temporary; however some 
may convert into permanent organizations over time depending on the circumstances (Murphy, 
2007; Drabek, 1987).  
 During the 2009/2011 floods, the growth and function of Emdad-SA, and the Civil 
Protection Volunteer Institution can be seen as two examples of social capital network 
development.  Emdad-SA (Risk and Disaster Management Team) is a non-profit organization 
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established in 2010 after the 2009 flash flood. Its main goal is to manage crises and disasters in 
Jeddah.  Members are committed to their core values and principles of neutrality, humanity, 
impartiality, and independence in providing their services.  They support the efforts of local 
communities to strengthen their capacities with respect to monitoring disasters and providing 
early warnings (e.g., workshops, publish materials)  as well as counseling afterward in order to 
reduce the risk of natural disasters, increase preparedness, and enhance mitigation efforts.  
According to the case-study results, Emdad-SA was actively engaged in providing support during 
the 2011 Jeddah flash flood.  
 Another emergent organization, the Civil Protection Volunteer Institution is also a youth 
team whose goal was to provide humanitarian services and rescue operations for communities 
affected during the 2009 and 2011 Jeddah flash floods.  Other emergent organizations, such as 
Jeddah Volunteer Club, Jeddah friends, and Jeddah boys delivered flyers, collected donations and 
helped to meet the needs of vulnerable community members.  
6.7 Modifications to the Initial RPDR-AF 
 The framework developed for this thesis was used to evaluate post-disaster recovery in 
Jeddah City, KSA.  The developed framework provides a method for holistically evaluating 
whether recovery efforts have effectively increased the capacity of the city to withstand future 
events, and also addresses some of the causes of slow recovery and low resilience observed 
during previous events.  The first version of the Resilient Post-Disaster Disaster Recovery 
Assessment Framework (RPDR-AF), whose structure is illustrated in Figure 4.1, depicts the 
foundations of the conceptual modeling framework used to guide the empirical research phase.  
Concepts of resilience and recovery that elaborate on the dimensions of households, 
organizational capacities, and social capital, were adopted in building the framework.  This 
method was applied for the assessment of flash flood resilience in the local Jeddah community 
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because that city offered an opportunity for the critical analysis of resilient post-disaster recovery 
procedures and operations.  The analysis afforded an opportunity to assess the strengths of these 
dimensions in the context of disaster recovery and to obtain insights with respect to the nature of 
the relationships among these dimensions in the context of the City of Jeddah.  The final version 
of the RPDR-AF model presented in this dissertation, anchored by resilience thinking, the three 
concepts of household capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital, and the explicit 
incorporation of religion, has been developed through an iterative process of ongoing reflection of 
the extant literature relevant to the Saudi Arabia context and the collected empirical results.  For 
example, at the family level (i.e., households), religious beliefs are considered as an important 
pillar of integrating family members, as the head of the household usually takes the major 
decisions.  In the case of social capital, the religious affiliation of the community has a strong 
influence, empowering the people. 
 Resilience was a foundational concept in the model to guide understanding of the 
underlying processes impacting individual, household, and community ability to access and 
effectively utilize a variety of societal, personal, and organizational assets.  The resilience 
perspective provides an understanding of the characteristics that contributed to the capacities to 
absorb, recuperate quickly, and transform after the flash floods.  Through the RPDR-AF model, 
the research was able to highlight areas of low resilience that may have been missed in 
approaches focused on a more limited set of recovery dimensions.  For example, many 
households indicated that they had struggled with issues of psychological trauma, access to 
available resources, and lack of knowledge on hazards.  In the given framework, it has been 
demonstrated that there are interactive and compounding influences among household capacity, 
social capital, and organizational capacity resiliencies and vulnerabilities that contribute to the 
post-disaster recovery process.  In contexts similar to the City of Jeddah, for instance, in 
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conservative Muslim countries, researchers may very well find similar empirical evidence.  
However, an important caveat is that the influence of these dimensions will likely vary in other 
socio-cultural systems and spatial locations.  
 Although other key authors have incorporated religion into their models, this model places 
the role of religion front and center.  The role of religion and its influence on the society of the 
study area was one of the main factors that contributed to the modification of this model.  The 
modified RPDR-AF suggests that the integration of religious leaders and organizational structures 
into disaster management planning could help minimize the impacts of future flash floods or other 
disaster events.   
 Building on these opportunities and experiences, the modified RPDR-AF can serve as a 
useful tool for facilitating an understanding of both the strengths and the challenges associated 
with increasing the resilience of post-disaster recovery and offered a new evaluative tool whereby 
recovery programming and outcomes were compared to an idealized conceptualization of resilient 
disaster recovery.  This framework models both the key dimensions undertaken to assess post-
disaster recovery as well as the study’s evaluation process.  It consists of 3 steps, assessment, 
analysis and processing and results (Figure 6.1).  
 The assessment of each affected community was focused on three main dimensions: 
household capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital.  The assessment was based on the 
collected and analyzed data, which were obtained through interviews with local residents and 
other key stakeholders in the zones affected by the Jeddah floods.  Municipal documents, inter-
ministerial responses, and contingency plans that were reviewed as secondary sources of 
information, along with other sources such as media and NGO reports.  The assessment process 
also incorporated input from decision-makers and implementers, those who were involved in 
ensuring sustainable development, and urban planners. 
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 The final framework model was refined and modified based on the empirical analysis of 
the case study and the research results.  Empirical analysis began with the development of a 
Likert scale assessment to undertake a review of the interview data and identify the pertinent 
sections of the interview recordings that needed translation from Arabic to English.  Once the 
Likert scale data had been incorporated into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, descriptive statistics 
were generated.  A visual representation of the data was provided through the use of graphs. For 
this research, drawing from the framework’s key themes, Likert scale measures were used for 
quantifying household participant answers in a more systematic manner in order to facilitate the 
analysis and discussion of the results.  The analysis afforded an opportunity to discover the 
advantages of these dimensions in the context of disaster recovery and to obtain insights with 
respect to the nature of the relationships among these dimensions in the context of the City of 
Jeddah.  
 Finally, the results drawn from the field case studies, interviews with households, key 
informants, the researcher’s observations, and secondary sources were organized according to the 
post-disaster recovery assessment framework.  Where appropriate, the findings have been 
summarized into bar graphs in order to provide a visual presentation of the data collected and 
information gathered.  Likewise, where possible, the data and related information were subdivided 
to represent the four selected areas in order to reveal a more nuanced picture for the creation of a 
resilient post-disaster recovery assessment framework.  
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Figure 6.1: Refined Resilient Post-Disaster Recovery Assessment Framework 
6.8 Research Challenges and Limitations  
 The conceptual RPDR-AF was used in this research for assessing the role of household 
capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital in resilient post-disaster recovery.  However, 
in this research, as in any human-related studies, challenges and limitations were encountered 
during the assessment of the overall recovery effort: 
1. Absence of baseline data or previous metrics due mainly to the lack of any previous 
detailed flash-flood research for the City of Jeddah: The researcher relied on as much 
limited data as was available to make meaningful comparisons and find connections 
between pre- and post-disaster conditions for a variety of stakeholders with a special focus 
on the three assessment dimensions.  Most information regarding pre-disaster conditions 
was based on the information provided the interviewees and key informants. 
2. Difficulties with the linkage between post-disaster conditions and recovery efforts using 
the RPDR-AF: The communities as a whole did receive relief aid and social assistance 
from several groups in the study area.  However, some people did not receive the relief 
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and assistance as they were not able to receive any assistance nor did they seek help from 
any group.  
3. The logistics of conducting the research was another challenge of the RDR-AF approach 
with regard to summarizing the information in a structured way so that a meaningful 
discussion could be undertaken and useful stakeholder recommendations provided.  The 
wide range of information needed required a considerable amount of time and effort in 
terms of background information on a given disaster, a thorough understanding of 
contextual information, including language, culture, and customs, and opinions and 
perceptions from a variety of actors at various scales.  
4. The terms and ideas associated with the RPDR-AF are virtually unknown in the Saudi 
Arabian context (e.g., lack of relevant Arabic literature, difficulties in translating the 
concept into local languages, lack of statements in official disaster preparedness 
documents, etc.).  
5.  Due to Saudi culture and traditions, I was not been able to interview women and obtain 
their perspectives. 
 
6.9 Summary 
 The role of religion and its influence on the society of the study area was one of the main 
factors that contributed to the modification of the RPDR-AF.  The results from this research 
places the role of religion front and center and suggests that the integration of religious leaders 
and organizational structures into disaster management planning could help minimize the 
impacts of future flash floods or other disaster events.  The role of religion in supporting the 
recovery efforts is a key finding of this research.   
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 The discussion in this chapter supports the assertion that prayers and worship practices 
were strong motivators in overall post-disaster response, and also delivered significant spiritual 
support for enhanced recovery and preparation for future disasters.  Religious leaders also 
contributed to resilience through their perceived roles as trustworthy individuals who provided 
emotional and psychological support that acted as spiritual healing for alleviating the trauma of 
the disaster.  It was also observed that due to some degree of political corruption, religious leaders 
held officials in authority accountable and responsible for working harder and more honestly to 
mitigate the impact of such disasters.  In addition, religious buildings such as masjids and jawami 
have been shown to be an element of the social capital of a community.  Along with their role in 
maintaining and raising morale and in increasing the level of faith, these facilities can also be used 
as relief and recovery hubs for activities such as collecting, distributing, and managing relief 
supplies, all of which can help ease the sadness and depression felt by the individuals affected. 
 This chapter has also highlighted the components of the refined framework, their 
empirical and methodological foundations, and the integration of three key dimensions.  The 
framework suggests the need for an in-depth understanding of a variety of contextual and 
intervention programs at various scales at different locations to compare scenarios.   
 Also highlighted in this chapter were the conceptual contributions of the research.  It was 
demonstrated that the empirical analysis and reflections on the research results contribute to a 
greater understanding and knowledge of post-disaster recovery, as well as the role of 
humanitarian relief organizations, religious institutions, and civil society organizations.  For 
example, the research findings have shown that religious faith and worship practices were 
observed to be important influential support factors during the post-disaster response and the 
creation of recovery strategies. 
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 Despite the current integration of government policies and decision-making systems with 
local, regional, and national disaster-management plans in the KSA, important key aspects remain 
excluded and could increase the resilience of Saudi communities.  For example, organizational 
capacity was apparent in the three stages of emergency management planning: awareness, 
response, and recovery.  However, this research recommends risk-reduction and disaster-
resilience improvement programs for the consideration of disaster-management stakeholders with 
respect to the creation of more comprehensive and detailed scenarios so that the City of Jeddah 
can sustainably, efficiently, and effectively confront any future flash floods. 
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Chapter 7: Recommendations, Future Research, and Conclusions 
 This empirical research was conducted using a field case-study, divided into 4 sites, and a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques.  A research comprised semi-structured 
interviews and informal conversation, was developed in order to acquire an understanding of the 
ways in which people recovered after the flash floods that damaged their local infrastructure, 
undermined their social networks, and interrupted their regular lifestyles.  This final chapter 
provides general and strategic recommendations to authorities for enhancing flood resilience and 
recovery in other Saudi communities at risk.  
 Based on the literature review conducted for this research, and building on the experience 
provided by the case study of the 2009 and 2011 flash floods that occurred in the City of Jeddah, 
KSA, the research identified current research gaps and emphasized the important roles of social 
capital, household capacity and organizational capacity in increasing community resilience for 
post-disaster recovery.  A preliminary framework derived from the extant literature was modified 
following the analysis of actual experiences acquired from the 2009 and 2011 flash floods in the 
City of Jeddah.  The RPDR-AF involves three key stages: 1) assessment, 2) analysis and 
processing, 3) results.    
 The objectives of this research were as follows: 1) Focusing on building resilience for 
post-disaster recovery in order to develop and test an evaluation framework that expressly 
incorporates religious dimensions, which have a significant impact on Saudi society; 2) Using 
the 2009 and 2011 flash flooding in Jeddah city as case study, to develop an assessment tool that 
incorporates factors and measures that contribute to evaluating the importance and the role of 
social capital to resilient post-disaster recovery, and to investigate how religion and religious 
leaders and institutions affected resilience and recovery during and after the two flash flood 
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events; and 3) Provide recommendations regarding the potential contribution of social capital 
and religion to the enhancement of Jeddah’s capacity to be more resilient to future flash flooding.  
 To meet Objective 1, an extensive literature review was undertaken and a preliminary 
framework was developed.  Following from the results of the empirical phase, the framework 
was then updated.  In order to achieve Objective 2, household capacity, organizational capacity, 
and social capital were the three main assessment dimensions used to evaluate the importance 
and role of social capital in resilient post-disaster recovery, and to investigate how religion 
contributed to resilience and recovery during and after the two flash flood events.  For Objective 
3, based on the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the results, the field investigations and the 
secondary data, recommendations were outlined in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.  Due to the 
increased frequency of such flooding events, it is becoming clear that future natural disasters are 
very likely to occur.  Given the results of this thesis, the incorporation of religion, religious 
leaders and institutions, and organizational capacities into effective disaster management is 
highly recommended.  
 The research results and findings support the effectiveness of the RPDR-AF.  The 
framework allows for a comprehensive analysis in the evaluation of post-disaster recovery 
processes in Jeddah and other Saudi communities and places the role of religion front and center 
within the concepts of household capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital.  Future 
work using the RPDR-AF model could include opportunities for researchers to further investigate 
the roles of government, community leadership, and religious affiliations with respect to building 
community resilience.  Other potential topics for investigation by future researchers could involve 
the goal of incorporating the important contribution of NGOs and CBOs in building citizen 
awareness and early preparedness programs, which are currently neither comprehensive nor well 
initiated and managed by relevant KSA authorities. 
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7.1 General Recommendations 
 For effective post-disaster recovery and implementation of future disaster-management 
plans in social contexts where religion is deeply embedded into the fabric of the society, it is 
highly recommended that religious leaders be involved at every stage of the planning and policy-
making process and that all developed processes and structures more fully incorporate religious 
leaders and organizational capacities into effective disaster management. 
 For the City of Jeddah, although some local offices had attempted to make earlier 
disaster-management plans, a lack of funding and of skilled human resources rendered these 
attempts ineffective.  In fact, prior to the 2009 flood, no professionally pre-arranged disaster 
management mechanisms had been put in place either by the government or non-government 
organizations.  Based on the findings and the analysis of the research results many deficiencies 
specific to the Saudi system of emergency management planning were demonstrated.  Despite 
these challenges, it was observed that people did receive relief aid and recovery assistance from 
the government, non-government organizations, and private entities.  The received aid was 
primarily undertaken by the central Saudi government launching generous recovery programs 
after the dramatic events of the 2011 flash flood.  Accordingly, local governments were then 
asked to start preparing emergency and disaster-management plans to withstand future events. 
 In light of the research findings, observations, and the positive opinions of key 
informants, which all underscored the need for a resilient post-disaster recovery assessment 
framework, recommendations are suggested for rectifying the current situation.  For example, 
local governments should start upgrading their emergency and disaster management plans so that 
they emphasize flash flood disaster management and resilient recovery.  Likewise, all 
government levels and their various agencies in charge of emergency and disaster-management 
plans should learn from the best practices and proven experience of other local and international 
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cities so that they can develop comprehensive disaster-management plans and maintain chains of 
command.  A similar recommendation is that governments put in place effective evacuation 
procedures and provision for temporary shelters.  The shelters would need to respect religious 
beliefs, social customs, and constraints on inter-gender interactions, and they should also provide 
sufficient and secured access to information.  
 Municipalities should also enforce proper building codes and land-use plans that should 
be respected and implemented at the community level, and they should also adopt effective 
oversight audits and inspections for identifying and preventing any irregularities, violations, and 
misconduct.  For example, an independent agency can be created which would have final 
approval authority for all proposed building and land use plans.  Another important initiative is 
the adoption by the civil defense authorities of a program integrated with those of other relevant 
government departments and non-governmental entities in order to raise and maintain public 
awareness through lectures, short workshops, interactive training sessions and through the 
publishing and distribution of educational brochures and booklets about risk awareness, that 
include considerations with respect to the status and needs of illegal immigrants.  Such a 
program should entail close collaboration with CBOs and, more particularly, local households. 
 The mapping of flash floods is another crucial aspect of prevention, rescue, and recovery.  
Civil Defense in cooperation with The Saudi Geological Survey (SGS) can accurately and 
clearly labeled directional evacuation maps should be made available to the community so that 
vulnerable individuals can confidently find their evacuation zones when necessary.  Viable 
coordination and joint operations between volunteers and the search and rescue authorities 
should be clarified prior to the occurrence of events with respect to the roles, responsibilities, and 
jurisdiction of each party, so that emergency evacuations can be conducted according to plan 
through  Makkah Area Crisis and Disaster Management Center (CDMC). 
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 In addition, because the role of the NGOs, CBOs, and religious organizations was proven 
to be crucial and highly beneficial, such organizations should be included in any emergency and 
disaster-management plans.  The inclusion of these organizations will promote a sense of 
confidence and trust that the recovery plan will work efficiently and effectively because it 
encourages the active participation of trustworthy local leaders and residents.  With respect to 
learning about crucial practices, it is recommended that schools and universities be encouraged 
to teach the basics of disaster management as part of their curriculum.  New funds can be 
provided to private educational institutions that can provide special training programs in how to 
deal with disasters, before, during, and after their occurrence.  The courses should incorporate 
disaster relief, recovery techniques, and flood drills, which will give people in the community the 
opportunity to find out about appropriate responses and their duties before a disaster occurs.  For 
those with less access to education, e.g., older men and women, knowledge can be spread 
through faith- and community-based organizations or women’s groups as a means of increasing 
preparedness and resilience levels.  CBOs and NGOs should also be formally empowered and 
supported by authorities with respect to training in emergency evacuation and recovery systems 
and techniques.  Similarly, local residents should be afforded clear and simplified avenues for 
filing any complaints with the appropriate authorities.  It is also highly recommended that local 
authorities provide special disaster and recovery training in advance so that senior citizens, in 
particular, will be able to respond according to prescribed procedures and rules governing 
disaster- and recovery-management plans.  Due to their social status and community-wide belief 
in their trustworthiness, such trained seniors could be crucial consultative stakeholders during 
disasters.  
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7.1.1 Strategic Recommendations 
 The analyzed empirical data provide a valuable and feasible source for deriving 
additional subject-specific recommendations and suggestions for the development of further 
policies for post-disaster management.  Decision-makers at different levels of authority and 
responsibility can use the results for building strategies and drawing up action plans according to 
their desired planning horizon, existing human resources, and available funds.  The following are 
possible examples:  
1. Define the most reliable sources of intervention and valuable support at local, regional, 
and national levels.  This step could lead to the identification of the nature, capacity, 
strengths, weaknesses, and value of local support and sponsorship, etc., and could also 
assist with budget projections for future events. 
2. Build a clear picture with respect to available local capacities, opportunities for 
improvement, and the development of strategies for more effective responses to future 
events.  For example, consider upgrading building codes and land use bylaws to 
incorporate more robust consideration of likely future hazards and risk mitigation 
strategies.  Resources might include government agencies, municipal authorities, local 
NGOs, and other civil society organizations. 
3. Use the results from this thesis as guidelines for building more comprehensive remedial 
strategies that will cost-effectively and efficiently integrate and synchronize the 
capacities and resources of various players in the event of local flooding and other natural 
disasters for more resilient post-disaster recovery operations. 
4. Explore best practices for employing smart technologies and other information 
communications technology (ICT) avenues for mitigating future risk and providing 
advanced alert systems for early preventive intervention (e.g., personal computers, digital 
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television, email, robots).  This measure will help with the development of more 
sustainable preventive and risk-reduction systems and practices.  
5. Develop ongoing community training hubs and promote the readiness of local volunteer 
and NGO groups through established organizations such as Scotts, the Red Crescent, and 
others.  The training could include tools such as a series of short workshops, online self-
learning courses, public campaigns, simulated drills, and informative and interactive 
sessions at educational and industrial institutions. 
6. Taking an all hazards approach, build a detailed historical database of past emergency 
events, supplemented by robust projections of the impacts likely from climate change.  
This information could be utilized by government and local authorities for the prediction 
of a variety of disaster scenarios.  Such a database would enable a determination of the 
best mitigation measures and remedial action, including a more practical expectation of 
the issues involved at various levels, the resources required, and the estimated budget 
allocations needed. 
7. Consider how meteorological techniques and analysis, along with empirical modeling, 
can be employed for measuring the intensity of floods and for determining their paths.  
The modeling could be utilized for creating awareness and alerting vulnerable people and 
areas in advance.  It would enable proactive preparation on the part of governments, 
communities, and other stakeholders, which would, in turn, increase resilience levels; 
mitigate casualties and damage; and enhance rescue, relief, restoration, and recovery 
operations. 
8.  Moving beyond the focus of the current project, explore ways that satellite images and 
geographic information systems can be used for establishing estimation algorithms that 
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incorporate consideration of spatial distribution and the monetary value of damage in 
impacted communities. 
7.2 Future Research  
 Based on the empirical analysis of the research results, field observations, information 
collected from the interviewees (household members, government officials, community leaders, 
and participating NGOs and CBOs), and the reflections of the researcher, there are more aspects 
that need to be addressed and studied further.  The study focused on improving the 
implementation of recovery planning and management strategies and increasing the knowledge 
and efficiency associated with the restoration, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of affected assets 
and areas.  Suggestions are therefore made for further research that would comprehensively build 
on the accomplishments of this study can include:    
1. Look at ways of using the contributions and experience of this research as a foundation 
for encouraging the continuous engagement and participation of local residents and 
community leaders for the enhanced management of future flash floods. 
2. Establish initiatives that would persuade related authorities to work progressively to 
educate vulnerable people (especially household members) in order to increase awareness 
and ensure a clear perception of risk reduction techniques and mitigation measures. 
3. Apply a multidisciplinary approach to integrating detailed aspects of policy development, 
technical tools and skills, social and economic dimensions, and other resilient post-
disaster recovery assessment parameters.  
4. Develop comprehensive quantitative damage- and cost-assessment tools and optimized 
decision-support systems for achieving better decisions related to flash flood warnings 
and dissemination systems: Such proposed systems could prove valuable for investigating 
and analyzing numerous hypothetical what-if pre- and post-disaster scenarios. 
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5. Future research could involve assessing the disaster resilience needs and perspectives of 
Saudi women.  
7.3 Conclusion 
 The main empirical contributions of this thesis work are mainly contributed to the choice 
of Jeddah for this research which makes everything about the empirical results unique.  There 
have not been any other post-disaster/resilience studies in Jeddah, the focus on the 2009/2011 
Jeddah floods, and the selection of the four studied communities.    
 The main theoretical contribution is the explicit inclusion of religion as one of the 
influential aspects in all dimensions of the RPDR-AF as the research findings have shown that 
religious faith and worship practices were observed to be important influential support factors 
during the post-disaster response and the creation of recovery strategies.  With regard to the 
methodological contributions, the research used standard social science research methods. 
 Like many countries, the KSA is now considered to be affected by recent challenges 
related to climate change, which include heavy rains that have the potential to cause flood 
disasters.  This study recommends taking into consideration the effect of climate change in the 
region and making necessary precautions in anticipation of future disasters. Based on historical 
data and the increased frequency of such events, such flooding is likely to continue.  For the City 
of Jeddah, this study contributes information about the socio-economic dimensions of flood risk 
that will be useful for flood risk analysis and water resources management decision-making.  The 
two flash flood events during 2009 and 2011 in the City of Jeddah were the most serious natural 
disasters in the history of that city and had a considerable effect on the people, civilian areas, and 
infrastructure. In the wake of the 2011 floods, the region witnessed similar events in 2015 when 
floods hit the western and northern parts of the kingdom and the civil defense announced the 
deaths of 12 people.  In November 2016 another 3 people have died as a result of severe floods 
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sweeping across the country.  The fatalities included 2 people who were struck by lightning in Al 
Qunfudhah, Makkah province (Flood List, 2016).  As a result, raising awareness of the risk of 
flash floods is urgently required.  This study was therefore undertaken in order to emphasize the 
importance of the role of household capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital in 
enhancing the resilience of post-disaster recovery processes in the City of Jeddah. 
 Local Saudi community and neighbourhood residents should also understand the 
importance of helping city authorities with the creation, implementation, and maintenance of 
emergency-management planning.  Communities should encourage one another to strictly follow 
and respect rules, building codes, land-use bylaws, and regulations so that future losses and 
damages can be minimized.  Education about building regulations and bylaws has also been 
found to be an important measure that can encourage people to be aware of the regulations and to 
stop violating them by building their homes in flood-prone areas.  
 The research results also indicate the important psychological and spiritual contribution 
of religious beliefs, and the role of imams and community seniors, who are regarded as 
trustworthy figures, with respect to increasing community bonding and elevating the levels of 
resilience and recovery during disasters.  This perspective offers evidence that faith-based 
interpretations of a disaster can provide spiritual resilience for the people affected.  Therefore, 
strengthening the sense of inclusion in a community and the feeling of ownership of public 
resources such as masajid, community halls, community centres, and recreational facilities is a 
very practical means of promoting the growth of local social capital. 
 The significant benefits of the developed RPDR-AF model are the integration of the 
concepts and detailed aspects of household capacity, organizational capacity, and social capital 
into an applied assessment framework.  Based on the research methodology, a wide range of 
issues and aspects that influence disaster management and the recovery processes were addressed 
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and analyzed.  The results of the research indicate the critical importance of incorporating all 
three concepts in an assessment of post-disaster recovery and in the creation of a strategic plan 
for long-term recovery.  The findings also reveal a strong correlation between the incorporation 
of the concepts in assessment and planning and the ability to ensure that the risk of potential 
future disasters can be reduced and their impact and damage mitigated.  The RPDR-AF was 
designed as an evaluation tool that can provide practical help with respect to establishing a 
conceptual assessment of the influence of long-term recovery efforts and plans.       
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APPENDIX 1 – Household Interview Question Guide 
Date ___________________ Location __________________________  
Oral Consent Obtained (Time): ____________________________________________________ 
Introduction Questions 
- Can you tell us a little bit about yourself (age, education level, occupation?) 
- Can you tell us a little bit about your household (i.e. other family members, who is head     
of family, education levels of other members) 
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- How long have you lived in your house? 
- Do you own or rent the house? 
Specific questions to 2009-2011 flash flood recovery 
Can you describe your experience during and after the 2009-2011 flash floods? 
- How did you know about the flash flood (media, family members, and friends)? 
- What was your experience during and right after the flash flood? What did you do? 
- Where did you live in the weeks/months following the disaster? 
- Where did you receive the assistance from? 
-           Were most people in this neighborhood are willing to help if you need it?  
-           How did you recover? Who helped your recovery? 
- How long did it take you to rebuild your house? 
- Did you wait for government funding before rebuilding your house or did you start  
 rebuilding with your own money/savings? 
- Did you ask for help to rebuild your house? 
-      What inspired you or gave you strength to recover after the flash flood disaster? 
- Do you feel that you have fully recovered from the event? If yes, at what point would you 
say that the recovery effort was finished? If not, what aspects of recovery are you continuing to 
work on? 
-           Have you undertaken any preparations or made any changes to your home to be ready for 
another flood? 
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APPENDIX 2 – Key Informant Interview Question Guide 
Date ___________________ Location __________________________  
Oral Consent Obtained (Time): ____________________________________________________ 
1) Do you belong to any social/community organizations? Can you talk a little bit about 
those organizations? 
2) Tell me about the people you helped in, do they were will connected? 
3) Thinking of the 2009 and 2011 recovery effort, would you describe it as successful? Why 
or why not?  
4) What do you think could have been done to make the recovery effort more successful? 
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5) Within the community, do you feel the aid was distributed fairly? 
6) Based on your experience with the response and recovery from the floods, what 
additional services or support do you think could be put into place to help the community 
better deal with any future events? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
